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THE  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  THE  HUGHES  COURT:
THE  RECENT  LITERATURE
Barry Cushman*
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR, MARIAN C. MCK-
ENNA (Fordham University Press 2002); THE HUGHES COURT: JUSTICES, RUL-
INGS, AND LEGACY, MICHAEL E. PARRISH (ABA-CLIO 2002); THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 1930–1941, WILLIAM G. ROSS (Uni-
versity of South Carolina Press 2007); BACKLASH: THE KILLING OF THE NEW
DEAL, ROBERT SHOGAN & IVAN R. DEE (2006); FDR V. THE CONSTITUTION:
THE COURT-PACKING FIGHT AND THE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRACY, BURT SOLOMON
(Walker & Company 2009).
The literature on the Supreme Court under the Chief Justiceship of
Charles Evans Hughes and the tumultuous events surrounding the struggle
over President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR’s) Court-packing plan in 1937 is
vast and varied.  The five recent monograph-length studies reviewed in this
Article to varying degrees build upon, synthesize, and offer original contribu-
tions to that considerable body of scholarship.  It is both difficult and hazard-
ous to generalize about such a substantial corpus of scholarly work, but the
antecedent literature has been grouped roughly into two types of accounts:
“externalist” and “internalist.”1  Externalist accounts tend to see a rather
sharp break in constitutional doctrine in the spring of 1937, and attribute
© 2014 Barry Cushman.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1 For an instructive overview of the literature’s development, see G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 13–32 (2000).  For classics of the externalist litera-
ture, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION (1938); EDWARD S. CORWIN, CON-
STITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY (1941); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN (1995);
ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE (1956); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERI-
CAN SUPREME COURT (1960); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES (1972);
BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1942).  For contri-
butions to the internalist literature, see, for example, BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE
NEW DEAL COURT (1998); WHITE, supra; Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other
Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1891 (1994).
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that sudden change to the influence of exogenous factors such as the threat
of the Court-packing plan or the impression made on the Justices by FDR’s
landslide re-election in 1936.2  Internalist accounts tend to see the change in
constitutional doctrine as more gradual and spread out over a longer period
of time, and to emphasize the importance of presidential appointments to
the Court in pushing doctrinal development along or in new directions.
Such accounts attribute the greater success of later New Deal initiatives
before the Court to legal factors such as improved constitutional conceptual-
ization at the stages of legislative drafting, test case selection, and briefing
and argument.  Externalist accounts tend to view the constitutional doctrine
of the period as more open-textured and attribute the selection among avail-
able doctrines (and thus case outcomes) to the political, economic, and
social preferences or ideological commitments of the Justices.  Internalist
accounts tend to note evidence and patterns of judicial performance that are
incompatible with this view, and instead tend to see the Justices as experienc-
ing constitutional doctrine as an independent constraint on their extra-legal
preferences.  Externalist accounts tend to present the Justices as the moving
parts in the story, and the relevant changes as the changes in the Justices’
positions.  Internalist accounts tend, by contrast, to emphasize adaptations by
Congress and administration lawyers—made in light of the Court’s decisions
invalidating portions of the early New Deal—that enabled them to accommo-
date their regulatory objectives within the Court’s evolving body of doctrine.
I want to underscore, as have scholars with perspectives as diverse as
those of Professors Richard Friedman,3 Laura Kalman,4 Mark Tushnet,5 and
G. Edward White,6 that this rough taxonomy can be misunderstood, and can
obscure important commonalities.  These terms are not best understood as
denoting a stark, mutually exclusive dichotomy.  Instead, they are best under-
stood as locating explanations along a spectrum, with externalists attributing
less importance to internal legal factors, and internalists ascribing less impor-
tance to certain exogenous, extralegal factors.  Externalists do not deny that
legal ideas sometimes operated as constraints on judicial behavior, and
internalists do not deny that some external factors were sometimes relevant
to constitutional adjudication.  The disputed terrain is over which factors
were relevant, how much constraint and how much influence each of these
factors brought to bear on the Justices, and the relationships among those
factors.
2 This paragraph and the next draw upon this author’s previous work. See Barry
Cushman, The Man on the Flying Trapeze, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 211–12 (2012) (review-
ing JEFF SHESOL, SUPREME POWER (2010)).
3 See Richard D. Friedman, . . . A Rendezvous with Kreplach: Putting the New Deal Court in
Context, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 453, 455 (2002) (reviewing WHITE, supra note 1). R
4 See Laura Kalman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and the New Deal, 110 AM. HIST.
REV. 1052, 1074–75 (2005).
5 See Mark Tushnet, The New Deal Constitutional Revolution: Law, Politics, or What?, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1999) (reviewing CUSHMAN, supra note 1). R
6 See G. Edward White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal: The Internalist/Externalist
Debate, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1094 (2005).
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For example, in my own “internalist” work, I have incorporated a range
of factors external to the law into my efforts to explain constitutional devel-
opment in this period: free labor ideology;7 changes in unemployment and
understandings of its causes;8 changes in the structure of the labor market;9
changes in cultural perceptions of and self-conceptions of portions of the
labor movement;10 reactions to the experience of the World War and its
aftermath;11 the onset of an economic depression;12 developments in eco-
nomic integration;13 the wave of sit-down strikes in 1936 and 1937;14 and
personnel changes on the Court, which are due to presidential appointments
made for political reasons and as a result of political victories in presidential
elections.15  At the same time, I have attempted to show the ways in which law
shaped and channeled political activity into prescribed legal forms, and how
such political activity, so channeled, reconfigured the legal landscape from
the inside.16  The debates among internalists and externalists therefore are
not about whether law is related to politics and other aspects of social experi-
ence.  Everyone agrees that it is.  The debate is instead about how law was
related to such variables in a particular chapter in American legal and consti-
tutional history.
It is thus a mistake to see internalist accounts as resting upon a theory of
law that posits the autonomy of law from politics.  To be sure, some Marxist
and Critical Legal scholars have remarked upon the “relative autonomy” of
law from politics,17 and their views have been influential in the development
7 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 6, 90, 107, 139. R
8 See id. at 90–91, 116–17.
9 See id.
10 See id. at 115, 120–21.
11 See id. at 119–20, 123–24.
12 See id. at 90–91, 117.
13 See id. at 217–21.
14 See id. at 168, 237 n.156.
15 See id. at 208, 224–25.
16 See id. at 7, 133, 162–207. See generally Barry Cushman, The Hughes Court and Consti-
tutional Consultation, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 79 (1998) (discussing instances in which the
Hughes Court cooperated with the political branches to formulate solutions for the eco-
nomic crisis of the 1930s).
17 See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 25 (1974) (“[T]he fashionable
relegation of law to the rank of a superstructural and derivative phenomenon obscures the
degree of autonomy it creates for itself.”); E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 262 (1975)
(arguing that the law is “something more” than “a pliant medium to be twisted this way and
that by whichever interests already possess effective power,” but instead “has its own charac-
teristics, its own independent history and logic of evolution”); Robert W. Gordon, Critical
Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 101 (1984) (“[L]egal forms and practices don’t shift
with every realignment of the balance of political forces.  They tend to become embedded
in ‘relatively autonomous’ structures that transcend and, to some extent, help to shape the
content of the immediate self-interest of social groups.”); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an
Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America,
1850–1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3, 4–5 (1980) (urging recognition of “the existence of legal
consciousness as an entity with a measure of autonomy” and defining “legal consciousness”
as “a set of concepts and intellectual operations that evolves according to a pattern of its
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of some internalist thinking.18  But it would be an error to view the internal-
ist project as an effort to defend the normative or jurisprudential tenets of,
say, the Legal Process School.19  Internalism is not inherently a normative or
jurisprudential position—it is instead an historiographical approach.
Indeed, to the extent that it has any jurisprudential association, internalism
may be best understood as a species of legal realism that emphasizes an often-
neglected social fact about the past: that at least some, if not most Justices
have experienced legal ideas and legal materials as restraints on the imple-
mentation of their own policy preferences through judicial action.
Let me illustrate this phenomenon with a few examples from the period.
One commonly associates the divergence of judicial action from policy pref-
erences with Justice Holmes, who believed that a good deal of the social legis-
lation he voted to uphold was humbug.20  But there are many other instances
of such role differentiation among Justices who served on the Court during
the Lochner and New Deal eras.  For example, when future Justice Edward
Douglas White was representing Louisiana in the United States Senate in
1892, he delivered a lengthy speech in opposition to the “Hatch Anti-Option
Bill.”21  That bill would have imposed prohibitively high excise taxes on
options contracts concerning certain enumerated agricultural commodi-
ties.22  During that speech Senator White maintained that the 1886 federal
statute imposing an excise tax of two cents per pound on colored oleomarga-
rine23 had been “objectively” constitutional, as on its face it appeared to be
own . . . [and] the body of ideas through which lawyers experience legal issues,” which
“exercises an influence on results distinguishable from those of political power and eco-
nomic interest”).  Professor Gordon maintains that, as a result of this “relative autonomy,”
legal forms and practices can’t be explained completely by reference to external political/
social/economic factors.  Gordon, supra, at 101.  “To some extent they are independent
variables in social experience and therefore they require study elaborating their peculiar
internal structures . . . .” Id.; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI-
CAN LAW, 1780–1860, at xiii (1977) (considering law as “autonomous”); MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 249–51 (1987) (detailing the “relative autonomy” of
law); Gordon, supra, at 88–90 (explaining the “disengagement” of law and politics); Mark
V. Tushnet, Perspectives on the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman’s “A
History of American Law,” 1977 WIS. L. REV. 81, 83 (book review) (criticizing Friedman’s
“pluralist, materialist perspective”).  Marxist and Critical Legal scholars are not alone in
embracing such ideas. See, e.g., FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAIS-
SANCE 18 (1901) (“[T]aught law is tough law.”); ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF
AMERICAN LAW 82 (1938) (meditating on the “[t]enacity of a taught legal tradition”).
18 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 40–41. R
19 See, e.g., Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 2189
(1999) (suggesting such a connection).
20 This and the following four paragraphs draw on this author’s previous work. See
Barry Cushman, The Structure of Classical Public Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1917, 1920–24
(2008) (reviewing DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT
(2006)).
21 See 23 CONG. REC. 6513–20 (1892).
22 See id. at 5071.
23 Oleomargarine Act of 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209, 210.
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designed to raise revenue, but “subjectively unconstitutional,” because it was
in fact designed not to raise revenue but instead to regulate a matter reserved
to the several states.24  White insisted that as a Senator he “would not vote for
a dishonest bill raising revenue,” but conceded that if he were “a judge and
the bill came to me, then having passed out of this sphere and into another
sphere where motives could not enter, I should say the sole question
presented to me was, does it raise revenue on its face, and, if so, I would hold
it constitutional.”25
White passed into that other sphere in 1894, when he was appointed to
the Supreme Court by President Cleveland.  In 1902, Congress amended the
1886 statute to raise the excise on colored oleomargarine from two to ten
cents per pound.26  The 1886 bill, in its original form, similarly had imposed
a ten cent per pound excise,27 a tax White had characterized as “prohibitive”
in the Anti-Option Bill debate.28  The constitutionality of the amended stat-
ute was challenged in McCray v. United States.29  As he had suggested he
would on the Senate floor in 1892, now-Justice White wrote for the majority
upholding the tax.  In an opinion laced with expressions of concern over the
possibility of “judicial usurpation” eliminating “the entire distinction between
the legislative, judicial and executive departments of the government, upon
which our system is founded,”30 White rejected the contention “that the judi-
ciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a
wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.”31  Though
White believed that the statute was subjectively unconstitutional, and would
have voted against it for that reason as a Senator, his conception of the judi-
cial role prevented him from vindicating that conviction in his capacity as a
Justice.
Consider next an instance involving Justice Mahlon Pitney.  Section 10
of the Erdman Act of 1898 prohibited interstate carriers from requiring their
employees, or any person seeking employment, as a condition of employ-
ment to enter into an agreement not to become or remain a member of a
labor organization (a so-called “yellow-dog contract”).32  That section further
prohibited carriers from threatening any employee with loss of employment
or discriminating against any employee because of his union membership.33
During the debates on the bill, no member of either house of Congress sug-
gested that this provision was unconstitutional,34 and Pitney, who was then a
24 23 CONG. REC. 6518 (1892).
25 Id. at 6519.
26 Oleomargarine Act of 1902, ch. 784, 32 Stat. 193, 194.
27 17 CONG. REC. 4911 (1886).
28 23 CONG. REC. 6518 (1892).
29 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
30 Id. at 54.
31 Id. at 56.
32 Erdman Act of 1898, ch. 370, § 10, 30 Stat. 424, 428.
33 Id.
34 For the legislative history, see S. REP. NO. 55-591, at 1–4 (1898); H. REP. NO. 55-454,
at 1–3 (1898); 31 CONG. REC. 74–5566 (1897–1898).
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Representative from New Jersey, voted to enact the bill.35  In 1908, the
Supreme Court invalidated section 10 as an infringement of the liberty of
contract guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment in Adair v. United States.36
Pitney was appointed to the Supreme Court by President Taft in 1912.  In
1915, the Court heard Coppage v. Kansas, which reviewed the conviction of a
supervisor for the St. Louis and San Francisco Railway Company for violating
a Kansas statute prohibiting employers from requiring their employees to
sign yellow-dog contracts.37  Now-Justice Pitney wrote the majority opinion
holding that Coppage “cannot be distinguished from Adair v. United States,”
and that the Kansas statute therefore deprived employer and employee of the
liberty of contract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.38
The case of United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.39 is particularly
revealing.  The Court had established in United States v. E.C. Knight Co.40 that
the federal commerce power, and hence the Sherman Antitrust Act, did not
reach corporate consolidation in the manufacturing sector in the absence of
a showing of intent to restrain interstate commerce.41  Subsequent cases
demonstrated that the same limiting principle also covered attempts to use
the Sherman Act to enjoin or penalize labor strikes, boycotts, and distur-
bances at manufacturing establishments.42 Coronado Coal was such a case.
The Court unanimously reversed the Sherman Act judgment against the
union that the company had secured below, holding that “[c]oal mining is
not interstate commerce, and the power of Congress does not extend to its
regulation as such.”43  Yet Chief Justice Taft’s opinion for the Court made no
effort to conceal his discomfort with the result he understood the law to
require.  “The circumstances,” Taft wrote, which had involved both homicide
and arson committed by union members, “are such as to awaken regret that,
in our view of the federal jurisdiction, we cannot affirm the judgment.”44
Justice Day wrote on his return of Taft’s circulated opinion, “I agree, and
regret that this gross outrage by the local union cannot be reached by federal
35 31 CONG. REC. 5053 (1898).
36 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908).
37 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
38 Id. at 6–7, 13.
39 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
40 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
41 See id. at 17 (noting that an indirect effect on commerce “was not enough to entitle
complainants to a decree”).
42 See, e.g., Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107 (1933) (finding that
the aim of a labor strike among New York steelworkers was “not for the purpose of affect-
ing the sale or transit of materials in interstate commerce”); United Leather Workers v.
Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 471 (1924) (finding that a leatherworking
union’s picketing campaign was an “indirect and remote obstruction” to interstate
commerce).
43 Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 407.
44 Id. at 413.
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authority.”45  Justice McReynolds, on his return, wrote, “I am sorry you can’t
make the scoundrels pay.”46  Justice Pitney quipped, “Too true to be good.”47
Such instances were commonplace during the New Deal.  Justices Stone
and Brandeis each disapproved of the first Agricultural Adjustment Act
(AAA),48 yet they voted to uphold it.49  Stone’s policy preferences ran against
both the Railroad Retirement Act of 193450 and the administration’s legisla-
tion abrogating the gold clause,51 yet he voted to uphold each statute.52  Sim-
ilarly, Brandeis opposed the gold clause legislation yet voted to uphold it;53
45 William Howard Taft, 1922 Pres. Papers, Reel 615.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).  For the Justices’ disapproval of the Act, see
PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 140 (1982) (describing the report of Thomas
Reed Powell to Felix Frankfurter in November of 1933 that Brandeis was “very strongly
opposed” to much of the AAA); MASON, supra note 1, at 416 (quoting a letter dated Janu- R
ary 9, 1936 from Stone to Charles C. Burlingham in which Stone insisted, “You do not
dislike the AAA any more than I do”); MARIAN C. MCKENNA, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE
GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL WAR 128 (2002) (noting that “Justice Stone disliked the AAA and
said he would not have voted for it” and that “Justice Brandeis also disliked the AAA”);
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 139–43 (1982) (“Bran-
deis formulated a powerful argument against what he viewed as the bigness of the AAA.”);
LEWIS J. PAPER, BRANDEIS 345–47 (1983) (noting that Brandeis “repeatedly warned” mem-
bers of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration “that they were going down the wrong
path”); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 162 (1981)
(reporting that Brandeis wrote to his daughter in April of 1934 that he saw “little to be
joyous about in the new Deal measures most talked about; NRA and AAA seem to be going
from bad to worse”); Allison Dunham, Mr. Chief Justice Stone, in MR. JUSTICE 229, 231
(Allison Dunham & Phillip B. Kurland eds., 1964) (“Stone regarded [the AAA] as so bad
that, even four years later when I first came to know him, he would talk about it in scathing
terms.”).
49 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78–88 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the AAA should be upheld as a lawful exercise of congressional taxing power).
50 Pub. L. No. 73-485, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934).
51 H.R.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong., 48 Stat. 112 (1933) (containing what is known as the
gold clause legislation).  For details of Stone’s policy preferences concerning these laws,
see MASON, supra note 1, at 393 (quoting a May 9, 1935 letter from Stone to Felix Frank- R
furter: “If I had been a member of Congress . . . I am certain I should have voted against
[the Railroad Retirement Act]”); id. at 390 (noting that Stone was “sorely troubled” by the
abrogation of the gold clause); Dunham, supra note 48, at 231 (reporting that Stone was R
“so incensed” that “he proposed never again to purchase government bonds”).
52 See R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 392 (1935) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)
(noting Justice Stone’s vote to uphold the Railroad Retirement Act); Nortz v. United
States, 294 U.S. 317, 330 (1935) (upholding the gold clause legislation); Norman v. Balt. &
Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935) (upholding the gold clause legislation).
53 See PAPER, supra note 48, at 346 (“Brandeis put aside his personal feelings and sup- R
ported the majority decision that left the government’s policy intact.”); Interview by Wil-
liam J. Marshall with Paul A. Freund (Oct. 18, 1982) (noting that Brandeis joined the
majority opinion upholding the constitutionality of the gold clause “without enthusiasm”),
available at http://nyx.uky.edu/oh/render.php?cachefile=1982OH138_Reed18_Freund
.xml.
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and though he strongly supported the objectives of the Frazier-Lemke Farm
Debt Relief Act of 1934,54 he wrote the unanimous opinion striking it
down.55  Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, recorded in his
diary that he had spoken with Justice Roberts at a dinner party shortly after
the Court had rendered its eight-to-one decision in Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan56 (the “Hot Oil Case”) invalidating certain provisions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).  Ickes’s diary reveals that on that occasion
Justice Roberts (who had voted with the majority) “assured me that he is
entirely sympathetic with what we are trying to do in the oil matter and that
he hoped we would pass a statute that would enable us to carry out our
policy.”57
These examples offer a corrective to suggestions that there was always a
plausible legal theory available to sustain any result in a constitutional case
that came before the Court, and therefore the Justices must have resorted to
some extra-legal consideration to select from among the available legal theo-
ries.58  It is true that, in any case that was presented to the Court, there were
losing arguments that one of the litigants thought sufficiently plausible to
warrant the financing of appellate litigation.  In cases in which the Court
reversed a lower court, there were in addition other judges who were per-
suaded by the legal arguments of the losing party.  And in cases involving a
grant of certiorari, which became increasingly common after 1925, there
were at least four Justices who believed that the case was worth hearing.  But
the fact that other legal thinkers regarded a legal argument as respectable or
even persuasive by no means implies that any particular Justice, after develop-
ing views concerning constitutional law and the role of the judiciary over the
course of a long professional career, found himself in intellectual equipoise
as between the legal arguments offered in a particular case.  Indeed, the fact
that Justices with such divergent views on issues of social policy so frequently
reached unanimous decisions59 belies the notion that they experienced the
applicable law as so radically indeterminate.
The illustrations that I have offered are especially revealing in this
regard because, with the exception of Coronado Coal and Radford, each of
these cases was decided by a divided Court.  It was not merely the case that a
54 Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934).
55 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935) (hold-
ing that the Act violated the Fifth Amendment by taking private property without just com-
pensation); PAPER, supra note 48, at 350 (noting that despite Brandeis’s sympathy toward R
providing debt relief for farmers, he “could not get around the fact that [the Act] simply
cut off the rights of the person holding the mortgage”).
56 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
57 1 HAROLD L. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES 273 (1953).
58 For a collection of a multitude of cases in which “conservative” Justices voted for
“liberal” outcomes, see Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV.
559 (1997).
59 Eighty-five percent of the cases the Court adjudicated between 1930 and 1934 were
decided by a unanimous vote. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF CHARLES
EVAN HUGHES, 1930–1941, at 54 (2007).
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legal argument congruent with the Justice’s policy preferences had been
made by one of the litigants; in these cases, that argument had been accepted
by one or more colleagues on the Court.  And yet in each of these cases the
Justice in question resisted the temptation to join colleagues who were voting
his policy preferences because he experienced the constraint of a legal
idea.60
The balance of this Article is devoted, after a fashion, to an exploration
of the extent to which the recent literature on the Hughes Court seeks to
incorporate the internal point of view.  In Part I, I seek to identify the histori-
ographical premises undergirding each author’s treatment of the subject.  In
Part II, I explore how those historiographical premises are reflected in each
author’s treatment of the substantive development of constitutional doctrine
during the period.  In Part III, I examine the ways in which those histori-
ographical premises inform each author’s analysis of the causal forces driving
that doctrinal development.  Part IV concludes.
I. THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL POSTURE
A. Shogan and Solomon
The foundational premise of Mr. Solomon’s account of the Hughes
Court is that this is most emphatically not a story about law.  Mr. Solomon’s
understanding of the judicial process is one in which a Justice is nearly always
confronted with precedents adequate to support any result in the case before
him, and that the Justice therefore must decide the case on the basis of crite-
ria external to the law.  As Mr. Solomon puts it, “A judge typically had prece-
dent to rely on, yet that was only the beginning of the path toward a decision.
As Cardozo had once explained, a judge’s initial choice was whether to
invoke precedent or to ignore it, if departing from precedent was necessary
to satisfy society’s needs.”61  Even “a judge who determined to follow prece-
dent often faced a choice of precedents, each credible on its face, requiring
decisions about which to apply and which to pass by.  The outcome was ordi-
narily far from obvious, as the frequency of the Court’s split decisions
suggested.”62
“Over the years,” he continues, “introspective jurists have reached a strik-
ingly similar conclusion describing a process that has little to do with the
intellect.”63  In support of this he quotes Judge Posner as saying “‘[t]here is
nothing on which to draw to decide constitutional cases of any novelty other
than discretionary judgment,’”64 and as “marveling at ‘the essentially per-
sonal, subjective, and indeed arbitrary character of most [Justices’] constitu-
tional decisions.’”65  And what is it that informs this discretionary judgment?
60 For elaboration of this point, see Cushman, supra note 20, at 1924–27. R




65 Id. (alteration in original).
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Typically, Mr. Solomon tells us, “it is life experience that has seemed to shape
a justice’s philosophy of the law.”66
“The words of the Constitution are so unrestricted by their intrinsic meaning
or by their history or by tradition or by prior decisions,” [Felix] Frankfurter
[once] explained, “that they leave the individual justice free, if indeed, they
do not compel him, to gather meaning not from reading the Constitution
but from reading life.”67
Such a life-informed “ideology, really—of the law” provided a Justice with a
“short cut” to a judicial result.68  So, for example, it was “John Marshall’s
presence at Valley Forge in the desperate winter of 1777–78, as General
Washington begged the states to rescue his ragged army because the Conti-
nental Congress lacked the authority to compel them[ that] made him a
believer in a strong central government.”69  “Oliver Wendell Holmes had
placed his faith in elected legislatures . . . .”70  And as a result of “[l]iving on
the frontier,” the Four Horsemen “trusted in laissez-faire and perceived it as
woven into the Constitution.”71
For both Mr. Solomon and Mr. Shogan, therefore, the constitutional
clash of the New Deal was essentially a contest between two competing
schools of political economy: laissez-faire and the national welfare state.  Con-
stitutional doctrine was simply the idiom in which these ideological views
were expressed, and the terms in which they were debated.  Mr. Solomon’s
account of American constitutional history is an exemplar of unrecon-
structed Progressive historiography, in which judges wielded doctrines in the
service of their extra-legal preferences.  “In the 1880s and 1890s,” he relates,
“federal judges began to overturn hundreds of state laws, those that con-
trolled railroad rates and the like, and by century’s end the High Court was
doing the same.  With pride of purpose, the justices struck down the laws
they did not like.”72  Mr. Solomon includes on this list the federal income tax
invalidated in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.73 in 1895 and “the child
labor law in 1913.”74  One assumes that here he means the Court’s 1918 deci-
sion in Hammer v. Dagenhart75 invalidating the Keating-Owen Child Labor
Law of 1916,76 for the Court actually upheld the Illinois Child Labor Law
against a constitutional challenge in 1913.77  But it was the Court’s 1905 deci-







72 Id. at 44.
73 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
74 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 44. R
75 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
76 Pub. L. No. 64-249, 39 Stat. 675 (1916).
77 See Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325–26 (1913).
78 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a maximum-hour law for bakers).
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Amendment,” that truly initiated an “era of laissez-faire jurisprudence, in
which it was no longer considered the proper business of government to tell
business what to do unless it involved a state’s narrowly defined ‘police
power’ to assure its citizens’ safety and health.”79  “During [Theodore
Roosevelt’s] presidency,” we learn, “the Court’s Lochner decision locked the
nation into supporting laissez-faire policies.”80  In doing this, the Court “was
only embodying the ethos of the age, reflecting what the body politic seemed
to want.  Decades of Republican presidents who believed in laissez-faire had
assured this by appointing justices who accepted the principles of capitalism
as their own.  They obeyed the wisdom” proffered by Finley Peter Dunne’s
fictional Mr. Dooley that “ ‘th’ Supreme Court follows th’ illiction returns.’”81
And so, Mr. Solomon tells us,
The Court made itself into the champion—indeed, the protector—of
laissez-faire.  The justices’ approach to the Constitution was more than a pas-
sive matter of interpretation.  They saw in the Constitution what they wanted
to see.  They believed in a world in which property was sacrosanct, economic
regulation was taboo, and the survival of the fittest—social Darwinism—was
a nation’s natural route to prosperity and power.82
“Having openly taken sides, the Court laid the legal foundations that estab-
lished laissez-faire as the nation’s guiding doctrine—treating Adam Smith’s
economic views, a later justice would write, ‘as though the Framers had
enshrined them in the Constitution.’”83  During the 1920s, Chief Justice Wil-
liam Howard Taft “and his majority of conservatives treated property rights as
beyond the reach of democracy’s experimentation.”84  “[O]n the bench, Taft
was unabashed in taking property’s side.”85  And perhaps inadvertently, Mr.
Solomon appears to suggest that there was even something faintly fascistic
about all of this.  The new Supreme Court building, designed under Taft and
completed under Hughes, “employed a special police force answering only to
the Court.  Alone among the lawmen in Washington, its members sported a
Sam Browne belt, with its leather shoulder strap, such as Hitler favored.”86
Mr. Shogan similarly sees the Court’s decisions as giving “tangible
expression” to “America’s middle-class tradition with its inherent respect for
property, attachment to the established order of things, and mistrust of gov-
ernment.”87  The Justices’ “deep-rooted devotion to laissez-faire economic
79 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 43.  Curiously, Mr. Solomon counts as other manifesta- R
tions of “laissez-faire jurisprudence” the Court’s decisions in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), both of which actu-
ally upheld Louisiana statutes against charges that they violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 43. R
80 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 133. R
81 Id. at 43–44.
82 Id. at 44.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 147.
86 Id. at 45.
87 ROBERT SHOGAN, BACKLASH: THE KILLING OF THE NEW DEAL 9 (2006).
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doctrines” was “troubling,” even “threatening to the president” “in the face of
the New Deal’s penchant for economic planning.”88  “The role of the
Supreme Court in defending the supremacy of individualism and of free
enterprise, in the face of grave inequities, had made the Court the natural
enemy of the New Deal.”89
For Mr. Solomon, then, the central question presented in the great con-
stitutional cases litigated before the Hughes Court was whether this laissez-
faire, Social Darwinist, property-protective ideology would continue to reign.
As he puts it,
Something . . . of grave importance was at stake—the sort of nation that
the world’s oldest constitutional democracy was to become.  Would it remain
the land of laissez-faire, in which the corporate interest was treated as tanta-
mount to the national interest, or should the national government be
allowed to champion the majority’s needs?  Which would rule: property, or,
as in the opening words of the Constitution, ‘We, the People’?90
The conceptualization of the conflict in these terms leads both Mr. Solo-
mon and Mr. Shogan persistently to categorize the Justices’ decisions in the
terminology of political taxonomy.  They were either “liberal” or “conserva-
tive.”91  “The justices,” Mr. Solomon tells us,
had formed themselves into two competing cliques that began as ideological
in nature and then became personal.  The three reliably liberal justices—
Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo—often left the courtroom together, in smil-
ing conversation, and they met every week at Brandeis’s apartment on Friday
afternoon to prepare for the Saturday conference.92
On the other hand, “[t]wo of the steadiest conservatives, Van Devanter
and Pierce Butler, liked to share a round of golf on Sundays at Burning Tree
Country Club, past the Maryland line.  And all four of them, including James
McReynolds, ordinarily rode together home from the Court in Justice Suther-
land’s machine.”93  Mr. Shogan also views Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo as
88 Id. at 9, 13.
89 Id. at 9.
90 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 6. R
91 E.g., id. at 45, 49, 51, 53, 69, 79, 81, 157, 158, 160, 201.
92 Id. at 49.
93 Id.  There is reason to doubt claims that the Four Horsemen and the Three Muske-
teers held such meetings to coordinate strategy. See Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. et al., A Personal
View of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo: Recollections of Four Cardozo Law Clerks, 1 CARDOZO L. REV.
5, 9 (1979) (noting that Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. claimed such caucuses took place).  Cardozo’s
clerks for the 1933, 1934, and 1935 terms, Ambrose Doskow and Alan Stroock, maintained
that to the best of their knowledge there was no such liberal caucus during their tenures. 
See id. at 18, 21.  Similarly, the memoir of John Knox, McReynolds’s clerk during the 1936
term, does not support Rauh’s recollection, id. at 9, that the Four Horsemen held regular
caucuses as they drove to and from the Court building on argument and conference days.
See, e.g., JOHN KNOX, THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNOX 92–93, 115, 145, 151, 179,
205, 221 (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow eds., 2002) (describing instances in
which Justice McReynolds drove to the Court either alone, with Knox, or perhaps with his
messenger, Harry Parker).
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“liberals,” while “the Four Horsemen of Reaction” were “conservatives.”94
Stone was “the least dependably liberal of the liberals,”95 while Cardozo
“defended New Deal measures as vigorously as the Four Horsemen attacked
them.”96
Mr. Solomon portrays McReynolds as “an unbending conservative,”97
while Mr. Shogan casts him as the “archest of the archconservatives.”98  But-
ler shared McReynolds’s “judicial philosophy,” Mr. Shogan tells us, “and to a
degree his personal predilections.”99  And “Justice Butler’s performance
matched expectations.  He was, as Justice Holmes termed him, a ‘monolith’
in his opposition to any regulation of business.”100  Interestingly, Mr. Solo-
mon characterizes Butler as “the Court’s only Catholic—in every way a con-
servative.”101  Van Devanter and Sutherland were “similarly dedicated to the
sanctity of free-market economics,” Mr. Shogan explains.102  Van Devanter
“believed in property rights, private enterprise, and the principle of the less
government, the better.”103  His “subtle skills as a negotiator eased the path
to conservative rulings.”104  Mr. Solomon agrees that “[l]iving on the frontier
shaped the Four Horsemen’s faith in laissez-faire.”105  He argues that Van
Devanter’s “values were largely rooted in the past, faithful to a frontiersman’s
laissez-faire”106 and adds that Sutherland was a “devotee” of “social Darwin-
ism.”107  “Early on,” Mr. Shogan relates,
[Sutherland] came to believe that the U.S. Constitution was divinely inspired
and that government power must be severely restricted to preserve individ-
ual liberty and economic expansion.  As U.S. Senator from Utah he modi-
fied his conservative instincts enough to back Theodore Roosevelt’s
economic reforms, but he opposed the constitutional amendment establish-
ing the federal income tax.108
He was known for his “dedication to conservatism.  He fought the New Deal
every step of the way, claiming that only ‘self-denial and painful effort’ could
solve the problems of the depression.”109  On Mr. Solomon’s analysis, Van
Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler “had found their fortunes on the western
frontier, not as rugged individualists but as lawyers for the railroads or other
94 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 24, 163, 165. R
95 Id. at 166.
96 Id. at 165.
97 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 157. R
98 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 77.
99 Id. at 163.
100 Id. at 164.
101 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 81. R
102 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 164. R
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 213. R
106 Id. at 195.
107 Id. at 159.
108 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 164–65. R
109 Id. at 165.
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corporations,”110 while McReynolds, “to the Wilsonian progressives’ horror,
[had] revealed himself as business’s dearest friend.”111  The Four Horsemen
thus were “imbued with an unquestioned faith in laissez-faire economics,”112
and together they comprised “the Court’s laissez-faire bloc.”113  “The hostility
between the liberals and the conservatives betrayed itself in open court when-
ever the justices wrestled over the constitutional provocations of the New
Deal.”114
“More or less in the center of the Court, along with the chief justice, was
Justice Owen J. Roberts,”115 whom Mr. Shogan reports was considered “more
or less of a middle-of-the-roader.”116  He was “the Court’s youngest member
and the most ambiguous in ideological terms.”117  Along with Hughes “he
shifted back and forth between the Four Horsemen of the right and the
three liberals to establish the majority on any given case of importance.”118
Mr. Solomon regards Roberts as the “least reliable of the Court’s conserva-
tives,”119 agreeing that of all of the Justices, he was “in his philosophy of
jurisprudence, the least formed.”120  Roberts was, Mr. Solomon relates, “far
from the most brilliant man on the Court . . . . He was an ordinary man, at
best, among the justices.”121  He “had developed no original conception of
the Constitution or even a consistent view of the law.  He was known, above
all, for inconsistency.”122  As a consequence, Roberts was “the Court’s least
predictable justice.”123  “[A]s to precisely what Roberts would support, in a
particular case, no one could ever feel sure.  Since joining the Court three
months after Hughes, he had bounced back and forth between factions.
Originally touted as a conservative, he had voted often with the liberals at
first.”124  For instance,
[i]n the spring of 1934 he had heartened New Dealers with a breathtaking
opinion in the precedent-shattering case of Nebbia v. New York,125 which
seemed to open the way for state legislators to regulate the economy on the
public’s behalf as they saw fit.  But a year later he jumped to the conserva-
tives’ camp and joined in decimating the New Deal, and he had never both-
110 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 49. R
111 Id. at 50.
112 Id. at 49.
113 Id. at 45.
114 Id. at 49.
115 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 166. R
116 Id. at 24.
117 Id. at 166.
118 Id.
119 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 45. R
120 Id. at 46.
121 Id. at 208.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 53.
124 Id.
125 291 U.S. 502, 536–39 (1934) (upholding state regulation of milk prices and no
longer limiting price regulation to a narrow category of businesses “affected with a public
interest”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 15 30-MAY-14 13:52
2014] the  jurisprudence  of  the  hughes  court 1943
ered to explain his shift.126  His legal reasoning had proved wildly
inconsistent, even within a single opinion.127
Mr. Solomon sees this apparently schizophrenic judicial performance as
betraying a deep feature of Roberts’s character:
He was a man of dueling impulses—comfortable in a tuxedo or wearing
overalls, in the city or on the farm, who seemed to believe in just about
everything, but in no one thing above all.  He stalked moose in the Maine
woods but refused to shoot them.  He kept his own counsel, and nobody
could quite figure him out.128
Mr. Solomon’s understanding of Chief Justice Hughes’s position on the
Court is also entirely political, but not in the ideological sense.  “Hughes had
always been a political creature in a nonpolitical guise,” he tells us.129  “Prob-
ably better than anyone alive, Charles Evans Hughes understood that the
Supreme Court had been a political institution from the first.”130  The Chief
Justice “seemed to care less about a philosophy of jurisprudence or a particu-
lar constitutional worldview than about the institutional health of the
Court.”131  He “had reason to worry” that if “the Court declined in the pub-
lic’s estimation, its chief justice would, too.”132  As Mr. Solomon puts it:
The Supreme Court was in a fix of its own making.  Its steadfast and
heartfelt refusal over so many years to understand the world from the van-
tage point of the laborer or the farmer or anyone who lacked leverage in a
ruthless marketplace had not mattered very much while prosperity reigned.
But now that the nation was deep into the Depression, if the Court was seen
to be blocking the people’s will, it endangered its standing with the public.
This mattered to Hughes, if not to the rest of the Court.133
As the Chief Justice understood, “[i]n a constitutional system of checks
and balances, an extended reign of unpopularity will bring down the peo-
ple’s wrath, even upon an unelected branch of government.  The Court’s
inveterate divisiveness carried a similar risk, at least in the chief justice’s
mind.”134  Accordingly, “Hughes hated dissents.”135
[H]e seemed to believe that the Court’s best hope for restoring its moral
authority with the public—and assuring his own reputation—was by issuing
unanimous, or at least lopsided, decisions.  No politically-minded man
126 See SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 210 (“[Roberts] had indeed switched—and not R
once, but twice, first when he abandoned the liberal interpretation he had proclaimed in
his 1934 Nebbia decision to join the Court’s conservatives, then again in forsaking the con-
servatives by reversing himself on the minimum wage.”).
127 Id. at 53 (footnotes added).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 148.
130 Id. at 147.
131 Id. at 52.
132 Id. at 52–53.
133 Id. at 47.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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wanted to be part of an institution that the public disrespected, much less
occupy its center seat.  Yet a Court exposed as a nakedly political institution
would subject itself to the checks and balances that the Constitution reserved
for any branch of government that overreached.136
As a result, “[w]ith rare exceptions, whatever Roberts did, Hughes felt com-
pelled to support in the name of consensus.”137
Regrettably, a review of Mr. Solomon’s references suggests that his basis
for reaching each of these judgments about the Chief Justice is almost
entirely conjectural and rests on little if any hard evidence.  A review of his
bibliography similarly reveals him to be innocent of recent scholarly work
impugning such cartoonish characterizations of the Four Horsemen.138  Mr.
Solomon also appears to have overlooked the substantial literature impeach-
ing portraits of the Four Horsemen, and the Court more generally, as imple-
menting through its decisions policies of laissez-faire economics and Social
Darwinism.139
136 Id.
137 Id. at 53.
138 See, e.g., Cushman, supra note 58; Samuel R. Olken, Justice George Sutherland and R
Economic Liberty: Constitutional Conservatism and the Problem of Factions, 6 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1 (1997).
139 See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at
156, 160 (1993) (discussing the Court’s efforts to limit legislative redistribution through
the requirement that laws be “universal” or “neutral” in their application); HOWARD GILL-
MAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 10 (1993) (examining the influence of the principle of
neutrality on the Lochner Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence); HORWITZ, supra
note 17, at 19–31 (analyzing Lochner and pre-Lochner police powers decisions in light of the R
nineteenth-century liberal conception of “the neutral state”); Michael Les Benedict, Lais-
sez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutional-
ism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 298, 304–31 (1985) (contending that the Supreme Court’s
development of due process doctrine should be understood, in part, as an effort to protect
traditional notions of liberty); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Loch-
ner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 1–9 (2003) (relat-
ing reasons for scholarly rejection of the laissez-faire and Social Darwinism accounts);
Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2005)
(reviewing several of the previous theories on the 1920’s Court’s jurisprudence); William
E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L.
REV. 767, 771–72 (arguing that the development of constitutional labor regulation during
the Gilded Age was the product of competing visions of republicanism); John Harrison,
Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 504 (1997) (examining
the original meaning of “due process”); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurispru-
dence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,
1863–1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 971–73 (1975) (discussing Justice Field’s attempts to for-
mulate “immutable rules” to distinguish between regulation and confiscation when exam-
ining the limits of states’ police powers); Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era:
Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187,
189–92 (1984) (discussing the distinction between privilege and property in the context of
liberal and conservative reactions to the changing economic environment of the early
twentieth century); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 878–89
(1987) (discussing the legacy of the Lochner Court’s view of “neutrality”).
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B. Ross
Professor Ross similarly engages in the problematic, reductive characteri-
zation of the Justices as “liberal” or “conservative.”140  He often places these
terms in quotation marks, though it is never entirely clear precisely what the
quotation marks are intended to convey.  One gathers from the context that
it is not irony.  Instead, Professor Ross appears to wish the reader to infer that
the terms have connotations that may oversimplify and mislead.  For exam-
ple, he tells us that the “conservative” Four Horsemen shared the “political
outlook,” “attitudes,” and “antiregulatory predilections” “of their clients,
mostly corporations that often sought to circumvent, circumscribe, or nullify
federal and state regulatory legislation.”141  At the same time, however,
unlike Mssrs. Solomon and Shogan, he recognizes that “they more often than
not voted to uphold the constitutionality of regulatory legislation.”142  Yet
this awareness does not prevent Professor Ross from allowing his terminology
occasionally to lead him down the same primrose path that has seduced
Mssrs. Solomon and Shogan.  For example, he casts Justice Holmes as a “lib-
eral” who could be found “consistently voting to uphold regulatory legisla-
tion that he privately disparaged as a ‘humbug.’”143  And yet the record is
replete with examples of Holmes and his fellow “liberal” Justice Brandeis,
whom Professor Ross describes more cautiously,144 voting to invalidate eco-
nomic legislation.145  Similarly, like Mssrs. Solomon and Shogan, Professor
140 ROSS, supra note 59, at xvii, 20, 23, 24, 26, 30, 33, 35, 101, 141 (using phrases such as R
“liberal bloc,” “a spate of liberal decisions,” “conservative majority,” and “liberal majority”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
141 Id. at 21.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 24.
144 See id. at 26 (“Brandeis voted more often to sustain economic regulation than did
most of his brethren.”).
145 For just a few examples of cases involving due process and/or the Contracts Clause,
see Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (Brandeis, J.); Treigle v.
Acme Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936) (Brandeis, J.); Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (Brandeis, J.); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295
U.S. 56 (1935) (Brandeis, J.); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (Bran-
deis, J.); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); W. & Atl. R.R. v.
Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1
(1929) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278
U.S. 116 (1928) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.);Williams v. Standard Oil Co. of La., 278 U.S. 235,
245 (1928) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Miller Cnty. Highway &
Bridge Dist., 277 U.S. 160 (1928) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Rd. Improvement Dist. No. 1 v.
Mo. Pac. R.R., 274 U.S. 188 (1927) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271
U.S. 500 (1926) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 267 U.S. 552 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v.
Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286
(1924) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations,
262 U.S. 522 (1923) (Holmes & Brandeis JJ.); St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas,
260 U.S. 346 (1922) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 251
U.S. 396 (1920) (Holmes & Brandeis, JJ.); Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252
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Ross has Hughes “moving back and forth between the Court’s factions,”146
yet he recognizes that Hughes and Roberts were “much too complex to fit
simple and standard generalizations, and much of the apparent inconsis-
tency about [which] many of their liberal critics complained stemmed from
their fidelity to precedent, their commitment to deciding each case on its
own special facts, and their refusal to wed themselves to ideology.”147  He
notes Hughes’s disdain for the application of conventional political labels to
judges, and appears to agree with the Chief Justice that “ ‘[s]uch characteriza-
tions are not infrequently used to foster prejudices and they serve as a very
poor substitute for intelligent criticism.’”148  Nevertheless, Professor Ross
persists in employing such characterizations throughout the book.
In Professor Ross’s case, one suspects that this attitudinal undercurrent
is in part a function of the sources upon which he relied in constructing his
account.  He obviously has worked hard at examining the Court’s decisions
and the papers of the Justices.  Moreover, he clearly has consulted some of
the principal secondary works on the subject, though the literature is so vast
that one could explore it more deeply.  But his other primary source material
from the period seems to consist principally of articles from contemporary
popular periodicals like the Literary Digest, The Nation, The New Republic, Com-
monweal, and the like.  The use of the legal periodical and treatise literature
of the period is, at most, sparse.  Nor is there much indication of how sophis-
ticated legal thinkers in, say, the Justice Department, understood what was
going on.  This tends to bias the commentary toward the perceptions of
observers without legal training, who thought about these events more in
terms of their political valence than their legal significance.  This may tend to
reinforce Professor Ross’s own tendency to employ analytic categories such as
“liberal,” “conservative,” “pro-regulatory,” and “anti-regulatory,” which often
obscure more than they explain.  Of course, the perceptions of such lay
observers are hardly irrelevant to the story.  But one would hope and expect
that a book devoted to understanding the work of the Hughes Court would
benefit from greater inclusion of the perspectives of contemporary legal
commentators.
C. Parrish
Professor Parrish, too, cannot completely resist the resort to political tax-
onomy in describing the Justices.  He recognizes that “the Hughes Court jus-
(1916) (Holmes, J.); Myles Salt Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916) (Holmes, J.);
San Joaquin & Kings River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 233 U.S. 454,
458–61 (1914) (Holmes, J.); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914)
(Holmes, J.); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (Holmes, J.); Mo. Pac. Ry.
v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910) (Holmes, J.); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Cent. Stock
Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132 (1909) (Holmes, J.).
146 ROSS, supra note 59, at 230. R
147 Id. at 35.
148 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Chief Justice Hughes Addresses Judicial Conference of
Fourth Circuit, 18 A.B.A. J. 445, 447 (1932)).
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tices did not always align themselves neatly along ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’
lines in every important constitutional case,” yet he insists that “a number of
generalizations can be made.”149  He, too, divides the Court into two fac-
tions: the “conservative” Four Horsemen,150 and the more “liberal” Holmes,
Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo.151  These four, and later the Roosevelt
appointees, were “willing to sanction a much expanded role for government
at all levels[ and] asserted a far less imperial role for the judiciary in its rela-
tionship to the political branches” than did the conservatives.152  The Four
Horsemen, by contrast, “generally privileged judicial over legislative power
and manifested a high degree of skepticism concerning the role of govern-
ment.”153  Like Mssrs. Shogan and Solomon, Professor Parrish maintains that
“McReynolds, Van Devanter, and Butler[ ] all . . . subscribed to the view that
the Constitution mandated a particular economic philosophy, the one they
shared that stressed minimal interference by government into economic rela-
tionships.”154  Similarly, Van Devanter “viewed the Constitution as generally a
restraint upon the power of the state, especially when it tread upon that
sphere of private economic choice guarded by the Due Process Clause.”155
McReynolds was “unshakable in his faith that the courts remained the ulti-
mate repository of wisdom about both constitutional and policy matters.”156
And “[i]n Butler’s jurisprudential world . . . the Constitution of the United
States mandated an untrammeled marketplace, free of governmental regula-
tion except for those economic entities such as utilities that fell within the
narrow category of ‘businesses affected with a public interest.’”157
Professor Parrish also situates Hughes and Roberts between these two
groups.  They were “less bound by the conceptualism that shaped the outlook
of a Sutherland or a Butler, [and therefore] displayed more frequent regard
for the orientation of [the liberals], but also thirsted at times for the intellec-
tual security afforded by the [Four Horsemen].”158  Hughes and Roberts
“defected sharply from the conservative block in 1934–1935” in Home Build-
ing & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,159 Nebbia, and the Gold Clause Cases.160  “[B]y
mid-decade,” however, “when New Deal statutes first came before the justices,
Roberts drifted into the camp of the Court’s ultraconservative block in
important cases that voided significant federal programs aimed at fighting
149 MICHAEL E. PARRISH, THE HUGHES COURT 40 (2002).
150 Id. at 28.
151 Id. at 75.
152 Id. at 41.
153 Id. at 40.
154 Id. at 87.
155 Id. at 60.
156 Id. at 69.
157 Id. at 83 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934)).
158 Id. at 41.
159 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding Minnesota mortgage moratorium law).
160 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 28; see Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz R
v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
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the depression.”161  It was only in 1937 that “Hughes and Roberts finally cast
their lot permanently with Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo.”162
At the same time, however, Professor Parrish recognizes that these char-
acterizations are overstatements bordering on caricature.  He reports that
several New Deal initiatives were invalidated by unanimous or near-unani-
mous votes.163  He notes that the “liberal” Brandeis personally disapproved
of the NIRA,164 and that both Brandeis and Stone held the AAA165 and the
administration’s gold policy in low esteem.166  Moreover, unlike Mssrs. Sho-
gan and Solomon, he recognizes that “[d]espite historical legend, no rigid
philosophy of laissez-faire dominated Sutherland’s approach to the issues of
law and politics.”167  Instead, “Sutherland displayed from the beginning of
his public life a robust appreciation for utilizing government as an instru-
ment of economic development.”168  This appreciation was reflected in his
support for free coinage of silver, grants of the power of eminent domain to
mining companies and irrigation districts, high tariffs, a federal workmen’s
compensation law, the Seamen’s Act, the Pure Food and Drugs Act, the
Hepburn Rate Act, and women’s suffrage.169  It was Sutherland, Professor
Parrish observes, who wrote the majority opinion rejecting the constitutional
challenge to a residential zoning ordinance in the landmark case of Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.170 Sutherland was joined by each of his colleagues
in leading cases such as Frothingham v. Mellon171 and Alabama Power Co. v.
Ickes,172 which insulated federal spending grants from constitutional chal-
lenge under the taxpayer standing doctrine.173  “[E]ven Butler and McReyn-
olds found nothing constitutionally objectionable in key spending programs
of the New Deal such as the Public Works Administration and the Home
Owners’ Loan Corporation.”174  Moreover, Van Devanter and Sutherland
“sometimes broke ranks with their conservative brethren and voted with the
Court’s more liberal justices on both economic issues as well as those touch-
ing civil liberties and civil rights.”175  For example, they “joined Cardozo’s
opinion upholding the old-age benefit provisions of the Social Security
161 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 12. R
162 Id. at 27.
163 See id. at 75.
164 Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195 (1933).
165 Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933).
166 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 71–72, 87. R
167 Id. at 75.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 75–76.
170 Id. at 77–78; see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
171 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923) (rejecting challenge to Sheppard-Towner Maternity Act of
1921).
172 302 U.S. 464, 473 (1938) (rejecting challenge to loan and grant agreements made
by the Public Works Administration).
173 See PARRISH, supra note 149, at 77. R
174 Id. at 27.
175 Id. at 75.
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Act,176 perhaps the premier symbol of the emerging New Deal welfare
state.”177  Professor Parrish concludes that “even [the Four Horsemen], usu-
ally branded as antigovernment reactionaries, voted to sustain more state and
federal regulatory laws during the decade than they voted to strike down.”178
D. McKenna
Professor McKenna is alone among the authors under review in eschew-
ing the use of political taxonomy to describe the Justices of the Hughes
Court.  She explicitly rejects “the conventional interpretation developed by
generations of writers,” in which “[t]he justices are portrayed as old men
bearing stereotyped labels.”179  One objective of her book, she explains, is
“to reinstate or restore the reputation of the individual justices on the New
Deal Supreme Court.”180  She argues that “[t]hey were unfairly maligned
during their time by partisan supporters of the Roosevelt administration . . . ,
beginning with [Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen’s] The Nine Old Men181 . . .
[and] perpetuated to a surprising extent in conventional interpretations
appearing in books and articles ever since.”182  Instead, Professor McKenna
associates herself with Professor G. Edward White’s view that such pejorative
assessments rest on the “‘triumphal’” conventional narrative’s “ ‘misconcep-
tion’” of the Justices’ understandings of “ ‘the nature of law, the meaning of
legal sources, and the role of the judge as a constitutional interpreter.’”183
As these remarks might suggest, Professor McKenna’s approach to the
subject is largely internalist in nature.  She insists that the constitutional crisis
of the 1930s cannot be understood properly without attention to “the prac-
tices of the era’s legal and political elites in framing laws” and “to evolving
legal ideas and practices as they became interwoven with the politics of the
day.”184  She correctly characterizes her book as a work of political history,185
but nevertheless finds unsatisfactory explanations of events that are centered
on “the interplay of politics, judicial intent, external events, and case out-
comes.”186  Instead, she insists that attention to issues of “statutory formula-
tion, test-case fact patterns, and legal theories” is necessary for a fuller
understanding of the subject.187  “[T]he New Deal Court and its history can-
176 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 634 (1937).
177 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 27 (footnote added).  He also notes that “[t]he largest
funding agency of the Roosevelt years, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, never suf-
fered a constitutional setback.” Id.
178 Id.
179 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at xxiii. R
180 Id. at xxv.
181 DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN (1936).
182 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at xxv (footnote added).
183 Id. at xxv–xxvi (quoting WHITE, supra note 1, at 300). R
184 Id. at xxiv–xxv.
185 See id.
186 Id. at 25.
187 Id.
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not be comprehended in purely political terms,” she maintains; “an honest
effort to delineate the various dimensions and subtleties of judicial behavior
and the justices’ jurisprudential positions, with a more respectful attitude
toward their integrity, provides a better approach than that undertaken in
past studies.”188  What is required, she argues, is an appreciation of how a
system of constitutional thought “underwent gradual though not sweeping
transformation during the first four decades of the twentieth century.”189
II. DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Shogan
Mr. Shogan’s account of the legal developments of the 1930s is strikingly
spare, and unfortunately also frequently inaccurate.  He maintains that in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish190 the Court “upheld a Washington state mini-
mum-wage law not significantly different from the New York law it had held
to be unconstitutional in the notorious Morehead ruling only nine months
before.”191  In fact, in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo192 New York’s attor-
neys had rested their entire argument on the distinction between the kind of
statute enacted by Washington state and the kind enacted by New York.193
Moreover, that distinction helps to account for why Chief Justice Hughes, in
his dissenting opinion in Tipaldo, insisted that the New York statute, unlike
the Washington statute involved in West Coast Hotel, could be upheld without
overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.194  Mr. Shogan asserts that in Helver-
ing v. Davis,195 which upheld the old-age pension provisions of the Social
Security Act,196 “the Court repudiated its prior dictum that the general wel-
fare clause of the Constitution applies only to subjects specifically cited in the
Constitution.”197  In fact, Justice Roberts’s 1936 opinion in United States v.
Butler had explicitly adopted the Hamiltonian interpretation of the clause in
preference to the Madisonian construction,198 and Justice Cardozo expressly
relied upon that pronouncement in Helvering.199
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
191 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 185. R
192 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
193 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Motion to Advance at 7–8, 13–14, Tipaldo, 298
U.S. 587 (No. 838); Appellant’s Brief on the Law at 32–49, Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (No. 838);
CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 96. R
194 Tipaldo, 298 U.S. at 619 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923).
195 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
196 Id. at 634, 646.
197 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 204. R
198 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936).
199 301 U.S. at 640.
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Mr. Shogan also maintains that in Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain
Trust Bank200 “the Court rejected a challenge to the Federal Farm Bank-
ruptcy Act, an almost identical revision of a law it had held unconstitutional
on ‘Black Monday’ in 1935.”201  In fact, the revised Act was far from identical.
It had undergone significant revision in order to redress the five constitu-
tional deficiencies identified by Justice Brandeis’s unanimous opinion in Lou-
isville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, which invalidated the Frazier-Lemke
Farm Debt Relief Act of 1934.202  Mr. Shogan maintains that the decisions in
Wright and in the Court’s contemporaneous decision upholding the 1934
amendments to the Railway Labor Act203 “were by 5 to 4, with Roberts’s vote
enabling the defeat of the Four Horsemen who remained intractable in their
opposition to the New Deal and all its works.”204  In fact, both decisions were
unanimous—the Four Horsemen were not nearly as intractable as Mr. Sho-
gan suggests.  Nor is he correct in his accounts of the votes in the Wagner Act
and Social Security Cases.205  The Labor Board Cases206 were not all “rendered
by 5-to-4 majorities that included the vote of Justice Roberts.”207  The deci-
sion in Washington, Maryland & Virginia Coach Co. v. NLRB, which upheld
application of the Wagner Act to an interstate bus company, was unani-
mous.208  Nor did “the same 5-4 majority” give its “approval” to “the old-age
pensions that were the heart” of the Social Security Act.209  Helvering was
decided by a vote of seven to two, with Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland
joining the majority.210  Each of these errors might have been avoided by
simply reading the opinions in question.
200 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937) (upholding the Frazier-Lemke Act, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49
Stat. 943–45 (1935)).
201 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 186. R
202 Wright, 300 U.S. at 456–59; Louisville Joint Stock Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555,
594–95 (1935) (invalidating Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48
Stat. 1289 (1934)); see Cushman, supra note 16, at 81–83. R
203 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937) (upholding Railway
Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 73-442, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934)).
204 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 186. R
205 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 4, 228 n.7 (referring to Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 R
(1937), Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937), and Carmichael v. Southern Coal &
Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937), as the “Social Security cases”).
206 The Labor Board Cases refers to five cases in which the Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of application of the National Labor Relations Act to various enterprises. See
Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB,
301 U.S. 103 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937);
NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
207 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 188. R
208 301 U.S. at 147.
209 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 203. R
210 Helvering, 301 U.S. 619.  Indeed, because these two Justices dissented separately
from McReynolds and Butler in Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 609–16 (Sutherland, J.,
dissenting), objecting only to easily correctable administrative provisions of the law, that
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In general, Mr. Shogan’s account of the legal developments follows the
conventional story line.  Along with the other opinions handed down in the
spring of 1937, the Court’s decisions upholding the Wagner Act were “sur-
prising”211 and “stunning,”212 “part of what would ultimately become clear as
one of the most dramatic reversals in the Court’s history.”213  In each of the
Labor Board Cases, Mr. Shogan relates, “the Court based its decision on a
remarkably generous view of the commerce clause.”214  This was an outcome,
Mr. Shogan asserts, that was unanticipated by administration officials, partic-
ularly in view of the Court’s decision in Carter v. Carter Coal215 the preceding
term.216
That outcome may have surprised some, but it certainly was not unantici-
pated by Charles Fahy, the general counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) who had masterminded the litigation strategy in the Labor
Board Cases.  Despite the recent decision in Carter Coal, Fahy was confident
that the Court would uphold the Wagner Act.  Fahy insisted that the Act
“should have been sustained on the basis of precedents,” and was “not
inclined to attribute the fact that it was sustained to anything but that it was
believed to be constitutional.”217  Fahy was convinced that Hughes and Rob-
erts would vote to uphold the Act and “encouraged his staff to prepare their
arguments on the assumption that an unfavorable decision in Carter would
not invalidate the Wagner Act.”218  Nor was the outcome unanticipated by
NLRB Chairman Warren Madden, who confidently proclaimed that Carter
Coal was easily distinguished, and that the Court’s stream of commerce prece-
dents made it “obvious” that “[t]he Constitution and the statute give the
Labor Board jurisdiction over” the situations presented in the Labor Board
Cases.219  Neither was it unanticipated by Solicitor General Stanley Reed, who
wrote to Attorney General Homer Cummings: “I do not see any clear incon-
sistency between Wagner on the one hand and the Guffey or N.R.A. decision
decision upholding the unemployment compensation provisions of the Act might also be
better understood as decided by a vote of seven to two.
211 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 184, 186. R
212 Id. at 187.
213 Id. at 184–85.
214 Id. at 187.
215 298 U.S. 238, 316 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935, Pub. L. No. 74-402, 49 Stat. 991).
216 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 187 (“Understandably New Dealers had viewed the Wag- R
ner Act’s fate before the Court with trepidation.  Attorney General Cummings confided to
his diary that he considered the act to be ‘of rather doubtful constitutionality.’  Tom Cor-
coran had been telling friends that the most he hoped for was to get two justices on his
side.”).
217 CHARLES A. LEONARD, A SEARCH FOR A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION OF 1937, at 109 (1971) (quoting from author inter-
view with Charles Fahy, April 8, 1963).
218 IRONS, supra note 48, at 268.
219 3 U.S.L.W. 1041, 1041–42 (1936).
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on the other.”220  Nor did it come as a surprise to the many legal commenta-
tors who regarded the Labor Board Cases as consistent with the Court’s prece-
dents, nor to the many lower federal judges of both political parties who
continued to believe that Carter Coal remained good law.221  In short, Mr.
Shogan’s discussion of the Court’s decisions is plagued by numerous unfortu-
nate misstatements and oversights.
B. Solomon
Because Mr. Solomon sees constitutional law as almost entirely epiphe-
nomenal—as simply the expression of conservative or liberal preferences
regarding political economy—his treatment of doctrinal development is
exceptionally thin.  In a chapter entitled “The Conservative Court,” Mr. Solo-
mon explains that the animating forces behind the Court’s decisions in 1935
and 1936 were those of politics and personality.222  Roberts’s wife Elsie “dis-
liked the New Deal, and Roberts had come to oppose it as well.  His tradition-
alist upbringing had taught him that every man ought to make his own way in
life.”223  He told a group of Boy Scout leaders in 1936 that “the Depression
had made people ‘soft,’” and worried that many Americans now harbored
“the idea that if they leaned hard enough on the government, it would sup-
port them.”224  Privately, he believed that “the Roosevelt administration was
grabbing the country’s resources ‘and plunging them down the sewer.’”225
Worse yet, Roberts had become ensnared in the toils of the Four Horsemen.
On the bench, Roberts was often seen to share a chuckle with Pierce Butler,
the conservative in the adjacent seat and a frequent visitor to Roberts at
home.  He had also drawn close to the unsociable McReynolds, who was
genial to the few people he liked; the two of them, along with Sutherland,
had formed a club of sorts.226
Princeton political scientist and administration advisor Edward Corwin
“felt certain that Roberts had fallen ‘much under Justice Sutherland’s influ-
ence.’”227  And notwithstanding his wife’s opposition to any idea of the Jus-
tice leaving the bench, Mr. Solomon believes that Roberts’s judicial behavior
may have been influenced by presidential ambitions.  His name “had bub-
bled up as a Republican presidential dark horse before the party’s 1928 and
1932 national conventions, and he was considered a long shot for 1936.”228
220 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 318–19 n.100 (quoting Memorandum from Stanley R
Reed, Solicitor General, to the Attorney General, National Archives, Washington, D.C.,
Dep’t of Justice 114–15 (Apr. 22, 1937)).
221 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 177–80. R
222 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 68–83. R
223 Id. at 70–71.
224 Id. at 71.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 70.
227 Id.
228 Id.
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It was for these reasons, Mr. Solomon maintains, that “in the spring of 1935,
the Court’s swing vote swung to the conservatives’ side.”229
At the same time, Mr. Solomon does occasionally appear to recognize
that personal preferences and ambitions cannot explain each and every judi-
cial vote.  He observes that Justice Stone, who voted to uphold the AAA in
United States v. Butler, wrote to his sons, “ ‘I haven’t very much confidence in
the A.A.A.’”230  He also notes that Stone, who voted in Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton Railroad Co.231 to uphold most of the Railroad Retirement Act
of 1934,232 wrote privately that the law “‘was a bad one, and if I had been a
member of Congress I am certain I should have voted against it.’”233  Like
Stone, Mr. Solomon concedes that the Act was, as President Roosevelt admit-
ted, “ ‘crudely drawn’ and in need of a future Congress’s ministrations,”
though he does not appear to regard that fact as providing sufficient justifica-
tion for Roberts’s opinion declaring the statute unconstitutional.234
For the most part, however, Mr. Solomon’s story is one in which “the
Court’s conservatives . . . kept dealing the New Deal a thrashing.”235  They
failed to embrace the New Dealers’ “commonsense understanding of inter-
state commerce, one that counted factories, mines, and railroads as inher-
ently involved in the movement of goods across state lines, with an impact on
the national interest.”236  Instead, the Court’s decisions in 1935 and 1936
“determined the federal government lacked the constitutional authority to
protect the health and well-being of its most vulnerable workers.”237  With
the decision in Tipaldo invalidating the New York minimum wage law for
women, the Court similarly barred the state governments from protecting
such workers.238  “If Congress had so little power to correct the injustices of
Darwinian commerce,” Mr. Solomon asserts, then “clearly the Social Security
bill that was still mired in Congress”—which was an exercise of the powers to
tax and spend rather than of the power to regulate interstate commerce—
“would die at the hands of the Court, should it ever be enacted.”239  By the
summer of 1936, “[d]espite the millions of unemployed and the persistence
of bread lines and hunger, the Supreme Court had decided that no govern-
ment, on any level, had the power to address the citizens’ most wrenching
needs.  No matter what the people wanted or who they elected, they were on
their own.”240
229 Id. at 71.
230 Id. at 79; see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
231 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
232 Pub. L. No. 73-485, 48 Stat. 1283 (1934).
233 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 70. R
234 Id. at 69.
235 Id. at 81.
236 Id. at 69.
237 Id. at 82.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 69.
240 Id. at 82–83.
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With all due respect, this is an assertion of stunning inaccuracy.  The
Court had not held that government lacked the constitutional authority to
protect the most vulnerable.  Far from it.  In Nebbia, the Court had held that
government could engage in virtually unfettered price regulation in order to
address the citizens’ most wrenching needs.  In Blaisdell, the Court had held
that the state could significantly modify the contractual rights of mortgagees
in order to meet other citizens’ most wrenching needs.  In the Gold Clause
Cases, the Court had permitted the federal government to revise the contrac-
tual rights of millions of creditors in order to meet other citizens’ most
wrenching needs.  In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,241 the Court had
permitted the Tennessee Valley Authority to sell electricity to consumers in
competition with private power companies in order to meet citizens’ most
wrenching needs.242  And the taxpayer standing doctrine championed by
Sutherland and his fellow Horsemen in Frothingham v. Mellon insulated bil-
lions of dollars in public relief and public works expenditures from judicial
review.243  The minimum wage, as desirable as it may have been, was far from
the only way in which government sought to and succeeded in addressing the
citizens’ most wrenching needs.  Moreover, as Homer Cummings told FDR in
late May of 1936, both the AAA and the Guffey Coal Act struck down in Carter
Coal were being redrafted based on different doctrinal theories more likely to
withstand constitutional attack.244  And notwithstanding the Court’s Alton
decision striking down the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934, Roosevelt and
others believed that the Social Security Act was “safe because lawmakers, with
the Court very much in mind, had rested the bill on the government’s taxing
power rather than the commerce power.”245  Decisions striking down earlier
statutes did not foreclose the ends sought by those measures; they only fore-
closed achieving those ends through the particular means that legislators had
selected.
Mr. Solomon takes up the 1937 decisions in a chapter entitled “A Switch
in Time,”246 signaling his view that those decisions constituted watershed
departures from prior constitutional doctrine.  Like Mr. Shogan, Mr. Solo-
mon maintains that the law involved in West Coast Hotel “was strikingly similar
to the New York law that the Court had struck down, to such public disgust,
just ten months earlier.”247  Tipaldo, he insists, had involved “an almost iden-
tical law.”248  Hughes’s decision upholding the law was, on Mr. Solomon’s
account, entirely political.  “In Hughes’s mind, apparently, the case did not
involve legal principles or even the intent of the Constitution, but matters
241 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
242 Id. at 340.
243 WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 183–84. R
244 Homer Cummings Diary, May 19, 1936, University of Virginia Special Collections.
245 SHESOL, supra note 2, at 119. R
246 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 155. R
247 Id. at 156.
248 Id. at 159.
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more temporal . . . .”249  Yet for political reasons it was necessary to proceed
gingerly.  “Hughes cared deeply about the stability of the law, as a bulwark of
the judiciary’s standing with the people,” Mr. Solomon explains, and there-
fore “he had no wish to scuttle the liberty of contract.”250  “But he had every
intention of limiting it.”251  In doing so, he relied upon the principle,
“invoked more often than obeyed, of judicial self-restraint.”252  “This was not
the first time the Court’s majority had accorded such deference to legislators’
judgment.  If the chief justice’s reasoning sounded familiar, it was meant to.
It echoed Justice Roberts’s reasoning in the Nebbia case . . . .”253  Indeed,
“Hughes persisted in quoting from Roberts’s ruling—three times—in mak-
ing his case.”254  “‘Our conclusion,’ the chief justice boomed, his eyes flash-
ing, ‘is that the case of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital should be, and it is,
overruled.’”255  Overlooking an enormous number of social welfare mea-
sures that had escaped judicial invalidation, Mr. Solomon concludes that
West Coast Hotel meant that “[a]t last, it seemed, state legislatures possessed
the authority to regulate business to help society’s needy.”256  He then fol-
lows this with the doctrinal non sequitur, “and presumably the federal gov-
ernment could do the same.”257
Like Mr. Shogan, Mr. Solomon unfortunately has not become suffi-
ciently familiar with the United States Reports to describe accurately the Court’s
output.  “Before the day’s session ended,” he reports, “the justices had
announced four other decisions that allowed the government to protect the
weak against the strong.”258  “Of the day’s five rulings, one had been unani-
mous but the other four were decided by the narrowest of margins—in each
case, the same five justices prevailing over the Four Horsemen.”259  That
report might have some surface plausibility to one who categorizes the Jus-
tices using a crude political taxonomy, and Mr. Solomon does not make clear
which cases he regards as “allowing the government to protect the weak
against the strong.”  But no matter which cases he intends to describe, there
is no way that his description can even remotely approach accuracy.  Setting
aside decisions per curiam, none of which reflect any dissenting votes,260 on
March 29, 1937, the Court handed down seventeen opinions including West
249 Id. at 157.





255 Id. (quoting W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937)).




260 See Decisions Per Curiam, Etc., from February 1, Through April 11, 1937, 300 U.S.
635, 635–46 (1937).
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Coast Hotel.  Thirteen of those were unanimous,261 including the decisions
upholding the revised Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act262 and the 1934
amendments to the Railway Labor Act.263  One case was decided by a vote of
six to two, with Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Cardozo dissenting and Jus-
tice Stone not participating;264 another was decided by a vote of seven to two,
with Justices McReynolds and Butler dissenting.265  The only case other than
West Coast Hotel decided by a vote of five to four was Highland Farms Dairy, Inc.
v. Agnew, in which the Four Horsemen dissented in part.266  It is hard to
understand how Mr. Solomon could have arrived at such a wildly inaccurate
report.  Such easily avoidable factual errors both draw upon and reinforce
Mr. Solomon’s regrettably cartoonish understanding of the Four Horsemen,
just as they contribute to an exaggerated impression of the level of dissensus
on the Hughes Court.
Yet even after West Coast Hotel, Mr. Solomon maintains, it was not clear
“whether Roberts had truly switched.”  After all, “[a] justice who had changed
his mind could easily change it again.”267  That issue would be resolved only
when Roberts voted to uphold the National Labor Relations Act and the
Social Security Act.  The obstacle to upholding the former, in Mr. Solomon’s
view, was the Court’s historically pinched view of the scope of the commerce
power.  “Since 1895,” he writes,
as the industrial trusts created a national economy—and over and over again
in the decades since, in striking down a succession of progressive laws—the
Court had consistently protected the burgeoning businesses by distinguish-
ing between a “direct” and an “indirect” role in interstate commerce, exclud-
ing the latter from Congress’s potentially heavy hand.268
This characterization of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
overlooks three important facts.  First, it neglects the significant number of
instances in which the Court upheld prosecutions of or civil enforcement
actions against businesses under the antitrust acts.269  Second, it fails to take
261 See Brown v. O’Keefe, 300 U.S. 598 (1937); Martin v. Nat’l Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 588
(1937); United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564 (1937); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S.
506 (1937); United States v. Madigan, 300 U.S. 500 (1937); Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co.,
300 U.S. 481 (1937) (Roberts, J., took no part in the decision); Am. Propeller & Mfg. Co. v.
United States, 300 U.S. 475 (1937); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Scarlett, 300
U.S. 471 (1937); Stroehmann v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 300 U.S. 435 (1937); Gen. Bak-
ing Co. v. Harr, 300 U.S. 433 (1937); Matos v. Alonso Hermanos, 300 U.S. 429 (1937).
262 Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
263 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
264 Dugas v. Am. Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414, 429 (1937).
265 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 588 (1937).
266 300 U.S. 608, 617 (1937).
267 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 162. R
268 Id. at 181.
269 See, e.g., Hill v. United States ex rel. Weiner, 300 U.S. 105, 108 (1937) (upholding
punishment for contempt under Clayton Act); IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 140
(1936) (enjoining certain tying clauses as Clayton Act violations); Sugar Inst., Inc. v.
United States, 297 U.S. 553, 605 (1936) (finding that activities of trade association violate
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into account instances in which the distinction between direct and indirect
effects on interstate commerce shielded labor unions from liability under the
Sherman Act.270  And third, it takes no notice of the instances in which the
Court upheld congressional regulation of business under the principal doc-
the Sherman Act); Ind. Farmer’s Guide Publ’g Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publ’g Co., 293 U.S.
268, 280 (1934) (reversing directed verdict for antitrust defendant); Atlantic Cleaners &
Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 437 (1932) (finding Sherman Act violation);
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 567 (1931)
(affirming judgment for antitrust plaintiff); United States v. First Nat’l Pictures, Inc., 282
U.S. 44, 55 (1930) (finding Sherman Act violation); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930) (finding Sherman Act violation); George Van Camp
& Sons Co. v. Am. Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 254 (1929) (finding Clayton Act violation);
United States v. Goldman, 277 U.S. 229, 239 (1928) (reversing dismissal of criminal con-
tempt proceedings against defendants charged with violating an injunction enforcing the
Sherman Act); Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 145 (1928) (upholding criminal con-
tempt conviction of Sherman Act defendant who refused to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (finding Sherman Act
violation); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 407 (1927) (upholding
Sherman Act conviction); Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379
(1927) (affirming damage award judgment against Eastman Kodak for antitrust violation);
United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549, 553 (1926) (finding Sherman Act violation); United
States v. Am. Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 390 (1923) (finding Sherman Act violation);
Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exch., 262 U.S. 271, 273 (1923) (reversing dismissal of anti-
trust suit); Charles A. Ramsay Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 260 U.S. 501, 512 (1923) (find-
ing Sherman Act violation); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 465
(1922) (finding Clayton Act violation); Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258
U.S. 346, 357 (1922) (finding Clayton Act violation); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921) (affirming Sherman Act conviction); Sampliner v. Motion
Picture Patents Co., 254 U.S. 233, 240 (1920) (reversing judgment directing verdict for
Sherman Act defendant); United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 100 (1920)
(reversing judgment sustaining demurrer to indictment for violation of the Sherman Act);
Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 89 (1917) (affirming judgment for Sherman Act plaintiff);
E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914) (affirming
order enjoining trade association from engaging in activities violative of the Sherman Act);
Straus & Straus v. Am. Publishers’ Ass’n, 231 U.S. 222, 237 (1913) (reversing judgment for
Sherman Act defendant); United States v. Pac. & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87,
108 (1913) (reversing judgment sustaining demurrer to Sherman Act indictment); Stan-
dard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912) (finding Sherman Act viola-
tion); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 187 (1911) (dissolving unlawful
combination); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 79 (1911) (dissolving
unlawful combination); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 409
(1911) (invalidating resale price maintenance scheme under Sherman Act); Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 248 (1899) (upholding Sherman Act convic-
tion).  For additional examples of federal regulation of business upheld by the Court
between 1911 and 1937, see Cushman, supra note 58, at 567, 619–30. R
270 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 108 (1933); United Leather
Workers Int’l Union v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 461 (1924); United
Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 408 (1922).
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trinal theory advanced by government lawyers defending the Wagner Act,
namely, the stream of commerce doctrine.271
But for Mr. Solomon, who seems to believe that the period’s constitu-
tional law was all basically just politics under another name, and that the
pre–New Deal Court was all about defending a regime of laissez-faire, none
of this is relevant.  The complexity of the Court’s established Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, the resources that body of doctrine made available to
government lawyers seeking to sustain New Deal legislation, and the skill with
which those lawyers selected promising test cases and briefed and argued
them do not engage his interest or attention.  Instead, he directs our atten-
tion to the fact that the wily Chief Justice Hughes was only mildly inconve-
nienced by the professional requirement that he concoct “an ingenious,
convoluted argument” in which the Court “abandoned its precedent in sub-
stance, though keeping the form of it intact—evidence, again, of Hughes’s
legal canniness and his political guile.”272  Overlooking the fact that Hughes
also had voted in Carter Coal to invalidate the Guffey Coal Act’s labor regula-
tion provisions, Mr. Solomon concludes that Hughes’s crafty opinion endeav-
ored to “spare” Roberts, who had joined the Carter Coal majority, the
“embarrassment” of appearing to “shatter” a precedent to which he had so
recently subscribed.273  But to Mr. Solomon, it is clear that Roberts “once
again . . . had switched sides.”274
For Mr. Solomon, the final confirmation of the switch came with the
decisions upholding the Social Security Act in May of 1937.  “As the climax,
in upholding the Social Security Act, the Court had unleashed the power of
the national government to tax and spend for the purpose of furthering the
general welfare.”275  Mr. Solomon views this as the outcome of a “judicial
deal” that the farsighted Hughes had struck with Roberts when the Court had
invalidated the AAA in January of 1936.276  Ever since that time, Mr. Solo-
mon reports, “the rumor had persisted that Hughes had jumped sides at the
last minute, granting the conservatives a comfortable majority and the pres-
tige of having lured the chief justice to their side.  Now it was evident what
Hughes would have traded for his vote.”277  Hughes had persuaded Roberts
to include in the Butler opinion a passage endorsing Alexander Hamilton’s
expansive construction of the federal government’s power to spend under
the General Welfare Clause, “specifically endorsing Hamilton’s vision of the
Constitution as the template for a strong and active central government.”278
271 Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930); Chi. Bd. of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 34 (1923); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 519 (1922); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905); see CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 144–54, 162–68; R
IRONS, supra note 48, at 240–43, 252–53, 268. R
272 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 181. R
273 Id. at 182.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 256.
276 Id. at 207.
277 Id.
278 Id.
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“At the time, it had seemed an odd sidelight to the AAA’s death, but just
sixteen months later, it came to the fore” in Justice Cardozo’s opinions
upholding the Social Security Act.279  “Though his fingerprints were hidden
at the time, Charles Evans Hughes had laid the groundwork.”280  For Car-
dozo “had been wily enough to rest his decision on Justice Roberts’s own
Hamiltonian handiwork, and he succeeded.”281  “The chief justice, playing a
game of judicial chess, had evidently been thinking a few moves ahead.  His
earlier maneuver has now placed the king—the president and his judicial
ambitions—into check.”282
There are at least three difficulties with this account.  First, Justice Stone
reported that when Hughes presented the Butler case to the conference fol-
lowing oral argument, he denounced the AAA as an unconstitutional “regula-
tion of agriculture within the states and an invasion of the reserved powers of
the states,” and argued further that it also violated the nondelegation doc-
trine.283  There is no evidence to support the rumor that Hughes changed
his vote.  He was in the majority from the beginning.  Second, the fact that
the Court had adopted the Hamiltonian construction of the General Welfare
Clause in Butler makes it difficult to understand how the reliance upon that
construction in the Social Security Cases constituted any sort of “switch.”  Mr.
Solomon recognizes that Justices Van Devanter and Sutherland joined the
majority in the opinion upholding the old-age pension provisions of the
Act.284  And indeed, those Justices also agreed with the majority on the cen-
tral taxing and spending power issues in the decision upholding the Act’s
unemployment compensation provisions.285  Yet Mr. Solomon insists that in
the old-age pension case those two Justices, who had dissented in West Coast
Hotel and in four of the five Wagner Act Cases,286 “had switched sides.”287
He does not entertain the possibility that they, like Hughes and Roberts,
might have regarded their votes in Butler and in the Social Security Cases as
entirely consistent.
Third, the Justices actually had “unleashed the power of the national
government to tax and spend for the purpose of furthering the general wel-
fare” much earlier, in the 1923 decision of Frothingham v. Mellon.288  Writing
for a unanimous bench including each of the Four Horsemen, Justice Suther-
279 Id.
280 Id. at 206.
281 Id. at 207.
282 Id.
283 Memorandum Re: No. 401, United States v. Butler (Feb. 4, 1936) (Harlan Fiske
Stone MSS, Box 62, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
284 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
285 Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 609–10 (1937) (Sutherland & Van Devan-
ter, JJ., dissenting).
286 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 133 (1937) (Sutherland, Van Devanter,
McReynolds, & Butler, JJ., dissenting); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
76 (1937) (McReynolds, Van Devanter, Sutherland, & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
287 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 207. R
288 Id. at 256.
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land had held that taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of congressional expenditures made from general revenue.289  The
AAA had been vulnerable to challenge because its acreage reduction pay-
ments to farmers were financed by an earmarked excise tax on processors.
But so long as the expenditures were drawn from the government’s general
revenue, they were beyond constitutional challenge and could continue
unhindered by judicial review.290  After the AAA was declared unconstitu-
tional, the government continued to make payments under existing acreage
reduction contracts from general revenue, which no one had standing to
challenge.291  Congress continued its agricultural program by quickly enact-
ing the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act, which authorized pay-
ment to farmers to reduce acreage devoted to “soil-depleting” crops.292
These payments were to be made from general revenue, and thus also were
immune from constitutional attack.293
Moreover, throughout Hughes’s tenure as Chief Justice, the Supreme
Court and the lower federal courts repeatedly invoked the Mellon doctrine in
rejecting constitutional attacks on loans and grants made by the Public
Works Administration (PWA).294  Undoubtedly because the Mellon doctrine
posed such an insuperable obstacle to securing judicial review, a vast array of
New Deal spending programs, all financed from general revenue, never
underwent constitutional challenge.  Examples include the Civilian Conser-
vation Corps,295 the Farm Credit Act,296 the Reconstruction Finance Corpo-
ration,297 the Rural Electrification Administration Act,298 and the
Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1936.299  Indeed, the most significant
289 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
290 See DEAN ALFANGE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NATIONAL WILL 178–80, 205
(1937); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 176 (1934); SAMUEL J.
KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPREME COURT 102 n.11 (1945); CARL BRENT
SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 838 (2d ed. 1954).
291 ALFANGE, supra note 290, at 180–81; cf. SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 110–11 (“[The R
Court’s] decisions striking down New Deal legislation . . . deprived millions of Americans
of tangible dollars and self-respect, starting with three million farmers who received checks
from the AAA.”).
292 Pub. L. No. 74-461, 49 Stat. 1148 (1936).
293 FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 191–92 (1990); SWISHER, supra note 290, at R
902; Richard S. Kirkendall, The New Deal and Agriculture, in 1 THE NEW DEAL 84, 94 (John
Braeman et al. eds., 1975); Robert Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933–1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 689–90 (1946); Note, Soil Conservation and Domestic Allot-
ment Act, 24 GEO L.J. 962, 965–67 (1936).
294 See Cushman, supra note 16, at 92. R
295 Civilian Conservation Corps Reforestation Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 73-5, 48 Stat. 22,
23 (1933).
296 Pub. L. No. 73-75, 48 Stat. 257, 258 (1933).
297 Reconstruction Finance Corporation Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 74-1, 49 Stat. 1, 4
(1935).
298 Pub. L. No. 74-605, 49 Stat. 1363, 1364 (1936).
299 First Deficiency Appropriation Act, Fiscal Year 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-739, 49
Stat. 1597, 1608.
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thing about the Hughes Court’s much-discussed spending power jurispru-
dence is how little it actually mattered in light of the taxpayer standing doc-
trine.  Mr. Solomon’s claim that the Court’s spending power jurisprudence
had prevented federal appropriations to aid the needy, and that the spend-
ing power was liberated from such hidebound restraints only by the decisions
in the Social Security Cases, rests on an unfortunately inadequate understand-
ing of contemporary constitutional doctrine.
But because he does not appear to understand the way in which the
Court’s spending power jurisprudence actually functioned, Mr. Solomon
regards the Social Security Cases as granting to “Congress, whenever it deemed
wise, the power to ease Americans’ suffering.”300  At long last, “the govern-
ment had been granted the right to take the side of the people.”301 But of
course the federal government had been using its spending power to ease
suffering “without judicial let or hindrance”302 by the Court throughout the
Depression decade, and indeed throughout the Nation’s history.303  Were
one to believe, as Mr. Solomon avers, that the Court’s constitutional jurispru-
dence before 1937 is best understood as the judicial enforcement of a “lais-
sez-faire” economic policy that was blind to “reality,”304 one would quite
understandably regard the decisions of 1937 as representing a “most conse-
quential shift,”305 a “change[ ] of heart,” and a “constitutional revolution.”306
Mr. Solomon recognizes that the Due Process Clause, the Commerce Clause,
and the General Welfare Clause are “three distinct constitutional clauses,
each with its own interpretive history and abstruse arguments.  Strictly speak-
ing, none of them had anything to do with the others.”307  Yet he cannot
resist the conclusion that the “almost simultaneous[ ]” “change[s] in inter-
pretation” of these provisions, by which “all three long-standing premises of
constitutional theory had been abandoned,” “surely . . . was more than coin-
cidence.”  Taken together, these decisions signified a “reversal of attitude
about the Constitution—about its purpose in American life, about the duty
of law in achieving justice”308—a term Mr. Solomon uses frequently but
never defines.
But such an understanding is far too simplistic and schematic.  It under-
appreciates the extent to which the Court for many years had interpreted
both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clauses to permit substan-
tial regulation of the economy.309  It fails to recognize adequately the extent
to which Hughes and Roberts continued throughout their careers to regard
300 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 206. R
301 Id. at 208.
302 CORWIN, supra note 290, at 176. R
303 See generally MICHELE LANDIS DAUBER, THE SYMPATHETIC STATE (2013).
304 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 256. R
305 Id. at 208.
306 Id. at 206.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Lost Fidelities, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95, 100–05 (1999)
(“As several scholars have taught us, the number of cases in which the Justices of this era
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as placing significant restraints on
government’s regulatory authority.310  It underestimates the extent to which
several of the Justices, including some Roosevelt appointees, continued to
believe into the early 1940s that there were meaningful, judicially enforcea-
ble limits on the commerce power.311  And it completely misconceives the
way that the congressional spending power actually had worked on the
ground.  The Court’s doctrine was far more complex, the changes in it were
far more incremental, and its evolution was spread out over a much longer
period of time than Mr. Solomon’s reductive account would lead the reader
to believe.
C. Ross
Professor Ross’s account of the development of constitutional doctrine
under Hughes is for the most part well informed, careful, and judicious.  He
recognizes that “[r]ather than an instinctive bias in opposition to business
regulation, the Court’s willingness to second-guess legislatures and adminis-
trative agencies may have been a natural response to the constitutional
uncertainties created by unprecedented governmental intervention in eco-
nomic affairs.”312  He appreciates the fact that the Court’s decision in Blais-
dell did not, as many contemporary liberals hoped and conservatives feared,
remove the Contract Clause as a constitutional restraint on state legislative
authority.313  Indeed, the often-overlooked fact that in three decisions ren-
dered in 1935 and 1936 the Court unanimously invalidated statutes under
that Clause made its continuing vitality abundantly clear.314  Moreover, Pro-
fessor Ross emphasizes that it is important to recognize, as some recent com-
mentators have failed to do, that much of the New Deal presented “‘totally
different constitutional problems’”315 from those presented in Nebbia and
Blaisdell, and that decisions invalidating subsequent federal legislation did
not involve a retreat from the positions the majority had staked out in those
cases.
Indeed, Professor Ross insists that
[t]he actual holdings of the Court’s 1935–1936 decisions . . . did not wreak
as much devastation upon the New Deal as is often supposed.  The Court
invalidated only 11 of the 2,669 statutes signed by Roosevelt during his first
invalidated economic regulation simply pales in comparison to the number of such statutes
they sustained.”).
310 See Cushman, supra note 139, at 982–98. R
311 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 208–24. R
312 ROSS, supra note 59, at 41. R
313 Id. at 53.
314 See Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass’n, 297 U.S. 189 (1936); W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
315 ROSS, supra note 59, at 53 (quoting Case Comment, Constitutional Law—Contracts R
Clause—Mortgage Moratorium—Extension of Period of Redemption, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 361, 362
(1934)).
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term, albeit all of the statutes that the Court nullified were high-profile
laws.316
Title I of the NIRA, invalidated in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,317 “already had become a political embarrassment to the administra-
tion and . . . was facing congressional termination even before the Court
invalidated it.”318  The Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act “was not actually
part of the New Deal, and the Municipal Bankruptcy Act had little practical
significance.”319  “Moreover,” Professor Ross points out, “several of the stat-
utes, particularly NIRA, suffered from such serious constitutional infirmities
that even those justices who were ordinarily the most receptive toward regula-
tory legislation joined in opinions striking them down.”320  It was “[o]nly
invalidation of the statutes regulating agriculture and coal mining and pro-
viding pensions to railroad workers [that] seriously impeded recovery and
reform efforts, and even these decisions were rendered moot after 1937,
when the Court upheld similar statutes that remedied the constitutional infir-
mities about which the Court had complained.”321  As Professor Ross under-
stands, the Court’s decisions in 1935 and 1936 did not erect insuperable
obstacles to reform in these areas, but instead channeled congressional
efforts into achieving those desired ends through means that were consistent
with prevailing constitutional doctrine.322
The earliest example of this came with the Court’s first decision invali-
dating a New Deal measure—Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,323 which invali-
dated the NIRA’s petroleum code on nondelegation grounds.324  As
Professor Ross reports,
[T]he case humiliated the administration because it graphically illustrated
the chaotic administrative methods about which the New Deal’s critics had
so bitterly complained.  During oral argument, Assistant Attorney General
Harold M. Stephens revealed that the government had indicted and jailed
violators of the . . . code for a year before discovering that the code inadver-
tently lacked a penal section.  Under questioning from astonished justices,
Stephens also admitted that there was no general publication of executive
316 Id. at 59.
317 295 U.S. 495 (1935).




322 See generally Cushman, supra note 16.  For this reason it is odd to see Professor Ross R
later arguing that before 1937, “[t]he persistent threat of judicial nullification chilled
efforts to enact state and federal reform legislation”—a claim in support of which he
presents no evidence. ROSS, supra note 59, at 249.  In view of the evidence that he does R
produce, it might be more accurate to say instead that the persistent threat of judicial
nullification shaped efforts to enact state and federal reform legislation—that reformers
knew that if they wished to attain their objectives, they needed to be attentive to the con-
straints imposed by contemporary constitutional doctrine.
323 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
324 Id. at 433.
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orders prohibiting the transportation of “hot oil” and that they would be
“rather difficult” to obtain.325
Even Justice Cardozo, who filed a lone dissent from the majority’s opin-
ion, “rebuked the administration for its slipshod practices.”326  Later that
year, “after the House Judiciary Committee condemned the ‘utter chaos’ with
which administrative rules were promulgated, Congress created the Federal
Register for publication of all administrative rules having the force of law.”327
And yet, as Professor Ross observes, this poorly drafted and badly adminis-
tered measure “could be cured by statute,”328 and indeed, it was.  Within six
weeks of the Panama Refining decision Congress had replaced the NIRA’s
Hot Oil regulation with the Connally Act, which the lower federal courts uni-
formly sustained and the Supreme Court unanimously upheld.329
Professor Ross maintains that in Schechter the Court “restrictively inter-
preted the commerce clause,”330 exhibiting a “cramped vision of com-
merce.”331  Yet he appears to mean by this only that it appears restrictive or
cramped in retrospect, not that it was more restrictive or cramped than it had
been previously.  For as he recognizes, “the Court’s interpretation of the
commerce clause in Schechter was not inconsistent with established doc-
trine.”332  At the time, such an interpretation was thoroughly conventional.
Professor Ross also astutely observes that the Court’s rejection of the emer-
gency argument in Schechter was not inconsistent with its prior adoption in
Blaisdell, because the former concerned the reach of the commerce power
while the latter involved the scope of the police power.333  In fact, Professor
Ross notes, “Schechter had little practical impact because NIRA had become
such an embarrassment to the Roosevelt administration that Congress proba-
bly would not have renewed the statute when its initial term expired during
the summer of 1935.”334  The NIRA “tended to discourage competition,” and
“there was a growing consensus that its maze of bureaucratic regulations was
hindering rather than promoting economic recovery.”335  “Moreover, many
New Dealers and other advocates of economic regulation of business were
uncomfortable with NIRA’s corporatism, distrustful of its regulation of busi-
ness by business.  Others, sharing Brandeis’s longstanding misgivings about
centralization, preferred more regulation at the state level.”336  Indeed, even
after the Court’s decisions on “Black Monday” striking down the NIRA and
the Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt Relief Act, a Gallup poll showed only thirty-one
325 ROSS, supra note 59, at 60–61. R
326 Id. at 61.
327 Id.
328 Id. at 60.
329 See MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 46–47; Cushman, supra note 16, at 86. R
330 ROSS, supra note 59, at 67. R
331 Id. at 59.
332 Id. at 68.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 69.
335 Id.
336 Id.
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percent of those polled favoring limitations on the Court’s power to invali-
date congressional legislation, with fifty-three percent opposed.337
Unlike Messrs. Shogan and Solomon, Professor Ross also is alert to the
wide latitude that Congress enjoyed throughout the 1930s under the Court’s
demure approach to questions involving federal expenditures.  As he puts it,
“many New Deal measures prior to 1937 survived constitutional scrutiny by
default because they were not subject to lawsuits contesting their legality.”338
“[H]istorians often overlook the fact that the Court never reviewed the con-
stitutionality of several important New Deal measures because they were so
clearly within congressional power to appropriate funds for the general wel-
fare that even diehard conservatives shrunk from challenging them.”339  For
example, “no significant legal opposition was mounted against the PWA and
the WPA [Works Progress Administration], which provided jobs for millions
of Americans in a vast array of projects.”340  “Also escaping legal challenge
were the CCC [Civilian Conservation Corps], which employed hundreds of
thousands of youths on soil conservation projects, and the Home Owners’
Loan Corporation, which helped refinance home mortgages.”341  Moreover,
the Court’s rejection of a constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Valley
Authority, taken together with decisions upholding several state laws, sug-
gests to Professor Ross “that the Court’s adverse reactions to the New Deal
laws were based on adherence to well-established legal doctrines rather than
on implacable hostility toward regulation.”342  Indeed, the continuity in the
standard of review and its application “between the Court’s decisions on state
legislation before 1935 and its decisions during 1935 and 1936” similarly
leads Professor Ross to conclude “that the Court’s antipathy toward New Deal
legislation did not represent any sudden lurch to the political Right.”343
Thus, with respect to the “‘revolutionary’ Hughes Court decisions,” Pro-
fessor Ross maintains, “the Court’s change of course was not nearly as abrupt
as it appeared.”344  He does not regard the decisions in the Social Security
Cases as involving particularly remarkable doctrinal developments.  He notes
that the Court upheld the old-age pension provisions of the federal statute by
a vote of seven to two, with Van Devanter and Sutherland joining the major-
ity.345  He correctly observes that these two Justices dissented from the opin-
ion upholding the Act’s unemployment compensation provision on “narrow
grounds,” agreeing that “Congress had the power to levy the tax and that the
tax did not unduly coerce the states.”346  Instead, “they objected to the stat-
337 Id. at 72.




342 Id. at 84.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 167.
345 Id. at 129.
346 Id.
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ute only to the extent that it interfered with the states’ power to administer
[their] own unemployment compensation fund[s].”347  And in dissenting
from the opinion upholding Alabama’s state unemployment compensation
statute, “Sutherland, Butler, and Van Devanter agreed that the state’s objec-
tive was constitutional, objecting only on technical grounds to the statute’s
provision for pooling of the funds of different industries.”348  Professor Ross
similarly draws attention to the “broad interpretation of the federal taxing
and spending powers”349 on display in a 1938 Sutherland opinion unani-
mously rejecting challenges by private utility companies to loans made by the
PWA to municipalities to support development of electric power.350  “Suther-
land’s approval of the PWA loans,” he maintains, “was consistent with his
authorship” of the Mellon decision upholding federal grants-in-aid in 1923,
and also with his vote to uphold the Social Security Act.351  Quoting Profes-
sor Parrish with approval, Professor Ross concludes, “ ‘With his consistent
endorsement of Congress’s spending power via the grant-in-aid, soon to
become the most powerful engine of expanding federal authority, Justice
Sutherland, otherwise the nemesis of big government, could lay claim to
sponsoring the luxurious growth of the post–World War II welfare state.’”352
Professor Ross offers a similarly measured assessment of developments in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  He sees the opinions upholding the appli-
cation of the National Labor Relations Act to the manufacturing enterprises
there involved as elaborations of the “stream of commerce” doctrine estab-
lished by cases handed down between 1905 and 1930.353  He cautions against
the inference that the decisions upholding the Act signaled a strong shift in
“attitude” toward labor on the part of the Justices in the majority.  After sur-
veying a series of important labor law cases handed down in 1940 and 1941 in
which Hughes and Roberts dissented from pro-labor opinions written and
joined by Roosevelt appointees, he concludes that “[t]he dissents of Hughes
and Roberts in so many of these labor cases provides [sic] support for the
thesis that they did not ‘switch’ sides or undergo any metamorphosis in 1937
or afterward.”  Instead, “[l]abor’s victories in the Court appear to have
resulted more from changes in the Court’s personnel than from any
‘revolution.’”354
Professor Ross also cautions against the idea that with the 1937 decisions
the Court was abandoning the idea of judicially enforced limitations on the
commerce power.  He reminds us that Hughes had warned in his opinion in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.355 that
347 Id.
348 Id. at 130.
349 Id. at 161.
350 Ala. Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 485 (1938).
351 ROSS, supra note 59, at 160. R
352 Id. (quoting PARRISH, supra note 149, at 77). R
353 Id. at 122 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937)).
354 Id. at 146.
355 301 U.S. 1.
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the scope of the commerce power “must be considered in the light of our
dual system of government and may not be so extended as to embrace
effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace
them . . . would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national
and what is local and create a completely centralized government.”356
For example, Professor Ross observes, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins357
Justice Brandeis wrote for the majority that “Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State.”358  “In
expounding this theory of federalism and congressional power,” notes Pro-
fessor Ross, “Brandeis implicitly rejected the possibility that the commerce
clause might permit Congress to authorize the federal courts to craft rules of
common law in diversity litigation.”359  Indeed, Professor Ross insists that Erie
“implicitly invoked the Tenth Amendment by alleging that Swift permitted
federal courts to invade rights that ‘are reserved by the Constitution to the
several States.’”360  Clearly, the commerce power was still far from plenary in
1938.  Similarly, Professor Ross maintains that the Court’s labor decisions in
the late 1930s and 1940s “continue[d] to acknowledge the practical realities
of a national labor market while remaining sensitive to the exigencies of fed-
eralism.”361  He is cognizant of the fact that much of the early New Deal
failed to pass constitutional muster because it directly regulated production,
while much of the later New Deal, which instead astutely sought to regulate
interstate marketing in such troubled sectors as energy and agriculture, sur-
vived constitutional challenge for that very reason.362  And he correctly
points out that it was not until the 1941 decision in United States v. Darby363
that the Court effectively overruled Carter Coal.364
Professor Ross’s account of substantive due process also demonstrates
prudent judgment.365  He quite properly recognizes that the decision
356 ROSS, supra note 59, at 147 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37). R
357 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
358 Id. at 78.
359 ROSS, supra note 59, at 169. R
360 Id. (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 80).
361 Id. at 147.
362 Id. at 152–54.
363 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
364 Id. at 123.
365 There is, however, the arguable exception of his treatment of Railroad Retirement
Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935), in which Professor Ross breaks with his
general narrative equanimity to criticize Justice Roberts’s majority opinion as “contemptu-
ous” and “always unmistakably sarcastic.” ROSS, supra note 59, at 64.  Professor Ross over- R
looks the fact that the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hughes, which was joined by
Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, agreed with Roberts “that the requirement that the
carriers shall pay retiring allowances to [all workers in service one year prior to the enact-
ment, although they might never be re-employed] is arbitrary and beyond the power of
Congress,” that is, that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. R.R.
Ret. Bd., 295 U.S. at 389 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting).  Professor Ross asserts that “Roberts’s
opinion [for the Court]”—and by implication, this passage from Hughes’s dissent—“was a
classic specimen of substantive due process, for it unabashedly substituted the Court’s own
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upholding Washington state’s minimum wage statute for women in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish was a “watershed” in that it overruled Adkins v. Chil-
dren’s Hospital, a decision with “immense practical and symbolic significance”
that was one of the last remaining high-profile precedents from the so-called
Lochner era.  At the same time, Professor Ross understands that, as a doctrinal
matter, Hughes’s opinion for the majority “was not itself revolutionary.”366
The Chief Justice there employed fairly conventional police power analysis in
upholding the statute, analysis of the very sort that his predecessor William
Howard Taft had employed when dissenting from the majority opinion in
Adkins in 1923.  As Professor Ross observes, Hughes’s “heavy reliance upon
the state’s interest in protecting the health of women did not foreclose the
Court from invoking liberty of contract in other cases.”367  At the same time,
Professor Ross recognizes that Hughes and Roberts continued even after West
Coast Hotel to invoke the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses to invalidate regulatory legislation, in precisely the same
ways that they had in cases decided in 1935 and 1936.368  As he puts it,
“Hughes and Roberts were found in dissent in some important cases . . . for
they never were willing to defer to Congress so thoroughly as some of their
brethren.”369  In sum, Professor Ross concludes, “the voting patterns and
doctrinal beliefs of the justices did not change as much during 1937 as the
actual outcome of the Court’s decisions might suggest.”370
It is therefore quite curious to find Professor Ross periodically offering
evaluations of the Court’s performance that seem to be entirely at odds with
the assessments I have just reviewed.  For example, after arguing that the
deference accorded to the legislature in West Coast Hotel was entirely continu-
ous with what the Court had said and done in O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Insurance Co.371 in 1931 and Nebbia in 1934, he claims that “[t]he
Court’s decision in West Coast Hotel signaled the Court’s abandonment after
1937 of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as grounds for nullifying eco-
nomic regulatory legislation.”372  To see why this is such an odd assertion,
consider three contemporaneous cases in which the Hughes Court invali-
dated an economic regulation on the ground that it violated the Fourteenth
assessment of the law’s justification for those of Congress.”  ROSS, supra note 59, at 64.  If by R
this he means that the Court undertook an independent inquiry into the statute’s constitu-
tionality, this is true not only of substantive due process, but of all judicial review.  If he
means to suggest that in all substantive due process cases the Court substituted its policy
judgments for those of the legislature, then his understanding of the doctrine diverges
significantly from the revisionist consensus that has emerged among constitutional histori-
ans since the 1970s. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 139. R
366 ROSS, supra note 59, at 119. R
367 Id.
368 See id. at 153.
369 Id. at 166–67.
370 Id. at 135.
371 282 U.S. 251, 258 (1931) (upholding state regulation of commissions paid to agents
selling fire insurance).
372 ROSS, supra note 59, at 141. R
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Amendment.  First, less than two months before West Coast Hotel was
announced, the Court in Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. unani-
mously invalidated a natural gas proration order issued by the Texas Railroad
Commission on the ground that it deprived some owners of their property
without due process.373  Moreover, it is clear that Hughes and Roberts did
not regard their votes in West Coast Hotel as a repudiation of Thompson, for
they dissented when Thompson was effectively overruled in 1940.374  Second,
on May 24, the very day that the Social Security Cases were handed down,
Hughes joined the Four Horsemen in invalidating on equal protection
grounds a Georgia statute regulating stock insurance companies less favora-
bly than it did mutual insurance companies.375  How, one wonders, is this
consistent with the claim that in West Coast Hotel Hughes was signaling that he
would never again vote to nullify another economic regulation on Four-
teenth Amendment grounds?  Third, as Professor Ross briefly notes, “the
Court invoked substantive due process early in 1938 to strike down a Califor-
nia tax on a Connecticut insurance contract.”376  That opinion was written by
Justice Stone, and was joined by all of the other remaining members of the
West Coast Hotel majority who participated in the decision—Hughes, Bran-
deis, and Roberts.  The lone dissenting vote was cast by the sole Roosevelt
appointee, Justice Hugo Black.377  Are we to understand this as evidence of
backsliding by these Justices from the commitments that they had made in
West Coast Hotel never again to vote to nullify economic legislation on Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment grounds?  Or is it possible instead that Professor
Ross has exaggerated the commitments that West Coast Hotel entailed?
Moreover, as Professor Ross recognizes, Hughes and Roberts “continued
in some cases to deny the constitutionality of economic legislation”378 under
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.379  Internal Court documents reveal
that as late as 1939, Roberts continued to believe that Alton had been cor-
rectly decided,380 and this is corroborated by the inclusion of a favorable
citation to Alton in Justice Stone’s opinion in United States v. Carolene Products
373 Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 81 (1937).
374 See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 584–85 (1940)
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
375 Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937).
376 ROSS, supra note 59, at 141. R
377 Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 82 (1938) (Cardozo, J., took no
part in the decision).
378 ROSS, supra note 59, at 142. R
379 See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 511–15 (1945) (Rob-
erts, J. & Stone, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 393
(1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Alderson, 324 U.S.
182, 192–93 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93–94
(1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533,
583–87 (1939) (Roberts, J. & Hughes, C.J., dissenting); Cushman, supra note 309, at R
136–41; Cushman, supra note 139, at 984–95. R
380 See Cushman, supra note 139, at 991–92. R
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Co.381  Indeed, Justice Black refused to join the famous Part “Third” of that
opinion precisely because it reserved to the Court the power to invalidate
economic regulations on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.382
None of this is consistent with the claim that the members of the West Coast
Hotel majority were signaling “the Court’s abandonment after 1937 of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as grounds for nullifying economic regu-
latory legislation.”383
Similarly puzzling in light of his account of the Social Security and Com-
merce Clause cases is Professor Ross’s assertion that “[t]he Hughes Court’s
unwavering deference to Congress in a long line of important decisions dur-
ing the spring of 1937 provided powerful evidence of a profound shift in the
Court’s direction.”384  Consider the other 1937 cases involving the exercise
of federal power. Virginian Railway Co. v. Federation unanimously upheld the
1934 amendments to the Railway Labor Act.385 Wright v. Vinton Branch of the
Mountain Trust Bank unanimously upheld the revised Frazier-Lemke Farm
Debt Relief Act.386  Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB unan-
imously upheld the application of the National Labor Relations Act to an
interstate bus company.387 Sonzinsky v. United States unanimously upheld a
stiff federal excise tax on certain firearms.388  Each of these opinions was
joined by all of the Four Horsemen, who did not hesitate to dissent from
such landmark decisions as West Coast Hotel, four of the five cases involving
the National Labor Relations Act, and one or more of the Social Security Cases.
In view of their willingness to dissent in such high-profile cases, it is hard to
understand how they could have joined such unanimous opinions for any
reason other than that they regarded the statutes involved as constitutional.
And if such decisions did not constitute a “profound shift” on the part of the
Four Horsemen, then it is difficult to understand how they could have consti-
tuted such a shift for Hughes and Roberts, or for the Court as a whole.
This point can be extended.  Recall that the vote to uphold the old-age
provisions of the Social Security Act was seven to two, with Van Devanter and
Sutherland joining the majority.  Recall also that those two Justices dissented
from the opinion upholding the unemployment insurance provisions of the
Act on “surprisingly narrow grounds,”389 making the decision there very
nearly seven to two.390  Finally, recall that in the case of Associated Press v.
381 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938); see Cushman, supra note 309, at 132–35; Cushman, supra R
note 139, at 994. R
382 See Cushman, supra note 309, at 134–35; Cushman, supra note 139, at 994–95. R
383 ROSS, supra note 59, at 141. R
384 Id.
385 Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 563 (1937).
386 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937).
387 301 U.S. 142, 147 (1937).
388 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937).
389 ROSS, supra note 59, at 129. R
390 Earlier in the narrative Professor Ross contends that Alton “clouded the constitu-
tionality of the Social Security Act . . . which contained provisions closely resembling those
in the railroad statute.” Id. at 64.  It is not clear to which provisions of the Social Security
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NLRB, the Four Horsemen dissented solely on the grounds that application
of the NLRA to the AP violated the First Amendment, and not on Commerce
Clause grounds.391  If one or more of the Four Horsemen did not doubt that
these statutes fell within the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers, one
wonders, then why should it be surprising that Hughes and Roberts also
believed that they were constitutional?
In fact, Professor Ross appears to believe that this “profound shift”
began even before the spring of 1937:
The Court’s opinions during the two months after the election seemed to
give credence to the fictional Mr. Dooley’s famous observation that the
Court “follows the ’liction returns.”  During this period, the Court sustained
a major state insurance unemployment law, expanded the scope of the com-
merce clause, broadened the reach of civil liberties, upheld a key provision
of the federal bankruptcy law, construed the federal taxing power in a man-
ner that facilitated the Roosevelt administration’s fiscal policy, and broadly
construed the president’s power over foreign relations.392
“In their totality,”393 Professor Ross concludes, this “spate of ‘liberal’
decisions”394 “seemed to many Americans to signal a change of direction by
the Court.”395
Here again, the perception that the Justices had changed direction
seems untenable, because nearly all of the cases Professor Ross enlists in sup-
port of this claim were decided by unanimous or near-unanimous votes.  The
unemployment insurance case was decided by an equally divided Court,396
Act Professor Ross refers, nor in what ways the provisions of the 1934 Railroad Retirement
Act “closely resembled” those provisions.  But if the resemblance was as close as Professor
Ross suggests, one has to wonder why Sutherland and Van Devanter joined the majority to
uphold the Act’s old-age pension provisions in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); why
they concurred in most of what Cardozo wrote in upholding the unemployment insurance
provisions in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); and why the dissenting
Justices in the Social Security Cases never even mentioned Alton in their opinions.
391 301 U.S. 103, 133 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
392 ROSS, supra note 59, at 97. R
393 Id.
394 Id. at 101.
395 Id. at 97.  In an article published two years before his book appeared, Professor Ross
put forward a different view of these decisions:
A careful analysis of these “forgotten” decisions indicates that this so-called
revolution, or “switch,” was not merely an abrupt response to external factors, and
that the Court’s hostility toward regulatory legislation during 1935–36 was anoma-
lous.  Since such an analysis of these decisions suggests that the Court was not
directly influenced by the threat of Court-curbing in the wake of either the 1936
election or Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan, the “forgotten” decisions provide sup-
port for the thesis that the “judicial revolution” was more the product of jurispru-
dential evolution than political pressure.
William G. Ross, When Did the “Switch in Time” Actually Occur?: Re-discovering the Supreme
Court’s “Forgotten” Decisions of 1936–1937, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1153, 1220 (2005).
396 W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1936) (per curiam).
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but the Commerce Clause,397 civil liberties,398 bankruptcy,399 and taxing
power400 cases Professor Ross discusses were all decided without a dissenting
vote, and the foreign relations power case was decided by a vote of eight to
one.401  Professor Ross observes that “[t]he Court’s validation of economic
regulations during the winter of 1936–1937 was perceived by some as indica-
tions that at least Hughes and Roberts feared that Roosevelt’s landslide
would embolden the president to curb the Court,”402 but the unanimity of so
many of these decisions makes this perception difficult to credit.  McReyn-
olds and others of the Four Horsemen dissented in the most high-profile
cases that the administration cared the most about (e.g., the Labor Board
Cases, the Social Security Cases, and West Coast Hotel).  In light of their perform-
ances in such landmark cases, it is hard to believe that the Four Horsemen
voted to sustain the legislation involved in these lower-profile cases only
because they feared that Roosevelt would try to curb the Court.  And if that
supposition is not reasonable with respect to the Four Horsemen, it is diffi-
cult to see why would it be reasonable with respect to Hughes and Roberts,
who were already much more likely than the Four Horsemen to sustain eco-
nomic legislation.  Again, one is led to the conclusion that the Justices genu-
inely believed that these measures they upheld in the winter of 1936–1937
were actually constitutional.  Where, one is left to ask, is the evidence to sup-
port the claim that the Court’s “unwavering deference to Congress in a long
line of important decisions in the spring of 1937 provided powerful evidence
of a profound shift in the Court’s direction”?403
Professor Ross appears to believe that the string of government victories
alone supplies such powerful evidence.  But the fact that the government
happens to win a series of cases does not necessarily mean that the Court has
changed its “attitude” toward the type of legislation in question.  It may sim-
ply reflect the fact that the legal details of the cases and statutes that have
397 Ky. Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937).  The decision upheld a
federal statute prohibiting interstate shipment of convict-made goods into states banning
the sale of such products. Id. at 353.  Professor Ross appears to believe that the decision
was inconsistent with both Carter Coal and Hammer v. Dagenhart. ROSS, supra note 59, at R
98–99.  This was not the view taken by the Four Horsemen, who joined Kentucky Whip and
yet continued to think that Carter Coal and Hammer were still good law. See Mulford v.
Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 53, 55–56 (1939) (Butler & McReynolds, JJ., dissenting); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76, 96, 99 (1937) (McReynolds, Van Devanter, Suther-
land, & Butler, JJ., dissenting).  Many commentators and lower federal judges shared this
view. See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 177–82.  Indeed, in the preceding year all Four Horse-
men had joined in upholding a federal statute divesting convict-made goods of their inter-
state character upon arrival in a destination state, thereby allowing local law prohibiting
the sale of such goods to apply, freed from the constraints imposed by the dormant Com-
merce Clause. See Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).
398 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
399 Kuehner v. Irving Trust, 299 U.S. 445 (1937).
400 United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937).
401 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
402 ROSS, supra note 59, at 101. R
403 Id. at 141.
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come before the Court are materially different from those that the Court has
addressed previously.  Consider, for example, the Frazier-Lemke Farm Debt
Relief Act of 1934.  In 1935, Justice Brandeis wrote for a unanimous Court
that five of the statute’s provisions deprived mortgage creditors of their prop-
erty without due process.404  Working from the blueprint set out in Bran-
deis’s opinion, Congress quickly enacted a revised statute that was widely
recognized as remedying the defects the Court had identified in the early
version.405  Indeed, as Professor Ross reports, The Nation observed that the
Court’s unanimous decision upholding the revised statute in 1937406 was
“not especially remarkable” because “Congress in redrafting the Frazier-
Lemke Act had worked so ‘laboriously to the meet the court’s objections’ in
its 1935 decision.”407  Yet Professor Ross maintains that in the 1937 decision
the Court “appeared to reverse itself” by unanimously upholding the revised
measure, “which was nearly identical to the legislation that the Court unani-
mously had struck down two years earlier.”408  But it is clear that the statutes
were far from identical, and the unanimity of the two decisions with no inter-
vening personnel changes casts grave doubt on the contention that there was
any reversal of position involved.
How does someone of Professor Ross’s obvious knowledge and ability
fall into such difficulties?  One can only speculate, but I want to suggest that
the difficulty is traceable to the attitudinal presuppositions with which he
starts and the related political taxonomy through which he initially sets out to
understand the Justices.  It flows from a determination, which he sometimes
resists, to attempt to understand the performance of the Justices through
analytic dichotomies like “liberal” and “conservative.”  On such an account,
the Justices are the moving parts of the story.  If they invalidate a regulation,
they are being “conservative”; if they later uphold a comparable measure,
they have “switched” to being “liberal.”  This mode of analysis is not peculiar
to Professor Ross’s discussion of 1937—it makes appearances at other points
in the narrative as well.  For example, he characterizes a series of decisions
upholding various state and federal economic regulations between 1930 and
1932 as evidence of “the Court’s renewed receptivity toward economic regu-
lation”409 and its “growing deference to state economic regulation.”410  The
Court, on this account, was becoming more “liberal.”  Yet like many of the
decisions that Professor Ross believes constitute the evidence of a “profound
shift” in 1937, many of the cases Professor Ross discusses in support of this
thesis also were decided by unanimous votes.411  These government victories
404 Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 594–95 (1935).
405 See Cushman, supra note 16, at 81–83. R
406 See Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
407 ROSS, supra note 59, at 121. R
408 Id. at 120.
409 Id. at 31.
410 Id. at 34.
411 See, e.g., Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932); Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cin-
cinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931); Staten Island Rapid
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weren’t eked out by narrow margins—they commanded the support of all of
the Justices.  Are we to understand that the Four Horsemen, in voting to
sustain such legislation, were becoming more “liberal,” more “receptive” to
economic regulation than they had been previously?  Their continued resis-
tance to certain types of regulation throughout this period makes that highly
doubtful; and if that is not the best account of the reasons for the Four
Horsemen’s votes in these decisions, then there is no reason to believe that it
is the best account of the Court’s behavior as a whole.  There is no good
reason to think that the Justices voted to uphold these statutes for any reason
other than that they thought that the measures were constitutional.  Indeed,
as Professor Ross himself points out, eighty-five percent of the cases the
Court decided between 1930 and 1934 were unanimous.  Only three percent
were decided by a margin of only one vote.412  The notion that the Four
Horsemen ever set a face of flint to all forms of economic regulation is noth-
ing more than a myth.  Throughout their careers they voted to uphold many,
many economic regulations—it was not necessary that they “change” or
“shift” in order to do so.413  Unless we are to posit that all of the Justices were
subject to extreme degrees of vicissitude, a model that envisions the Justices
constantly vacillating between “liberal” and “conservative” postures can
account for the behavior of none of the Hughes Court Justices.  For through-
out their careers, all of the Justices were on such an account both liberal and
conservative.  It is only through sensitivity to the legal details of cases and
statutes, which Professor Ross demonstrates often but not consistently, that
we are enabled to see the performances of the Justices as anything other than
ultimately mystifying, inscrutable, and chaotic.
D. Parrish
Professor Parrish distances himself from “traditional accounts” that
“emphasize the importance of 1937 and argue that the Hughes Court exe-
cuted a sudden constitutional revolution, an abrupt departure from earlier
rulings when it came under intense political pressure from Roosevelt and
Congress.”414  Instead, he clearly associates himself with “[r]evisionist inter-
pretations” that “stress a more gradual constitutional evolution during the
decade, one with doctrinal roots that reached back to the jurisprudence of
Transit Ry. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 281 U.S. 98 (1930); Cochran v. La. State Bd. of Educ.,
281 U.S. 370 (1930); Corp. Comm’n of Okla. v. Lowe, 281 U.S. 431 (1930); Paramount
Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930); United States v. First Nat’l Pic-
tures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930); Tex. & New Orleans R.R. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281
U.S. 548 (1930) (McReynolds, J., took no part in the decision); ROSS, supra note 59, at R
31–32, 43.
412 ROSS, supra note 59, at 54 (“[O]nly 25 of the 798 cases adjudicated by the Court R
during the 1930 through 1934 terms were decided by a margin of one vote.  Some 85
percent of the decisions during these five terms were unanimous.”).
413 See Cushman, supra note 58, at 566–71, 605–36. R
414 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 23. R
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the Taft and White eras.”415  He maintains that “[t]he year 1937, dominated
by the ‘Court-packing’ fight and the Court’s endorsement of critical New
Deal reforms, has loomed so large in histories of the era that it has tended to
oversimplify the convoluted course of constitutional development during the
decade,”416 and urges greater attention to “the internal dynamics of legal
reasoning and the more astute lawyering of the Roosevelt administration and
its allies after 1935.”417  He rejects the contentions of scholars such as
Edward Corwin and Bruce Ackerman that American constitutional law
underwent a “sea change” during Hughes’s tenure.418  While he recognizes
that decisions such as Nebbia, West Coast Hotel, and Jones & Laughlin “formally
emancipated both state and federal governmental authority from constitu-
tional constraints that had limited their regulatory functions over the previ-
ous half century,” he insists that those constraints “had been weakened
significantly during the progressive movement prior to World War I and even
during the years of so-called constitutional fundamentalism under Chief Jus-
tice Taft.  The depression decade,” on this view, “provided the occasion for
their final interment through a slow ritual that might have been shortened
had the Court not been often sharply divided and, like most courts, unwilling
to break too suddenly from the doctrinal grooves laid down in the past.”419
“In short, the Hughes Court finally confirmed the revolution in the relation-
ship between the state and the American economy, one made ad hoc, piece
by piece, at least since the eras of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wil-
son.”420  “American constitutional law,” he concludes, “has been one long,
winding river of development.  So, too, with Hughes and his brethren.  The
road to West Coast Hotel, Jones & Laughlin, or Herndon v. Lowry had been
mapped, however faintly, by those jurists who came before them.”421
Professor Parrish recognizes the important role that the narrow category
of “‘businesses affected with a public interest’” played in limiting govern-
ment power to regulate wages and prices before 1934.422
Marshaling a slim majority of five, the Hughes Court methodically chipped
away at this inherited due process limitation beginning in 1931 with
415 Id.
416 Id. at 27.
417 Id. at 23.
418 Id. at 127.  At another point, however, he writes:
A legal historian can plausibly argue that America’s constitutional world under-
went a . . . fundamental transformation during the years of Hughes’s tenure as
chief justice, sometime between 1934 and 1938 “or thereabouts.”  These middle
years of the Great Depression, punctuated by Roosevelt’s abortive court-packing
proposal, provided a series of Supreme Court rulings that simultaneously emanci-
pated government to manage the nation’s economy and enlarge greatly the scope
of basic civil liberties . . . .
Id. at 177.
419 Id. at 127.
420 Id. at 127–28.
421 Id. at 177.
422 Id. at 152 (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 201 U.S. 502, 536 (1934)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 49 30-MAY-14 13:52
2014] the  jurisprudence  of  the  hughes  court 1977
O’Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., which sustained a legislative
regulation of the commissions paid to insurance agents by their companies.
Nebbia three years later effectively eliminated “business affected with a public
interest” as a due process barrier to price regulations mandated by the
state . . . .423
“The Four Horsemen, who dissented [in Nebbia], rightly regarded this
judicial innovation as one that opened wide the doors to legislative control of
the economy. Blaisdell and Nebbia, it can be argued, represented a significant
shift in constitutional doctrine equal to any that came later.”424  For Nebbia
“ultimately laid the foundation for the successful defense of state and federal
minimum wage legislation,”425 “and the walls came tumbling down on mini-
mum wage statutes with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish (1937), despite the brief
procedural detour taken in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo (1936).”426
With respect to developments in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence,
Professor Parrish emphasizes the importance of the doctrinal categories the
Hughes Court Justices inherited, and the inattentiveness of early New Deal
lawyers to the restraints those categories imposed.  “From the perspective of
most justices who served on the Court in the first four decades of the twenti-
eth century,” Professor Parrish tells us:
[T]he distinction between commerce on the one hand and production/
manufacturing on the other played a fundamental role in their conception
of American federalism.  That federalism, most assumed, had been
enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, which cabined the scope of national
jurisdiction and preserved the autonomy of the states.  They could not imag-
ine a constitutional world influenced by macroeconomic theory, where even
the most localized forms of behavior by businessmen, financiers, or farmers
could be conceptually linked to national commerce among the states.427
Similar to the situation they faced with respect to the states’ police
power and the Fourteenth Amendment, the Hughes justices inherited a
series of precedents that both limited and expanded the scope of Congress’s
423 Id.
424 Id. at 28.  I believe that Professor Parrish is mistaken in his assertion that Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion saw him “[t]emporarily resurrecting the public/private distinc-
tion he had cast overboard with respect to state regulation in Nebbia,” and that his analysis
departed “fundamentally from the Court’s historic Commerce Clause jurisprudence touch-
ing the railroad industry.” Id. at 29; see Cushman, supra note 2, at 242, 247–48.  However, R
Professor Parrish astutely observes that the dissenting Chief Justice Hughes also “found
other provisions in the statute to be violations of due process,” and that “[a]s Hughes
suggested in his dissent in Alton, Congress later in the decade proved capable of rewriting a
railroad pension law that enjoyed the support of management and the unions and
remained immune to similar due process challenges.” PARRISH, supra note 149, at 98. R
425 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 66. R
426 Id. at 152.  Professor Parrish also rightly observes that West Coast Hotel did not signal
Hughes’s and Roberts’s complete abandonment of the view that the Due Process Clause
imposed limitations on state and federal regulatory power, as their dissents in Railroad
Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 585 (1940), made clear. PARRISH,
supra note 149, at 99. R
427 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 97. R
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authority under Article I, conceptual categories that often baffled lay observ-
ers because of their apparent contradictions.428
It was “[t]he failure of lawyers in the early years of the New Deal to fully
appreciate these inherited conceptual categories” that “accounted in large
measure for their lack of success before Hughes and his brethren.”429  This
assessment was shared by Justice Brandeis, “who remarked to Frankfurter in
the summer of 1933: ‘Our Court will apparently be confronted, in a time of
greatest need of help, with a Department of Justice as incompetent as was
that of Mitchell Palmer.’”430  “Unwilling to accept any responsibility for the
fate of these statutes, even when their judicial allies joined the majority, the
New Dealers simply blamed the Court for the constitutional impasse that
seemed to have developed by 1937.”431
Professor Parrish asserts that “[n]o member of the Hughes Court broke
entirely free of these conceptual categories when considering the scope of
Congress’s authority to regulate commerce among the states, although Stone
and Cardozo came the closest to doing so.”432  It was Cardozo’s “pragmatic,
flexible approach to issues arising under the commerce power” articulated in
his Schechter concurrence that “laid the foundation for the more expansive
doctrines that emerged in Jones & Laughlin” and later cases.433  Indeed, he
cautions against exaggeration of the discontinuity between Jones & Laughlin
and the cases that preceded that decision.  “Invoking many prior rulings that
had located federal jurisdiction within a so-called stream of commerce or
current of commerce,” Professor Parrish explains,
Hughes turned back the argument that the steelmakers’ local labor conflict
lay beyond the control of Congress . . . . Without overruling them, Hughes
forcefully distinguished both Schechter and Carter Coal as irrelevant to the
present case because neither presented an issue of obstructing or burdening
interstate commerce.  In Schechter interstate commerce had ended at the
kosher plant.  In Carter Coal it had not yet begun.434
Accordingly, Hughes did not
have to bend his jurisprudential principles very far in order to sustain the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board in Jones & Laughlin. . . .
Even in Carter Coal, Hughes had left himself an exit when it came to the
scope of the commerce power, enough wiggle room to sustain Congress
428 Id. at 158.
429 Id. at 97.
430 Id. at 97–98.  According to Professor Parrish, “The administration’s simple failure to
publish its ‘hot oil’ regulations in 1933 confirmed this judgment.” Id. at 98.
431 Id. at 158 (“They did not immediately see that short-term defeats often contained
the doctrinal seeds of major victories such as occurred in United States v. Butler (1936),
which invalidated the AAA, but also yoked Congress’s taxing and spending powers to the
General Welfare Clause with language broad enough to encompass an extraordinary range
of future federal initiatives, including Social Security.”).
432 Id. at 97.
433 Id. at 109.
434 Id. at 36.
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when the appropriate facts presented themselves, as they did in 1937 thanks
to the careful selection of cases and litigation strategy by administration law-
yers. Jones & Laughlin bore slight resemblance to the Schechter Brothers.435
Similarly, Roberts’s votes in the Labor Board Cases “present few[ ] inter-
pretative problems,” for “nothing said about the distinction between ‘com-
merce’ and ‘production’ with respect to coal mining excluded the
application of another time-honored concept, a ‘current of commerce,’ to
steel producers or companies manufacturing clothing and trailers.”436
“Nonetheless,” Professor Parrish maintains,
Jones & Laughlin involved a big step for Hughes and the majority, because
the cases that employed the metaphors of “obstruction,” “interference,” or
“burden” to sustain the commerce power had arisen usually in relation to
the railroad industry and/or economic activities that involved rates, prices,
or buying and selling, not industrial manufacturing, mining, or agriculture
per se.437
This may understate the significance of Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in
Stafford v. Wallace, in which he upheld federal regulation of prices charged
for the agricultural activities of housing, feeding, and watering livestock in
major stockyards, and wrote of the federally regulable stream of commerce
flowing through “slaughtering centers” engaged in acts of production.438  It
may also overlook earlier decisions holding that the Sherman Act could
reach local activities of production undertaken with the intent to restrain
interstate commerce.439  But Professor Parrish recognizes that, even after
Jones & Laughlin, “[t]he line of cases that stressed a distinction between ‘pro-
duction’ or ‘manufacturing’ and ‘commerce’ as well as those that empha-
sized ‘direct’ as opposed to ‘indirect’ effects, still retained their vitality.”440  It
was only in Darby that Hughes “[r]eluctantly . . . went along with this near
coup de grace to the venerable distinction between ‘commerce’ and ‘produc-
tion’, something he had studiously avoided in 1937.”441  The “inherited intel-
lectual framework of Commerce Clause analysis” continued to exercise “a
powerful influence on virtually all of the justices, wholly apart from external
political and economic pressures or the addition of new members [of the
435 Id. at 39.
436 Id. Professor Parrish similarly sees no significant difficulty in accounting for Rob-
erts’s votes in United States v. Butler and the Social Security Cases, for “Cardozo relied on
Butler’s sweeping conception of ‘the general welfare’ as the foundation of his opinion in
Helvering v. Davis.” Id.
437 Id. at 160.
438 258 U.S. 495, 514 (1922).
439 See, e.g., Local 167, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934);
Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters’ Ass’n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Coronado
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
440 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 160. R
441 Id. at 40.
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Court].”442  In particular, both Hughes and Roberts “had great difficulty
accepting Stone’s opinion in Darby Lumber (1941), which sustained the
authority of Congress to regulate ‘production for commerce.’”443
Yet Professor Parrish does not contend that these inherited categories
left the Justices with no room for maneuver.  Instead, he believes that the
Court’s decisions reflect an ongoing struggle over how best to understand
the deeper import of the American Constitution.  “By the 1930s the Supreme
Court had established several competing and often conflicting lines of prece-
dent that gave the justices a range of choices when they confronted constitu-
tional questions of federal and state power to regulate economic and social
life,”444 he writes.  “The Hughes Court inherited a range of doctrines touch-
ing basic issues of federalism and the American economy notable for their
complexity, nuance, and contradiction.  These circumstances left the justices
with unusual opportunity for choice in a political environment generating
new demands for national action.”445  Those choices would be informed by
basic views about the Constitution—was it fundamentally a limiting, or
instead an empowering, document?  “Depending upon how an individual jus-
tice answered that fundamental question, he would adopt a broad or narrow
conception of the government’s role with respect to taxation, spending, the
regulation of commerce, and the police power.”446  For example, did one
apply the distinction between production and commerce when analyzing
congressional power to regulate interstate commerce, or did one invoke the
stream of commerce metaphor?  Did one construe the category of businesses
affected with a public interest broadly or narrowly?  “Faced with the historic
choice of whether the Constitution was a document of limitations or a char-
ter of powers, the Hughes Court ultimately opted for the latter when it came
to the scope of federal authority over the nation’s basic economic
arrangements.”447
This account may overstate the extent to which any Justice, having made
prior jurisprudential commitments, enjoyed such a psychological experience
of liberty to choose among doctrines in any given case.  But it does provide a
framework for understanding the reactions of those who observed and were
often frustrated or mystified by the Court’s decisions.  For as Professor Par-
rish explains, this perception that the Hughes Court Justices were essentially
free to rule as they liked “exposed them to criticism on the grounds of judi-
cial subjectivity and arbitrariness.”448  “[T]he road to Darby and federal
supremacy over the basic rules of the national marketplace had been a
bumpy and twisting one for the Hughes Court prior to 1937, a journey that
inspired pungent criticism and helped to provoke the confrontation with the
442 Id. at 160.
443 Id.
444 Id. at 40.
445 Id. at 145.
446 Id. at 40.
447 Id. at 158.
448 Id. at 145.
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president and Congress.”449  “The road to that final destination in 1941
seemed to many contemporaries one of twists and turns, the view certainly of
President Roosevelt and the New Dealers, who bridled at the decisions that
struck down their initial recovery measures.”450
E. McKenna
Professor McKenna recognizes that 1937 witnessed substantial develop-
ment in the Court’s constitutional doctrine, but she resists the contention
that these developments constituted a sudden discontinuity.451  Instead, she
maintains that “the changes that occurred in American constitutional juris-
prudence stretched over a much longer period than three short months in
1937.”452  Because much of Professor McKenna’s discussion of doctrinal
development is inextricably tied to her analysis of issues of causation, I defer
review of most of her treatment of the cases to that later section of this Arti-
cle.  But there are a couple of doctrinal points that merit mention at this
juncture.
First, Professor McKenna suggests that Alton’s “extremely narrow con-
struction of Congress’s commerce power” marked “any future pension law
unconstitutional.”453  This, however, is mistaken.  As Professor Ralph Fuchs
suggested in a law review article published shortly after the decision, Con-
gress could fund pensions for railroad retirees out of general revenue and
thereby insulate those payments from challenge under the taxpayer standing
doctrine.454  Congress followed this plan with the Railroad Retirement Act of
1937, which remains with us in modified form to this day.455
Second, Professor McKenna also suggests that Alton “signaled forebod-
ings of what the Court’s attitude would be toward”456 the Social Security leg-
islation then making its way through congressional committees.  An editorial
in Business Week predicted that the Court would “‘smash any social security
legislation that may be passed by Congress,’”457 Democratic Senator William
King of Utah thought that portions of the statute were “flatly unconstitu-
tional,” and Homer Cummings expressed his concern over the Act’s pros-
pects to Roosevelt in a memorandum written the day after Alton was handed
down.458  On the other hand, Professor McKenna observes that “Senator
Borah disagreed, joining those who argued that the Alton decision was not
going to ‘put up any bars for the social security legislation,’” and that
449 Id. at 146.
450 Id. at 158.
451 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at xxiv. R
452 Id.
453 Id. at 70.
454 Ralph F. Fuchs, Judicial Method and the Constitutionality of the N.I.R.A., 20 ST. LOUIS L.
REV. 199, 209 n.34 (1935).
455 Cushman, supra note 16, at 90–91. R
456 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 70. R
457 Id. (quoting 5 to 4 Against, BUSINESS WEEK, May 11, 1935, at 7–8).
458 Id. at 71.
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“[a]dministration lawyers agreed with him.  In their opinion, the railway deci-
sion was no blanket injunction against all social legislation.”459  At hearings
held before the Senate Finance Committee, Assistant Attorney General
Angus MacLean assured the Senators “that the railway pension decision
would not have the effect of upsetting the social security program because
the new bill was being framed on constitutional grounds different from those
in the invalidated railroad pension law.”460  “Speaking for himself and the
Justice Department, MacLean asserted that the opinion in the Railroad
Retirement Act case was not decisive in its bearing on the social security legis-
lation, and not directly authoritative, because the two dealt with entirely dif-
ferent constitutional questions.”461  As it would turn out, Borah and
MacLean would be proved correct, and by a vote of seven to two.
III. CAUSATION
A. Shogan
Mr. Shogan ascribes the Court’s decisions in the spring of 1937 entirely
to political motives.  He recognizes that Roberts voted in conference to
uphold the minimum wage law challenged in West Coast Hotel weeks before
the Court-packing plan was announced, and therefore his vote could not
have been a direct reaction to the President’s proposal.  Instead, Mr. Shogan
observes that Roberts’s “turnabout had come after Roosevelt’s thunderous
reelection victory, and when many believed some sort of presidential move
against the Court was in the cards.”462  He casts a skeptical eye at the “tor-
tured legal reasoning” Roberts’s later memorandum offered as an explana-
tion for his behavior in the minimum wage cases, suggesting instead that the
Justice “acted out of political motivation.”463  “Indeed,” he argues, “the Wag-
ner Act decisions reinforced the belief that the underlying cause for the
Court’s turnabout was not some sudden enlightenment but rather an effort
by Hughes, abetted by Roberts, to undermine support for the Court-packing
scheme.”464  “Hughes, who as chief justice was well positioned to carry out
such manipulation,” had conspired with Roberts “in order to frustrate
Roosevelt’s plans for revision of the Court.”465
B. Solomon
Mr. Solomon’s analysis of the reasons underlying the votes of Hughes
and Roberts in the spring of 1937 rests on a good degree of conjecture, some
of it remarkably confident in view of the evidence offered to support it.  His
459 Id. at 70.
460 Id.
461 Id. at 71.
462 SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 186. R
463 Id.
464 Id. at 188.
465 Id. at 186.
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account of Hughes’s thought processes appears in a single paragraph utterly
devoid of any supporting reference:
In Hughes’s mind, because the Court had taken sides against the peo-
ple, it had sunk to its low standing in the public’s eye—self-inflicted wounds,
as he liked to say.  If he hoped to restore the Court’s reputation, and thereby
to protect it from further harm, he felt it had to do the people’s bidding—to
follow, at least in a rough way, the election returns.  Otherwise the president
would surely succeed in expanding the Court, and forever after the justices
would have reason to worry about the president and the election returns.466
There is, to my knowledge, no evidence for any of this.  Moreover, the
claims that the Court had “taken sides against the people” and “sunk” to “low
standing in the public’s eye” are belied by a wealth of published, contempo-
rary polling data gathered by George Gallup and Elmo Roper.  For example,
Mr. Solomon claims that “Roberts’s opinion that abolished the AAA sparked
outrage all over the country,”467 and yet a Gallup poll published the week
that Butler was decided showed public opposition to the AAA running at 59-
41%.468  A Gallup poll taken one week before Schechter was handed down
showed that 62% of the public opposed the NIRA.469  The polling data do
not speak as directly to public views about other decisions, but “[i]n the
autumn of 1935 . . . only 31% of those polled said that they would ‘favor
limiting the power’” of the Court to declare congressional acts unconstitu-
tional,470 and by December of 1936 this number had risen only to 41%.471
In a Fortune survey published in April of 1936, nearly twice as many respon-
dents thought that the Court had “protected people against rash legislation”
as thought that the Court had “stood in the way of the people’s will.”472  The
magazine’s editors remarked that
New Dealers wishing to curtail the power of the Court by constitutional
amendment would apparently have a long handicap of established opinion
to overcome. . . . [S]upposing that the President were to consider basing his
campaign upon an attack on the Supreme Court, he would conclude that
there is political dynamite in appealing to the nation to curtail the powers of
the Court.473
And neither Roosevelt’s initial Court bill nor the substitute bill introduced in
the Senate that July ever commanded the support of a majority of the Ameri-
466 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 147–48. R
467 Id. at 80.
468 Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change
in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7, 36 (2002).
469 Id. at 33.
470 Id. at 67.
471 Id. at 68.  However, 59% of respondents to this poll did indicate a preference that
the Court be “more liberal in reviewing New Deal measures.” Id.
472 Id. at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A Fortune survey published in July of
1937 produced similar results. Id. at 70.
473 Id. at 67–68 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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can people.474  Such data offer substantial reasons to question Mr. Solomon’s
assertions concerning the interior life of the Chief Justice.
Mr. Solomon concludes that “Roberts’s reason—or reasons—for switch-
ing sides on the minimum wage for women was to become a historical mys-
tery, one destined never to be unambiguously resolved.”475  His efforts to
solve this mystery consider and ultimately reject a series of possible explana-
tions.  First, he affirms the common understanding that “it was indisputable,
as a simple matter of timing, that the Court-packing plan had made no
impact at all on Roberts’s reversal on the minimum wage.  His conversion,
though announced in March 1937, had already occurred by December 1936”
when Roberts voted to uphold the Washington minimum wage law in the
Justices’ conference.476  Mr. Solomon then entertains the possibility that
Roberts switched in response to Roosevelt’s landslide election in 1936, but it
is difficult to understand how that victory could have supplied any important
information concerning popular views on the minimum wage; both the
Republican platform and the Party’s standard-bearer Alf Landon explicitly
endorsed such legislation.477  The decision in West Coast Hotel would have
“followed the election returns” even if Landon had won in November.478
Indeed, Mr. Solomon goes on to suggest that Roberts “may have changed his
mind even earlier, before the election,” when he voted in conference on
October 10, 1936, to hear the appeal in West Coast Hotel.479
Mr. Solomon speculates that Roberts
also might have been embarrassed by the derision he took in the law jour-
nals, including the University of Pennsylvania’s, for his convoluted reasoning
in striking down the AAA and also for providing the fifth and decisive vote in
striking down New York’s minimum wage for women.  A scholar who sur-
veyed law journals found that eight of the nine that ventured an opinion on
the Tipaldo decision jeered.480
But if external criticism prompted Roberts’s change of vote, the effect must
have been cumulative.  For he responded to the criticism of his opinion strik-
ing down the AAA by voting later in the year to invalidate both the Guffey
Coal Act and the New York minimum wage law.  If he was as sensitive to
scholarly criticism as Mr. Solomon suggests, one has to wonder why this sensi-
tivity was not manifested earlier and more uniformly.
Mr. Solomon similarly rejects the contention that Roberts switched in
the minimum wage cases because he was, as Senator Sherman Minton and
others alleged, “ ‘just listening to the wee small voice of the chief justice that
474 Id. at 68 n.339.
475 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 210. R
476 Id.
477 CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 25–28. R
478 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 211. R
479 Id.  Mr. Solomon also suggests briefly that in June, when Tipaldo was handed down,
Roberts may have harbored hopes that he would be the Republican presidential nominee.
By the fall, however, this was no longer the case. Id. at 212.
480 Id.
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was talking politics to him.’”481  Mr. Solomon recognizes that “the two jus-
tices were close.”482  Roberts looked up to Hughes as a father or older
brother, and regarded the chief justice as “ ‘[i]n most ways . . . the greatest
man I have ever known.’”483  Nevertheless, Mr. Solomon regards it as
“unlikely that Hughes had openly coerced his younger brother on the bench.
For one thing,” he points out,
the Baptist preacher’s son made a point of never discussing the outcome of
cases beyond the Court’s conference room.  “Chief Justice Hughes was a
stickler for proprieties,” Roberts said later.  “He neither leaned on anyone
else for advice nor did he proffer advice or assistance to any of us, but left
each of us to form his own conclusions.”484
Instead, Mr. Solomon concludes that “[t]here was every reason to think
that Roberts had changed his mind on his own.  Since joining the Court, he
had been his own man.”  For example, he wrote dissenting opinions “far
more often than Hughes did.”485  Yet his votes in 1937 were not driven by
jurisprudential convictions, because “Owen Roberts’s life had dictated no
overarching philosophy of the law. . . .  He was a problem solver by nature,
captivated more by a pattern of facts than by a conceptual framework.”486
Instead, he was “untheoretical.”  “Indeed,” Mr. Solomon maintains, “his theo-
retical inconsistency was the essence of who he was. . . . Dogma contradicted
his nature; he had learned to see life from vantage points other than his
own.”487  He was “‘a conservative with liberal tendencies.’”488  His “idealism
had a practical cast.”489  As Erwin Griswold put it, Roberts displayed “‘a very
considerable flexibility of mind.’”490
As these remarks suggest, Mr. Solomon believes that the explanation for
Roberts’s behavior lies not in judicial philosophy, but instead in the Justice’s
life experience and personal temperament.  In a chapter entitled “A Good
Man’s Mind,”491 Mr. Solomon argues that Roberts was “refreshingly naı̈ve,”
“intellectually honest, personally tolerant, essentially a simple man—a good
man.”492  “He was a conventional man who believed in the conventional
things.”493  “Roberts was a man who went to church, donated to charity, and
involved himself in the community, working for the Boy Scouts though he
had no son.”494  Tellingly, “when he drove his automobile he tended to strad-
481 Id. at 211.
482 Id.
483 Id.
484 Id. at 212.
485 Id.
486 Id. at 213–14.
487 Id. at 214.
488 Id.
489 Id. at 215.
490 Id. at 214.
491 Id. at 209.
492 Id. at 214.
493 Id.
494 Id. at 215.
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dle the center line.”495  He “had seen different sides of life, and he had liked
them all.  As a lawyer, he had represented big corporations, and he had
fought against them.  He believed in property rights and in human rights.”496
He was a “denizen of Rittenhouse Square who liked to think of himself as a
farmer.”497  “On his farm he favored a khaki shirt, breeches, and a battered
straw hat.”498
His neighbors in Pennsylvania thought of him as “a humble, calm, everyday
person.”  In Washington, he was too thrifty ever to take a taxi or to let the
electric lights burn unnecessarily at home, yet he gave the most generous tip
of any justice—twenty-five cents—to the Supreme Court barber.499
And “[t]he justice who rode the trolley to work had never separated himself
from the reality around him. . . . [H]e felt comfortable in the twentieth cen-
tury, rooted in the real world.  By temperament, he was willing to accept the
changes that the new century, and its hard times, required.”500
Mr. Solomon is confident that this good man had changed his mind, but
he is more circumspect in discussing the potential reasons for the change.
Instead, he explores a number of possibilities.  As Mr. Solomon puts it, Rob-
erts had “evidently reached” the decision “to accept the changes that the new
century, and its hard times, required . . . sometime during the summer or fall
of 1936, and there may have been no single event that changed his mind.”501
Perhaps, he suggests, it was the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.  Perhaps it
was Somoza’s ouster of democratically elected President Adolfo Diaz in Nica-
ragua.  Perhaps it was Hitler’s proclamation that Max Schmeling’s victory
over Joe Louis at Yankee Stadium was evidence of white supremacy, and the
approbation that Der Führer seemed to enjoy among a number of promi-
nent Americans.  All of these events showed that a “nation’s stability was not
to be assumed.  [In the United States], across the land, amid the foreclo-
sures, the bankruptcies, the persistent unemployment—the social fabric con-
tinued to unravel.”502
On Mr. Solomon’s account, a particularly telling episode occurred no
more than a dozen miles from Roberts’s Pennsylvania farm a week before he
voted to note probable jurisdiction in West Coast Hotel.
As the customers arrived at Pratt Dutton’s Chester County farm for an auc-
tion of his possessions—to satisfy his $75 debt to the bank—the elderly
farmer opened fire from his barn, killing a neighbor and wounding three
others.  The anguish of the Depression on deadly display was front-page
news in Philadelphia and New York.  Had Roberts not voted to abolish the
495 Id.
496 Id. at 214.
497 Id.
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AAA’s agricultural subsidies, farmer Dutton might have been $75 richer, and
his neighbor Atlee Jackson might not have died.503
This rather macabre attempt to trace the cause of Mr. Jackson’s tragic
death back to Justice Roberts is difficult to credit.  First, as The New York Times
story to which Mr. Solomon cites makes clear, Mr. Dutton was a dairy farmer
whose herd had been destroyed when his cattle failed to pass a sanitation test
three months earlier, in July of 1936.  There is nothing in the article to sug-
gest that Mr. Dutton’s financial difficulties stemmed from the Court’s deci-
sion invalidating the AAA’s processing tax.504 The Philadelphia Inquirer’s
coverage similarly observed that Mr. Dutton’s debts had piled up since he
had lost his herd, and that he had gotten into trouble with the authorities for
continuing to sell the milk of his two surviving cows without a license.  The
article further states that Dutton was an eccentric who lived alone and had no
known relatives.  Again, there was nothing to suggest that the Butler decision
had anything to do with Mr. Dutton’s financial worries.505  Second, Roberts
and his colleagues did not vote to abolish the AAA’s agricultural subsidies.
They voted instead to invalidate the processing tax by which those subsidies
were financed.  After the processing tax was struck down, however, the gov-
ernment continued to make and farmers continued to receive the payments
promised under the AAA’s 1936 acreage reduction contracts, but now with
appropriations drawn from general revenue rather than from a fund
financed by an earmarked tax.  Under the taxpayer standing doctrine, such
appropriations were immune to constitutional challenge.506  Moreover,
within two months of the Butler decision Congress had enacted the Soil Con-
servation and Domestic Allotment Act, under which farmers were paid from
general revenue to shift acreage from soil-depleting surplus crops to soil-
building crops such as grasses and legumes.507  Unless Mr. Dutton’s case was
somehow unusual, Roberts’s opinion striking down the AAA’s processing tax
had no direct bearing on his financial condition.
The broader point again bears emphasis.  Mr. Solomon introduces this
anecdote with the observation that “John Maynard Keynes preached that an
economic depression could be sidestepped.”508  The inference to be drawn,
presumably, is that the Court was somehow interfering with the government’s
efforts to engage in the spending necessary to do so.  But as I have pointed
out above, the taxpayer standing doctrine immunized from judicial review
the many New Deal spending programs financed from general revenue.  The
Court’s justiciability doctrine freed the political branches to engage in the
503 Id. at 216.
504 See Pennsylvania Farmer Kills 1, Wounds 3 in Battle over Auction for $75 Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1936, at 1.
505 See 1 Slain, 3 Shot as Farmer and Posse Battle, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 3, 1936, at 1.
506 ALFANGE, supra note 290, at 180–81; see also F.G. Vogt & Sons, Inc. v. Rothensies, 11 R
F. Supp. 225, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1935) (discussing the taxpayer standing doctrine).
507 Cushman, supra note 16, at 92–93. R
508 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 215. R
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very sort of Keynesian experimentation that Mr. Solomon appears to believe
the Court was obstructing.
To his credit, Mr. Solomon does not try to pin Roberts’s alleged switch
entirely on the tragic murder of Atlee Jackson.  Instead he attributes the
putative alteration of view to Roberts’s sudden realization that
[t]he economy had changed—the world had changed—in ways that the
Founding Fathers could never have fathomed.  Yet they had been wise
enough, Roberts had begun to believe, to have provided for that.  “We live
today under a very different system from that contemplated by those who
drafted our Constitution,” he explained in a law review article after retiring
from the Court.  “A great virtue of the Constitution is the breadth and gener-
ality of its language.  Its phrases left latitude of action and room for interpre-
tation to meet changing conditions.”  He was persuading himself in 1936
and 1937 of the need for a living Constitution.  In his seventh year on the
Court, a lawyer’s lawyer was becoming a justice.509
Some may bristle at the notion that a “lawyer’s lawyer” is necessarily an
originalist, or that a “justice” must be a living constitutionalist.  But it is not
plausible that until the summer of 1936 Roberts was not alert to the fact that
there had been significant changes in the national economy between the
1780s and the Great Depression.  Surely he recognized that much in 1935
and 1936 as well.  And the idea that Roberts had no appreciation for the
virtues of an evolving constitutional “common law” until the summer of 1936
is quite difficult to reconcile, for example, with his landmark decision jet-
tisoning the category of business affected with a public interest from due
process doctrine in Nebbia v. New York, or with his concurrence in Chief Jus-
tice Hughes’s opinion upholding the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium in
Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell.  In fact, in the lecture to which Mr.
Solomon refers, Roberts pointed out that the Court had begun to recognize
the need for federal regulation of some local activities early in the twentieth
century,510 and Roberts himself joined opinions applying such doctrines well
before 1937.511  Indeed, in that same lecture Roberts referred to one such
doctrine in explaining the theory upon which the Wagner Act had been
enacted and sustained.  That statute, he explained,
premises its provisions upon the proposition that industrial conflicts inter-
fere with and limit interstate transportation and commerce.  Albeit a strike is
localized in a given community, the flow of goods to and from that commu-
nity is interfered with.  The interference may be so great as to be a matter of
national concern.512
509 Id. at 216 (quoting Owen J. Roberts, American Constitutional Government; The
Blueprint and the Structure, 29 B.U. L. REV. 1, 27 (1949)).
510 See Roberts, supra note 509, at 24–25; see also OWEN J. ROBERTS, THE COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 40–46 (1951).
511 See, e.g., Ohio v. United States, 292 U.S. 498 (1934); Florida v. United States, 292
U.S. 1 (1934); United States v. Louisiana, 290 U.S. 70 (1933).
512 Roberts, supra note 509, at 25.
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The doctrine to which Roberts alluded was the stream of commerce doctrine,
the theory on which the government lawyers had relied in defending the
Wagner Act before the Court.513  Though Mr. Solomon is confident that
“Roberts had switched” between Carter Coal and the Labor Board Cases,514
Charles Fahy, Warren Madden, Stanley Reed, and many legal commentators
and lower federal judges disagreed.515
But Mr. Solomon does not claim simply that Roberts became a living
constitutionalist.  He insists that Roberts became almost indifferent to law.
“He had come to believe, in effect, that the job of a Supreme Court justice
was to administer justice, not the law.  His evolving approach to the purpose
of the law was a matter of character more than of jurisprudence.”516  Mr.
Solomon contends that in his 1951 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at
Harvard, Roberts “explained his reasoning in the Wagner Act cases.”517  Mr.
Solomon displays his impatience with the discussion of legal doctrine when
he reports that, at the conclusion of “a ponderous lecture,” Roberts
remarked,
The continual expansion of federal power with consequent contraction of
state powers probably has been inevitable.  The founders of the Republic
envisaged no such economic and other expansion as the nation has exper-
ienced.  Looking back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted
the popular urge for uniform standards throughout the country—for what
in effect was a unified economy.518
“That last, passively constructed sentence,” Mr. Solomon maintains,
“explained his U-turn.  Two factors had moved him in 1937.  One was real-
ity—what in effect was a unified economy.  The other was democracy— the popu-
lar urge, the people’s will.  He said not a word about the law.”519  Roberts
“had begun his tenure on the bench trying to hew to the particulars of the
law, but he learned to rely on his own evolving judgment of the realities of
American life and of the citizenry’s needs.”520
Mr. Solomon notes that “Roberts’s explanation for his actions did not
end there.  He acknowledged that relying on the commerce clause, say, or
the general welfare clause ‘to reach a result never contemplated when the
Constitution was adopted, was a subterfuge.’”521  But Roberts
had accepted such a sophistry to avert a deeper danger to the American
system of government.  “An insistence by the Court on holding federal
power to what seemed its appropriate orbit when the Constitution was
adopted,” he said, “might have resulted in even more radical changes in our
513 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 164–68. R
514 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 216. R
515 See supra notes 217–21 and accompanying text. R
516 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 272–73. R
517 Id. at 216.
518 Id. at 217 (internal quotation marks omitted).
519 Id.
520 Id. at 272.
521 Id. at 217.
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dual structure than those which have been gradually accomplished through
the extension of the limited jurisdiction conferred on the federal
government.”522
Roberts “had switched sides, that is, to save the American system of fed-
eralism, to prevent the central government from assuming full power, as in
Europe.  By giving a little, he could avert something worse.”523  His goal was
“to assure a working democracy, safe from the desperation of its people and
the ambitions of its leaders.  And, in fact, he had done just that.”524  He rec-
ognized that “[t]he truly conservative position was to bend with the times.”525
Thus, Roberts’s “indifference to principle was his strength.”526  Mr. Solomon
quotes with approval the assessment of McReynolds clerk John Knox, who
wrote in his memoir:
Owen J. Roberts was impartial after he became aware of the need for social
change . . . . Roberts literally saved the Supreme Court of the United States
from being wrecked by the more conservative justices.  His contribution,
therefore, was of immense significance, and his importance as a justice dur-
ing the 1930s can scarcely be exaggerated.527
Thus, in Mr. Solomon’s view, Roberts abandoned “law” in favor of “jus-
tice,” “property”528 in favor of “the people’s will,” and “principle” in favor of
“pragmatism”529 in order to avoid the specter of radical change and a
descent into fascism or worse.  But there are numerous difficulties with this
account.  First, in the passage of Roberts’s lecture from which Mr. Solomon
quotes, the former Justice does not purport to be explaining his own actions.
He was instead explaining a long series of doctrinal developments that had
begun in the nineteenth century and proceeded, as Roberts stated in the
passage quoted by Mr. Solomon, “continual[ly]” and “gradually.”  Second,
Roberts had not insisted “on holding federal power to what seemed its appro-
priate orbit when the Constitution was adopted.”530  He had recognized the
need for doctrinal development taking into account social change well
before 1936.531  Third, Roberts did not become completely deferential to the
political branches after 1936—he persisted in voting to invalidate or limit the





526 Id. at 272.
527 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
528 Id. at 217.
529 Id. at 272.
530 Id. at 217.
531 See supra text accompanying notes 510–11.
532 See Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679, 685–86 (1945) (Stone, C.J., & Roberts, J.,
dissenting from opinion holding company covered by FLSA); 10 E. 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v.
Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945) (Roberts, J., joining opinion holding company not covered by
FLSA); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945) (Roberts, J., joining opinion
holding company not covered by FLSA); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 529 (1944)
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solicitude for the rights of property in favor of unwavering support for legisla-
tion embodying popular urges.  Throughout the remainder of his career,
Roberts would continue to vote to invalidate federal and state regulations of
the economy on the grounds that they violated the Takings533 or Due Pro-
cess Clauses534 of the Fifth Amendment, or the Due Process,535 Equal Protec-
tion,536 or Privileges or Immunities537 Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Finally, the timing of what Mr. Solomon characterizes as Justice Rob-
erts’s change of mind might quite reasonably arouse the suspicion of those
inclined to more explicitly political explanations of the Court’s behavior.
What an interesting coincidence, one might observe, that Justice Roberts
awoke to the changing nature of the American economy and the need for a
living Constitution precisely at the time when President Roosevelt threatened
to pack the Court.  Mr. Solomon emphasizes that “Justice Roberts had
(Stone, C.J. & Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion rejecting non-delegation challenge to
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 448 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion rejecting non-delegation challenge to Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942); McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943) (Roberts, J., joining
opinion holding company not covered by FLSA); Overstreet v. N. Shore Corp., 318 U.S.
125, 133 (1943) (Roberts & Jackson, JJ., dissenting from opinion holding company covered
by FLSA); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 584 (1942) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting from opinion holding company covered by FLSA); A.B. Kirschbaum v. Walling,
316 U.S. 517, 527 (1942) (Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion holding company covered
by FLSA); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 93–95 (1942) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting from opinion holding company covered by FLSA); H.P. Hood & Sons v. United
States, 307 U.S. 588, 583 (1939) (Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion rejecting non-delega-
tion challenge to Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937).
533 See United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 511–15 (1945) (Stone,
C.J. & Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion holding that government action reducing the
flow of water available to an electrical power plant did not constitute a taking requiring
compensation under the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324
U.S. 386, 393 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment did not require compensation of riparian landowner whose property was reduced in
market value but not invaded by government dredging operation).
534 See United States v. Rock Royal Coop, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 583–87 (1939) (Hughes,
C.J. & Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion upholding against a due process challenge an
order issued by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act of 1937).
535 See R.R. Comm’n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 584–85 (1940)
(Hughes, C.J. & Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion holding that oil proration order of
Texas Railroad Commission did not deprive the company of its property without due pro-
cess); Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937) (Hughes, C.J., & Roberts,
J., joining opinion invalidating gas proration order of Texas Railroad Commission on the
ground that it deprived the company of its property without due process).
536 See Charleston Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 192–93 (1945)
(Roberts, J., dissenting from opinion upholding tax assessments against equal protection
challenge).
537 See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1940) (Roberts, J., dissenting from
opinion upholding state tax against equal protection and privileges or immunities
challenges).
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switched his vote on the minimum wage even before the president had
announced, or even settled on, his plan to expand the Court.”538  At the
same time, however, he concedes that
the justice’s subsequent changes of heart took place after the president had
launched his assault on the Court, after the constitutional stalemate had
jeopardized any solution to an economic crisis, [and] after the Chief Justice
had begun to fear for the future of his beloved institution and had surely
shared his worries with his friends.  Owen Roberts could well have kept such
things in mind.539
Mr. Solomon presents no evidence that the Chief Justice shared any such
worries with any of his friends, but he is convinced that the causes for Rob-
erts’s change, whatever they might have been, were external to the law itself.
C. Ross
Professor Ross’s analysis of the causes of the Court’s decisions in 1937
considers both internal and external factors, but does not clearly settle on
any one explanation.  He is ultimately inconclusive about the reasons for
Roberts’s change in the minimum wage cases.  He points out the difficulties
with the memorandum that Roberts produced at Frankfurter’s request in
1945, and concludes that, taken alone, the memo does not provide a satisfac-
tory explanation of Roberts’s behavior.540  At the same time, however, Profes-
sor Ross seriously entertains the possibility that Tipaldo might have been
decided differently had the Hughes Court been less formal and more com-
municative.  That scenario suggests that Roberts was, as many readers of his
Nebbia opinion believed, prepared to overrule Adkins in 1936, but that he did
not believe that the New York statute could be sustained without overruling
Adkins.  As the opinions in Tipaldo indicate, Hughes was prepared to uphold
the New York statute by distinguishing it from the statute invalidated in
Adkins, but he was not prepared to join an opinion overruling Adkins.
Because there was no majority for overruling Adkins, Roberts joined the
majority opinion following that precedent, just as Adkins dissenters Holmes,
Taft, and Sanford, and later Justice Stone had done in two cases striking
down state minimum wage laws in the 1920s.541  “Unwilling to tolerate the
inconsistency of upholding both the New York law and Adkins, Roberts was
willing to join the Four Horsemen in an opinion that was narrowly based on
the Adkins precedent.”542  But Hughes might have “persuaded Roberts to
vote to sustain the New York minimum wage statute if Hughes had under-
stood that Roberts’s objection was based upon his belief that the Court could
not uphold the New York statute without rejecting Adkins and if Hughes had
538 SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 256. R
539 Id. at 256–57.
540 ROSS, supra note 59, at 125–27. R
541 See Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927) (per curiam); Murphy v.
Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (per curiam).
542 ROSS, supra note 59, at 126 n.165. R
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been willing to overturn Adkins,” as he would the next year in West Coast
Hotel, “rather than distinguishing it.”543
In support of this hypothesis, Professor Ross reminds us that many of the
Hughes Court Justices, including the Chief, did not work in the new
Supreme Court building, but instead continued their practices of working
from their homes.  Perhaps, he suggests, “Hughes might have convinced
Roberts to vote to sustain the New York minimum wage law in Tipaldo if
Hughes and Roberts had spent more time in the Court building.”544  Profes-
sor Ross suggests that, in the case of Tipaldo, this lack of frequent interaction
may have been compounded by Hughes’s personal style as Chief.  “Hughes
might have had more success in influencing Roberts,” Professor Ross
observes,
if he had not disdained personal appeals to his brethren.  As Merlo J. Pusey
explained, Hughes did not “solicit support for his views outside the confer-
ence.  He had only contempt for the kind of chief who would take a judge
aside and say, ‘Can’t you see the tight spot we’re in; you’ve got to help us
out.’”545
Professor Ross suggests that “Hughes’s refusal to lobby his brethren may have
represented more of a defect of leadership than a virtue,” for his “failure to
communicate with Roberts in Tipaldo might have deprived him of an oppor-
tunity to convince Roberts to vote to sustain the constitutionality of the New
York minimum wage law.”546  This, Professor Ross concludes, “surely would
have spared the Court and the nation much anguish.”547
More generally, Professor Ross observes that “[t]he amenability of
Hughes and Roberts to economic regulatory legislation clearly had origins
independent of the political pressures of the New Deal era, for the Hughes
Court from its beginning was more deferential to such laws than the Taft
Court had been.”  This change was “clearly evident in numerous decisions
during the first five years of Hughes’s chief justiceship.”548  The Hughes
Court’s “infamous hostility toward regulatory legislation,” he points out,
“manifest[ed] itself only through a period of a year and a half during 1935
and 1936.”549  Hughes, who was “an old-fashioned progressive,” and Roberts,
who was “a patrician with liberal instincts,” were “generally inclined to favor
economic regulatory legislation and were not inherently hostile toward the
New Deal’s reformist spirit.  Like many progressives, however, they were
alarmed that the Roosevelt administration’s programs disrupted the delicate
balances of federalism and separation of powers.”550  “Even members [of]
the Court’s liberal bloc shared these concerns to one degree or another, for
543 Id. at 232 n.87.
544 Id. at 227–28.
545 Id. at 232 (quoting MERLO J. PUSEY, 2 CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 676 (1951)).
546 Id.
547 Id.
548 Id. at 244.
549 Id.
550 Id.
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Schechter Poultry and Radford were decided by unanimous votes, whereas only
Cardozo dissented in Panama Refining.”551  Professor Ross further maintains
that it
is likewise possible to attribute the Court’s invalidation of some New Deal
legislation, particularly the National Industrial Recovery Act, to hasty and
inept statutory drafting and poor presentation of arguments to the Court,
factors that in several decisions helped to convince even members of the
Supreme Court’s liberal bloc of the unconstitutionality of some New Deal
nostrums.552
Moreover, the “justices were hardly alone, for public opinion surveys indicate
that substantial numbers of Americans remained skeptical about economic
regulation even at the high water mark of the New Deal, despite the Demo-
cratic triumph in the 1936 presidential and congressional elections.”553  “It
therefore may make more sense,” Professor Ross concludes,
to attribute the triumph of the regulatory state to a “congressional revolu-
tion” rather than to a “judicial revolution” insofar as Congress during the so-
called Second New Deal crafted legislation that the Court was able to uphold
within the framework of existing doctrines, at least when the Court applied
such doctrines more expansively and consistently.554
“In contrast with the clear influence of such internal factors,” Professor
Ross notes, “the extent to which the constant specter of Court curbing influ-
enced the Hughes Court’s decisions is more problematical.”555  Yet despite
this recognition, Professor Ross maintains an equivocal posture toward the
causal efficacy of the Court-packing threat.  At some points, he suggests that
“growing public impatience with the Court and increasing demands for curbs
on its power”556 might have influenced the votes of Hughes and Roberts.
“Despite the absence of any ‘smoking gun,’” Professor Ross contends, “it is
not implausible to believe that the specter of Court curbing influenced at
least Roberts in some decisions.”557  Indeed, he maintains that “it is possible
that Roberts, and perhaps even Hughes, allowed the threat of Court packing
to influence at least one or some of their votes in 1937—Roberts’s vote in
[West Coast Hotel] is the most obvious possibility.”558
It has long been known that Roberts cast his vote in West Coast Hotel in
conference on December 19, 1936, more than six weeks before the Court-
packing plan was known to any but the closest advisors to the President.559
For this reason West Coast Hotel is generally regarded to be the least likely
551 Id.
552 Id. at 244–45.
553 Id. at 245.
554 Id. at 246.
555 Id.
556 Id. at 94.
557 Id. at 247.
558 Id. at 135.
559 See THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 311–12 (David J.
Danelski & Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973); PUSEY, supra note 545, at 757; Memorandum
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decision to have been influenced by the threat of the Court-packing plan.560
Indeed, Professor Ross recognizes that FDR avoided making the Court an
issue in the 1936 campaign.561  Yet he urges that “[d]espite Roosevelt’s dis-
creet silence about the Court during the election campaign, the Democratic
landslide . . . generated widespread expectations that Roosevelt would pro-
pose some type of measure to circumvent the judicial impasse.  Only the
form of the measure remained uncertain.”562  “[T]he November 1936 elec-
tion had made some type of Court-curbing legislation almost certain, even
though the form that it took generated widespread surprise.”563
It is difficult to discern the basis for this belief.  If something resembling
Roosevelt’s proposal was so transparently inevitable after the election, one
has to wonder why it came as such a shock to Democratic leaders on the Hill
and to other observers around the country.  (Indeed, it turns out that such
legislation was not inevitable, as neither the President’s proposal nor its
revised version secured congressional approval.)  Moreover, as Professor Ross
has discussed in his fine book, A Muted Fury, hundreds of similar proposals
had been introduced in Congress in the preceding two sessions564 without
producing any discernible effect on the Court’s performance.565
Perhaps for these reasons, Professor Ross ultimately backs away from the
Court-packing story and turns instead to an explanation grounded in a more
generalized public pressure for constitutional change.  “Although it is possi-
ble that Roberts, and perhaps even Hughes, allowed the threat of Court-pack-
ing to influence at least one or some of their votes in 1937,” he concludes, “it
is more likely that public antagonism toward the Court’s decisions influenced
these and perhaps other justices566 in a more subtle and less overtly political
manner.”567  Here Professor Ross follows some recent political science litera-
ture reflecting on the relationship between the judiciary and public opinion.
One such study finds that, “given the institutional constraints imposed on the
Court, the Justices cannot effectuate their own policy and institutional goals
from Owen J. Roberts to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 9, 1945), printed in Felix Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314–15 (1955).
560 See, e.g., 1 ALFRED KELLY, WINFRED HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 488 (7th ed. 1991); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932–1940, at 236 n.20 (1963).
561 ROSS, supra note 59, at 94–95. R
562 Id. at 96.
563 Id. at 126.
564 See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY 298 (1994); see also CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at R
12 (“The recent history of legislative attempts to control judicial behavior was not one from
which Roosevelt could draw much encouragement.”).
565 See CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 12; RONALD L. FEINMAN, TWILIGHT OF PROGRESSIVISM: R
THE WESTERN REPUBLICAN SENATORS AND THE NEW DEAL 121 (1981); LEUCHTENBURG, supra
note 1, at 94; MASON, supra note 1, at 426; William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin R
D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347, 373.
566 It is not clear what “other justices” might have been so influenced, nor from what
one might infer such influence.
567 ROSS, supra note 59, at 135 (footnote added).
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without taking account of the goals and likely actions of the members of the
other branches.”568  Another concludes that “public opinion can and does
influence the decisions of individual justices whether by stimulating changes
in judicial attitudes or by shaping their subjective norms.”569  Still another
suggests that the Court “particularly needs to be responsive to public opinion
because it relies ‘on political leaders for the implementation of its deci-
sions.’”570  The Supreme Court, Professor Ross concludes, “has an institu-
tional stake in remaining attentive to public opinion, particularly
congressional opinion, insofar as criticism of its decisions and movements to
curtail its powers ‘can diminish the public respect which is so critical to the
maintenance of its powers.’”571
These “strategic” or “attitudinal” analyses are formulated as general, uni-
versal, and trans-temporal propositions about “the way that judges behave.”
They do not purport to derive from a study of the Hughes Court Justices, and
yet Professor Ross suggests that we ascribe these characteristics to Hughes
and Roberts based on the apparent behavior of other Justices at other times.
This might be more persuasive had Professor Ross adduced evidence that
that any of the Justices of this particular Court were in fact influenced by
public opinion, or that there was any demonstrated risk that political leaders
would not implement the Court’s decisions, or that the Justices expressed
concern about this possibility.  But Professor Ross has offered no such
evidence.
Most importantly, Professor Ross has not demonstrated that the Hughes
Court was ever significantly out of line with public opinion, and therefore
needed to change course in order to ensure “public respect.”  Indeed, having
floated this possibility, Professor Ross again steps away from a full embrace of
it.  In the book’s concluding pages, Professor Ross remarks upon the “gen-
eral concurrence between the Court’s decisions and the popular will.”572
And indeed, as I have indicated above, the contemporary polling data bear
out the claim that there was such a general concurrence.  It is difficult to
understand how Hughes and Roberts might have been reacting to “public
antagonism” when by and large the public was not antagonistic toward the
Court.
The polling data similarly complicate another possibility entertained by
Professor Ross: “Because Hughes and Roberts . . .  so often teetered between
the Court’s competing factions, even a mere glance at the election returns
568 Id. (quoting Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker,
50 EMORY L.J. 583, 585 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
569 Id. (quoting William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal
Model, and Supreme Court Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169, 198
(1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
570 Id. (quoting Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political
Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 382 (1992)).
571 ROSS, supra note 59, at 135 (quoting William G. Ross, The Resilience of Marbury v. R
Madison: Why Judicial Review Has Survived So Many Attacks, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 769
(2003)).
572 Id. at 248.
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might have sufficed to tilt them over to the proregulatory side.”573  Let us
unpack the difficulties with this hypothesis.  First, as indicated above, Hughes
and Roberts continued to cast votes on the “anti-regulatory side” in 1937 and
thereafter.  Each of them voted to invalidate a Texas oil proration regulation
on February 1.574  Indeed, the unanimity of that opinion suggests that the
election returns were not sufficient even to tilt Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo
over to the “pro-regulatory side.”  That same day Roberts delivered an opin-
ion striking down certain fees imposed on railroads by the Washington State
Department of Public Works;575 on May 24, Hughes voted to invalidate a
Georgia statute regulating insurance companies;576 and both of these Justices
continued after 1937 to invalidate various state and federal programs of eco-
nomic regulation.  In none of these instances were the Justices “tilted over”
to “the pro-regulatory side.”
Second, if one is to posit the election returns as an influence on the
judicial behavior of Hughes and Roberts, then one needs to account for their
reactions to the results of other elections as well.  The Democrats won a stun-
ning victory in the off-year elections of 1934, picking up thirteen seats in the
House and nine in the Senate.  The results gave the Democrats a
supermajority in both houses of Congress.  Veteran New York Times reporter
Arthur Krock wrote that the New Deal had won “the most overwhelming vic-
tory in the history of American politics.”577  William Allen White read the
election results to mean that the President had “been all but crowned by the
people.”578  William Randolph Hearst remarked that there had been “no
such popular endorsement since the days of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew
Jackson.”579  William Swindler concluded that the Congress elected in 1934
was “unmistakably returned by the voters to continue the program Roosevelt
had inaugurated.”580  And how did Hughes and Roberts respond to this over-
whelming electoral triumph?  By invalidating the administration’s Hot Oil
program in Panama Refining, the NIRA in Schechter, the Frazier-Lemke Farm
Debt Relief Act in Radford, the AAA in Butler, the Guffey Coal Act in Carter
Coal, and, in the case of Roberts, the New York minimum wage statute in
Tipaldo.  These decisions similarly raise difficulties for the contention that
Hughes and Roberts appreciated the need to remain “attentive” to “congres-
sional opinion.”581
Now consider the responses of Hughes and Roberts to the results of the
1938 election.  In late 1937 and 1938, as the nation’s economy fell again into
recession, Roosevelt’s personal popularity continued to slip.  The President
573 Id. at 247.
574 Thompson v. Consol. Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
575 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154 (1937).
576 Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937).
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was facing resistance to his program in an increasingly recalcitrant Congress,
and he accordingly waged a campaign against anti–New Deal Senators and
Congressmen in the Democratic primaries.582  This campaign was largely
unsuccessful, and the failure of this attempted purge was exacerbated by the
outcome of the fall elections.  The Republicans picked up eighty-one seats in
the House, eight seats in the Senate, and eight governorships.583  Newspaper
columnists wrote that the electorate had lost confidence in Roosevelt and the
New Deal, and that the President could not be elected to a third term even if
he wanted to.  The new Congress proceeded to “dismantle the New Deal” by
cutting taxes, slashing relief appropriations, and killing Roosevelt appoint-
ments.584  And how did Hughes and Roberts respond to this electoral set-
back for the Democrats?  By voting to uphold the Tobacco Inspection Act585
in Currin v. Wallace,586 the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938587 in Mulford
v. Smith,588 the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937589 in Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins,590 and to extend the reach of the National Labor Relations Act in
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB591 and NLRB v. Fainblatt.592  At the same
time, of course, they continued to cast votes against state and federal regula-
tory legislation in other cases.  With respect to Hughes and Roberts, there is
simply no clear pattern of judicial response to electoral outcomes.593
Third, it is not clear what Hughes and Roberts might have gleaned from
their glance at the election results that would have been relevant to the reso-
lution of the cases handed down in the spring of 1937.  In 1936 the Republi-
can Party had nominated Progressive Governor Alf Landon of Kansas, who
supported much of the New Deal and criticized it principally for “its adminis-
trative inefficiency and its fiscal deficits.”594  In the national radio broadcast
inaugurating his campaign in January of 1936, Landon proclaimed himself a
“constitutional liberal.”595  At the same time, Roosevelt refused to make the
Court or the Constitution a campaign issue.  Instead, his platform pledged
the administration to tackle the nation’s economic problems “‘through legis-
lation within the Constitution,’” or, if that could not be accomplished,
582 Id. at 30–31.
583 Id. at 31.
584 Id. at 30–31.
585 Pub. L. No. 74-314, 49 Stat. 731 (1935).
586 306 U.S. 1, 19 (1939).
587 Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31.
588 307 U.S. 38, 51 (1939).
589 Pub. L. No. 75-48, 50 Stat. 72.
590 310 U.S. 381, 404 (1940).
591 305 U.S. 197, 239 (1938).
592 306 U.S. 601, 609 (1939).
593 Nor, obviously, do these electoral outcomes appear to have affected the Four Horse-
men, whose judicial behavior likewise fails to follow any clear pattern of response.
594 CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 27. R
595 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 71 30-MAY-14 13:52
2014] the  jurisprudence  of  the  hughes  court 1999
through a “‘clarifying amendment.’”596  Though Landon occasionally
remarked that that the Court had held unconstitutional several New Deal
measures, he did not associate himself with the positions that the Court had
taken in these cases.  Instead, he ran on a platform that generally called for
national solutions to economic problems.597  The election was not framed as
a constitutional referendum.
On the specific issues that would come before the Court during the 1936
term, there was little difference between the candidates.  Both Landon and
the Republican platform endorsed minimum wages for women and chil-
dren.598  The election results could provide the Justices with no additional
information concerning popular attitudes toward the minimum wage,
because it was already abundantly clear that both parties and both candidates
supported it.  As for the Wagner Act, Roosevelt initially had opposed it and
spoke in its support only after it had passed the Senate by a lopsided margin
and its passage in the House was assured.  The Republican platform, mean-
while, pledged the Party “ ‘to protect the right of labor to organize and bar-
gain collectively through representatives of its own choosing without
interference from any source.’”599  Similarly, Landon’s acceptance speech
promised both full protection for the right of labor to organize and govern-
ment mediation of disputes between management and labor.  Landon con-
tinued to adhere to those positions throughout the campaign.  As with the
minimum wage, it is not clear how consulting the election returns would
have helped inform the Justices whether there was popular support for
national collective bargaining legislation.  Again, both parties favored it.600
The case of Social Security is more complicated.  As Governor, Landon
supported the unemployment compensation features of the Social Security
Act and resisted Virginia Democratic Senator Harry Byrd’s efforts to enlist his
opposition to the statute.601  At the Republican National Convention Landon
promised to continue federal unemployment grants, and on the campaign
trail he repeated the Republican platform pledges to assist the needy, blind,
and disabled, and to promote child welfare.602  Landon favored old-age pen-
sions in principle, but he was critical of various features of the Act’s approach
to providing those stipends, and clearly contemplated at least a significant
revision of that portion of the statute.603  At the same time, however, three
times as many Republicans had voted for the Act as had opposed it, and the
Party’s platform declared that “[s]ociety has an obligation to promote the
security of the people, by affording some measure of protection against invol-
596 Id. at 12–14, 27 (quoting DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON & KIRK H. PORTER, NATIONAL
PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1972, at 362 (1973)).
597 Id. at 27.
598 Id.
599 Id. (quoting JOHNSON & PORTER, supra note 596, at 367).
600 Id. at 27–28.
601 Id. at 28.
602 Id.
603 Id.
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untary unemployment and dependency in old age.”604  The platform pro-
posed, and Landon defended, a federal-state cooperative system of old-age
pensions financed on a pay-as-you-go basis from the proceeds of a federal tax
widely distributed.605  The platform also called for state-level experimenta-
tion with various types of unemployment compensation programs.  This was
hardly an ideological crusade against a federal program of social security.606
As it turns out, however, the Social Security Cases are the decisions least
susceptible to an electoral explanation.  As Professor Ross correctly observes,
Van Devanter and Sutherland joined the majority in Helvering v. Davis; they
agreed with the bulk of the majority opinion in Steward Machine, objecting
only “on surprisingly narrow grounds” to easily correctable provisions of the
statute; and in Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.607 they and Butler
offered an advisory opinion that Wisconsin’s unemployment compensation
statute was a model of constitutionality.608  It does not seem plausible to
assert that they took these positions in the Social Security Cases because of the
1936 election or the Court bill, because they had flouted those pressures by
dissenting in West Coast Hotel and Jones & Laughlin.609  If those pressures
were not necessary to secure the approval of Van Devanter and Sutherland to
the Social Security Act, then why should we think that they were necessary to
secure the approval of Hughes and Roberts?
Indeed, as their voting patterns illustrate, attempts to account for the
behavior of Hughes and Roberts—and, indeed, of their colleagues on the
Court—with categories such as “pro-regulatory” or “anti-regulatory” simply
are not workable.  This sort of characterization of their jurisprudence is just
implausibly thin and provides almost no illumination.  Such categories do
not help to clarify what, on their terms, would appear to be significant irregu-
larities in the trajectory of judicial performance.  They do not help to explain
why, at a particular point in time, the government prevails in some cases and
not in others.  Such a model treats the Justices as the relevant moving parts,
shifting erratically back and forth between “pro-regulatory” and “anti-regula-
tory” “stances.”  We might say that Van Devanter and Sutherland were “anti-
regulatory” in opposing the minimum wage610 and farm price supports,611
but “pro-regulatory” in upholding the Social Security Act,612 the Railway
Labor Act,613 and the National Labor Relations Act.614  We might also
604 Id. at 29.
605 Id.
606 See id. at 28–29.
607 301 U.S. 495 (1937) (upholding Alabama’s unemployment compensation statute).
608 Id. at 527, 530 (Sutherland, Van Devanter, & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
609 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 76 (1937) (McReynolds, Van
Devanter, Sutherland, & Butler, JJ., dissenting); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 400 (1937) (Sutherland, Van Devanter, McReynolds, & Butler, JJ., dissenting).
610 See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
611 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
612 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
613 See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
614 Washington, Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
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observe that Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo were “pro-regulatory” in Butler
and Carter Coal, but “anti-regulatory” in Schechter and Radford.  All of that is
true, but it is also not very informative.  In order to develop a deeper under-
standing of the pattern of judicial behavior, we must recognize the need to
take into account as an independent variable the constitutionally relevant
differences among cases and statutes brought before the Court.
The use of analytic categories such as “pro-regulatory” and “anti-regula-
tory” tends to diminish, if it does not disregard, the importance of these dif-
ferences.  In doing so, it suggests that the only real question was whether the
Justices were “for regulation” or “against” it.  And it makes lawyerly efforts to
draft statutes designed to comply with the requirements of constitutional
doctrine, and to craft legal arguments couched in terms of such doctrine,
look like silly and irrelevant wastes of time and effort.  Professor Ross is far
too sophisticated to believe that this is the case, and yet in places his embrace
of such relatively unsophisticated terminology pushes his analysis in that
direction.
Having explored the unpersuasive electoral explanation for the Court’s
behavior, Professor Ross turns to another alternative.  “Because Supreme
Court justices are influenced by many of the same forces as other citizens,”
he writes, “it is not surprising that the tragedy of the Great Depression may
have affected the attitudes of Hughes Court justices in the same manner as
this catastrophe influenced the thinking of many other Americans.”615  The
difficulty with this explanation is that the tragedy of the Great Depression was
already longstanding and abundantly evident by 1935.  If that were the key to
understanding the behavior of the Justices, one has to wonder why they
didn’t acquiesce in the New Deal all along.  Is it plausible to think that
Hughes and Roberts recognized the need for mortgage moratorium relief in
1934 (Blaisdell), then failed to appreciate the need for farm debt relief in
1935 (Radford), but then awakened to that need in 1937 (Wright)?  Is it possi-
ble that they just didn’t get the Hot Oil problem six years into the Great
Depression in 1935 (Panama Refining), but did by 1939 (United States v. Pow-
ers)?616  That in 1936 they didn’t understand the need to aid farmers who
had been struggling for decades (Butler), but that they did three short years
later (Mulford)?  That Roberts didn’t see the need to regulate the price of
coal in 1936 (Carter Coal), but did in 1940 (Sunshine)?  And if Hughes and
Roberts did come to understand the compelling need for more state and
federal regulatory legislation, then one has to wonder why they continued to
vote to invalidate so much of it even after 1936.  It doesn’t appear that one
can easily explain the pattern of their judicial behavior by reference to the
tragedy of the Great Depression.
Perhaps in light of these difficulties, Professor Ross modifies this thesis
in an important way on the very next page:
615 ROSS, supra note 59, at 247. R
616 307 U.S. 214 (1939).
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Although it is possible that the Court’s greater receptivity to economic regu-
latory legislation reflected fears of at least Hughes and Roberts that the
Court would lose some of its power or legitimacy, it is perhaps more likely
that the ravages of the Great Depression helped to convince Hughes and
Roberts, like millions of their fellow Americans, that there was a compelling
need for more state and federal economic regulation and that it was possible
to remove existing constitutional impediments to such laws largely within the frame-
work of existing doctrines.617
It is not entirely clear what is meant by this suggestion, but it points us to an
important observation about the comparative constitutional fates of early and
later New Deal initiatives that Professor Ross makes just a few pages earlier.
In the wake of their losses before the Court in 1935 and 1936, Congress came
to recognize that most of what it wished to accomplish to address the tragedy
of the Great Depression could be accomplished within the framework of
existing doctrines, and crafted statutes accordingly.618
But there is more to the story, and Professor Ross goes on to explore
another extremely important factor in the New Deal constitutional saga.
“Ultimately,” Professor Ross concludes, “New Deal legislation survived judi-
cial review not because of the threat of Court packing, but because death and
resignations produced numerous vacancies that Roosevelt was able to fill with
Justices who did not disappoint him”;619 “not so much because Hughes and
Roberts became wholehearted converts to a theory of judicial restraint in eco-
nomic cases, but rather because the numerous justices appointed by
Roosevelt formed a permanent liberal majority.”620  “Although many justices
have disappointed the presidents who have appointed them, every justice
appointed by Roosevelt was deferential toward economic regulatory legisla-
tion and protective of personal liberties.  Roosevelt therefore won his con-
frontation with the Court through the appointment process even though his
Court-packing plan failed.”621
This is an essential point, and yet we must be careful to distinguish what
it can from what it cannot help to explain.  True, one cannot account for
revolutionary cases like Darby and Wickard v. Filburn622 without reference to
changes in personnel.  At the same time, however, there were other decisions
in the late 1930s and early in the 1940s, such as Sunshine Anthracite Coal, Mul-
ford, and Powers, where the government’s success before the Court was due
not to changes in personnel, but instead simply to careful statutory revision
producing measures that could withstand challenge under established doc-
trine.  Similarly, the Roosevelt appointments cannot explain the Court’s per-
formance in cases decided before there were any deaths or resignations.
They don’t explain the unanimous 1937 decisions in Wright v. Vinton Branch
617 ROSS, supra note 59, at 248 (emphasis added). R
618 Id. at 246.
619 Id. at 136.
620 Id. at 249.
621 Id. at 140.
622 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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of the Mountain Trust Bank, Virginian Railway, and Washington, Virginia, &
Maryland Coach.  They don’t explain the closely divided decisions in Chamber-
lin v. Andrews,623 West Coast Hotel, or the other Labor Board Cases.624  They do
not explain the outcomes and the divisions in Carmichael and the Social Secur-
ity Cases.  And they do not explain Nebbia, Blaisdell, the Gold Clause Cases, or
Ashwander.  The changes in personnel that help to explain some of these
closely divided cases are the resignation and death of Chief Justice Taft and
Justice Sanford, and President Hoover’s replacement of them with Hughes
and Roberts in 1930.  Nevertheless, one cannot adequately account for the
performance of the various Justices in these various decisions without discuss-
ing in some detail the salient legal differences among the various cases and
statutes in question.  Judicial personnel matters deeply, but as Professor Ross
recognizes, with respect to the Hughes Court, it is only a part of the story.
In the end, one leaves Professor Ross’s causal analysis with a sense of a
lack of historiographical coherence.  He has considered a variety of potential
causal factors, but has not configured them into an integrated explanation
that helps the reader to make sense of the Court’s pattern of behavior.  In
the conclusion, for example, Professor Ross calls attention to the following
causal variables: Hughes’s judicial statesmanship, the political and jurispru-
dential dispositions of Hughes and Roberts, internal legal factors, public
opinion, the 1936 election, the ravages of the Great Depression, Hughes’s
“keen political instincts” and “‘highly developed ear for the aspirations of the
American people,’”625 and Roosevelt’s judicial appointments.  It is not made
clear, however, how these factors were related to one another, what the rela-
tive importance of each of them might have been, and how those factors that
might appear to be in tension or in conflict with one another might have
been reconciled.  Professor Ross’s consideration has informed the reader’s
own evaluation of these questions, but ultimately we are left to speculate.
D. Parrish
Professor Parrish largely rejects the notion that external political events
played a significant role in determining the outcomes of cases decided by the
Court in 1937.  He is disinclined to attribute causal significance to the Court-
packing plan, which “had little chance of adoption from the beginning, a fact
not lost upon the chief justice and his colleagues.”626  Moreover, he points
out, Roberts “voted to uphold the Washington [minimum wage] law several
months prior to FDR’s announcement of his Court-packing plan.”627  “The
623 W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1936) (per curiam) (upholding
New York unemployment compensation statute by an equally divided vote, with Justice
Stone not participating).
624 NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); NLRB v. Frue-
hauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
625 ROSS, supra note 59, at 248–49. R
626 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 26. R
627 Id. at 103.
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‘court-packing’ measure, therefore, can be ruled out as a decisive variable” in
the minimum wage cases.628  “Nor,” in Professor Parrish’s view, “does the
1936 election appear to have been a critical turning point.”629  He notes that
“following large Democratic gains in 1934, the Court struck its heaviest blows
against the New Deal in 1935–1936, while in the wake of the 1938 congres-
sional returns that reduced FDR’s support in the House and Senate, the
Court continued to endorse the last reforms of the New Deal.”630  The Jus-
tices, Professor Parrish concludes, do not appear to have been influenced by
the election returns.
Instead, Professor Parrish is inclined to attribute much of the constitu-
tional change of the New Deal period to changes in Court personnel brought
about by presidential appointments.  He notes that in 1929 Chief Justice Taft
“feared for the future of the Court and the Constitution” because he dis-
trusted President Hoover as “ ‘a Progressive’” who, if given the opportunity to
appoint Justices to the Court, “ ‘would put in some rather extreme destroyers
of the Constitution.’”631  “Discounting Taft’s hyperbole,” Professor Parrish
maintains, “his prediction proved more than accurate about the new presi-
dent and his three appointments over the next three years—Hughes, Rob-
erts, and Cardozo.”632  Indeed, Professor Parrish insists that “Hoover’s three
appointments, far more than Roosevelt’s after 1937, changed fundamentally
the Court’s jurisprudence in the decade of depression.”633  And though he
discounts the likelihood that the election returns affected the votes of sitting
Justices, he recognizes that “the electoral victories of FDR and the Democrats
in 1936 and 1940 made possible the creation of a ‘Roosevelt Court’ that codi-
fied and extended the constitutional changes wrought earlier.”634  “The arri-
val of Roosevelt justices beginning in 1937 secured both the triumph of the
New Deal in the Hughes Court and of judicial restraint as its guiding ideolog-
ical orientation.”635
Professor Parrish rejects the contention that Justice Roberts voted to
uphold the minimum wage law in West Coast Hotel because Hughes cajoled
him into doing so.636  Like Professor Ross, he notes that “[p]ersonal rela-
tions among the justices on the Hughes Court impressed many observers as
628 Id. at 38.
629 Id.
630 Id. at 183.
631 Id. at 90.
632 Id.
633 Id. at 91.
634 Id. at 183.
635 Id. at 47.
636 For treatments advancing this hypothesis, see JAMES F. SIMON, FDR AND CHIEF JUS-
TICE HUGHES 300 (2012); William E. Leuchtenburg, Charles Evans Hughes: The Center Holds,
83 N.C. L. REV. 1187, 1198–1200 (2005); William E. Leuchtenburg, Comment on Laura Kal-
man’s Article, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1081, 1089–90 (2005).  For more doubtful assessments of
this claim, see PUSEY, supra note 545, at 675–76, 768; Barry Cushman, The Hughes-Roberts
Visit, 15 GREEN BAG 2D 125 (2012).
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very formal,”637 and that “[o]utside the formal conferences, the austere
Hughes eschewed ad hoc discussions with other members of the Court, a
posture of rigorous independence that forestalled politicking for votes.”638
Indeed, Professor Parrish suggests that this feature of the Hughes Court’s
culture “may account for the absence of serious dialogue between the austere
chief justice and his younger colleague,”639 “and may have contributed to
misunderstandings in critical situations such as the minimum wage case,
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, in 1936.”640  As Professor Parrish
explains, in Tipaldo,
lawyers representing New York, calculating the odds against them, attempted
to distinguish their statute from the federal law struck down in Adkins.  That
approach found favor with Hughes, who dissented in Tipaldo because it per-
mitted him to reaffirm support for a minimum wage law without overturning
the Adkins precedent, a course he often found unpalatable.641
At that time Hughes “may have hesitated to confront Sutherland and
overrule Adkins,”642 though Felix Frankfurter later maintained that Roberts
was prepared to uphold the New York statute and overrule Adkins if there
were five votes to do so.643  But Hughes insisted on upholding the New York
statute without overruling Adkins—something that Roberts did not believe
could be done—and so Roberts voted to affirm Adkins on the basis of stare
decisis.644  Yet “[f]ive months later in West Coast Hotel, Hughes did not hesi-
tate to inter Adkins.”  “What changed the chief justice’s mind?”645  Professor
Parrish regards it as “plausible” that Hughes, who was “[n]ever wedded to the
abstraction of freedom of contract,” “may have misunderstood Roberts’s will-
ingness to overrule Adkins” in Tipaldo, “but finally grasped the situation” in
West Coast Hotel.646  Had Hughes’s punctilious formality not precluded an
informal conversation with Roberts about their respective positions, Profes-
sor Parrish suggests, “fruitful collaboration and compromise” might have pre-
vented the Tipaldo debacle.647  Thus, “[i]f Roberts was the key to Hughes’s
vote or visa versa, the failure of the two justices to effectively communicate in
1936 may account for the outcome that led most contemporaries to assert
637 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 39. R
638 Id. at 93.
639 Id. at 39.
640 Id. at 93.
641 Id. at 94.
642 Id. at 104.
643 Frankfurter, supra note 559, at 314.
644 Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Paul Freund (October 18, 1953), microformed on
Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library, Part III, Reel 15 (Univ. Publ’ns Am.,
Inc.), quoted in Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 620,
633 n.78 (1994); see also CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 92–104 (discussing the basis of Rob- R
erts’s vote in Tipaldo).
645 PARRISH, supra note 149, at 104. R
646 Id.
647 Id.
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that in the minimum wage decisions there had been a ‘switch in time that
saved nine.’”648
Professor Parrish recognizes that this explanation rests on informed con-
jecture, and is therefore willing to entertain “other possibilities.”649  He sug-
gests that “[t]he storm of criticism against the Court that followed Tipaldo,
including a rebuke from former President Hoover” may have induced the
Chief Justice to overrule Adkins once “it became clear that four others were
prepared to cut the Gordian knot.”650  As for Roberts, Professor Parrish sug-
gests that he may simply have “changed his mind about minimum wage legis-
lation,” or he may have “remained confused and conflicted about the
issue.”651  The truth, he concludes, “may never be known.”652
As for the more general issue of the causes of the Court’s decisions in
the spring of 1937, Professor Parrish strikes a balanced, if similarly inconclu-
sive, pose.  He maintains that the dedication of “pre-Hughes era Courts to a
strict laissez-faire interpretation of the Constitution has often been grossly
exaggerated,” and that as a consequence “the major decisions of the Hughes
Court touching upon issues of government’s relationship to the economy
had deep, if usually contested, roots in the doctrinal past of the Fuller, White,
and Taft Courts.”653  Sophisticated New Deal lawyers “correctly perceived the
many doctrinal openings created for their programs during the earlier pro-
gressive years and attempted to drive their innovative laws through them.”654
But what these lawyers “saw as a wide tunnel, many of the justices on the
Hughes Court saw as only the eye of a needle that required careful jurispru-
dential threading.”655  Courts, Professor Parrish quite properly reminds us,
“remain different from other institutions in our governmental structure,
decisively so when it comes to the claims and constraints of the past.”656
At the same time, Professor Parrish insists that “even within the conserva-
tive constitutional tradition inherited from the Fuller-White-Taft years, room
had been made for choice, opportunity for affirming the powers of govern-
ment, as well as for denying those powers.”657  On the Hughes Court, “[a]
majority of the justices often opted for the doctrines that constrained rather
than emancipated government’s role in the economy.”658  Professor Parrish
does not undertake any sustained effort to determine the extent to which the
Justices actually experienced the doctrine as presenting them with a range of
648 Id. at 38–39.
649 Id. at 104.
650 Id. at 94.
651 Id. at 104.  Professor Parrish also suggests that Roberts may have “felt the pressure
of Roosevelt’s reelection,” id. at 104, though this is curious in view of his earlier rejection
of the view that the 1936 election was “a critical turning point.” Id. at 38.
652 Id. at 104.
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respectable options in any given case.  But he concludes that the “more cau-
tious lawyering practiced by the New Dealers after 1933–1934” conspired
with a “series of external events between 1934 and 1937—rising Democratic
majorities in Congress, Roosevelt’s decisive reelection, mounting evidence of
real class warfare”—to tip “the constitutional balance toward emancipa-
tion.”659  “The world beyond the closed chambers of the Supreme Court,”
Professor Parrish maintains, “does make a difference in judicial behavior”—
though it is noteworthy that the evidence he offers in support of this claim is
an anecdote involving the later behavior of some Roosevelt appointees rather
than anything involving the Justices of the early Hughes Court.660
Even here, however, Professor Parrish recognizes that questions of tim-
ing and comparative causal significance linger.  For example, he asks, did the
“widespread disorders arising from the sit-down strikes weigh upon the jus-
tices who decided Jones & Laughlin in 1937?  No doubt yes, but how decisive
were those events when assessed against the inherited Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, the particular facts of the NLRB cases, and the arguments
advanced by government attorneys?”661  “Did the real constitutional switch
take place in 1934 with Nebbia?”662  Or did it “come later in 1937 with [West
Coast Hotel Co. v.] Parrish and Jones & Laughlin?  Did Roberts and Hughes
trim their constitutional principles to fit new circumstances or did the New
Dealers trim theirs?”663  “That these issues will never be resolved to the satis-
faction of every scholar appears assured,” Professor Parrish concludes,
“because we have no historical method for reading the minds of individual
justices in 1934–1937.”664
E. McKenna
In her preface, Professor McKenna informs the reader that her study
“refutes earlier claims of a linkage between Roosevelt’s reelection victory in
1936, his judicial reorganization bill, and the ‘1937 constitutional revolu-
tion.’”665  She resists previous studies that “tried to establish a direct link”
between these events.666  She insists that “[t]he election of 1936 had no bear-
ing on the decisions reached by the justices in subsequent cases coming
before them for review,” pointing out that “[t]he midterm elections of 1934
were almost as one-sided as that in 1936, but after them the Court showed no
hesitation in invalidating New Deal legislation.  Contrary to Mr. Dooley’s
statement, the Supreme Court did not ‘follow the election returns.’”667
659 Id.
660 Id. at 178–79.
661 Id. at 179.
662 Id. at 178.
663 Id.
664 Id.
665 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at xx. R
666 Id. at xxiii.
667 Id. at xxii.  She also suggests that the 1936 election did not present a stark choice
between constitutional visions, noting that “Landon opened his campaign for the presi-
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Nor, she maintains, did the legal developments of 1937 result “from the
‘fear of God’ that Roosevelt’s court bill put in the hearts of the sitting jus-
tices.”668 West Coast Hotel was actually voted on in conference nearly two
months before Roosevelt unveiled his Court plan,669 and in his Autobiographi-
cal Notes, Chief Justice Hughes rejected as “utterly baseless” the contention
that he voted to uphold the Washington minimum wage statute and the
National Labor Relations Act for the purpose of defeating the President’s
proposal.670  Indeed, Professor McKenna believes that Roosevelt’s plan “had
no chance of passing,” because “[t]he original proposal could not command
a majority in the Senate” and “House leaders refused to take it up.”671  Thus,
she maintains, for the Justices “the outcome was never in doubt.”672  She
views it as “likely that the Supreme Court lineup in the post–March 1937
cases would have occurred as it did without FDR’s Court-packing chal-
lenge.”673  The notion “that the Court, led by an able chief justice, had
reversed itself on a number of important constitutional issues mainly out of
fear that Roosevelt would succeed in ramming his bill through Congress” is
thus in Professor McKenna’s view a “fiction” that was “created by the adminis-
tration, its supporters, and generations of liberal interpreters.”674
Thus, Professor McKenna devotes at least as much of her attention to
understanding why the Court struck down New Deal legislation in 1935 and
1936 as she does to explaining why the Court upheld challenged legislation
in 1937.  As she puts it, she sets out to explain “why FDR and the Court got so
out of joint.”675  She argues that “it would be virtually impossible to under-
stand the friction that developed” and “why the Court’s decision making took
the form it did” without “a firm grasp of the test cases,” “their fact patterns,”
“the legal theories that then prevailed,” and “their influence on the doctrinal
categories in the constitutional consciousness of the individual justices.”676
And she insists that “FDR and his key advisers were no innocent bystanders”
dency with a national radio broadcast in which he proclaimed himself a ‘constitutional
liberal.’” Id. at 224.
668 Id. at xxiii.
669 Id. at xxii, 536.
670 Id. at 437.
671 Id. at 562.
672 Id. at 536.  I would not put the point so strongly.  The evidence does not support
the claim that the outcome was never in doubt, nor that the Justices never doubted what
the outcome would be.  However, I do believe that the formidable political and parliamen-
tary obstacles the bill faced in the House and Senate gave the Justices “ample reason to be
confident that constitutional capitulation was not necessary to avert the Court-packing
threat.  Certainly they had reason to doubt that immediate, total, and unconditional sur-
render was required.” CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 25 (footnote omitted); see also Barry R
Cushman, Court-Packing and Compromise, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2013); Barry Cushman,
The Court-Packing Plan as Symptom, Casualty, and Cause of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2089 (2013).
673 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at xxii. R
674 Id. at 536.
675 Id. at xxi.
676 Id.
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in the constitutional crisis that developed.677  “By taking a blithe approach to
sloppy bill drafting and a peculiar kind of ‘wink and nod’ attitude toward the
Constitution,” she argues, “Roosevelt and his subordinates played a central
role in precipitating the crisis.”678  Thus, Professor McKenna attributes the
unhappy constitutional fate of much of the early New Deal to poor legal rep-
resentation from the Justice Department and deficient constitutional lawyer-
ing at the statutory drafting stage.
Roosevelt’s difficulties with the Department of Justice began even before
he took the oath of office.  It took him nearly a month to persuade Mon-
tana’s Senator Thomas Walsh to accept the nomination for the post of Attor-
ney General.  Unfortunately, Senator Walsh then died unexpectedly of a
heart attack just two days before the inauguration.679  Homer Cummings had
been campaigning for the post since shortly after the election, and Roosevelt
was ultimately persuaded to appoint him on a temporary basis until a suitable
permanent appointee could be found.  Cummings was a longtime party oper-
ative who enjoyed the support of a number of Senators and cabinet officials,
but others, like Montana’s Senator Burton Wheeler, did not believe that he
was up to the job.680  What started as a stopgap appointment of a few weeks
turned into six fateful years at the helm of the Department of Justice.681
Roosevelt faced similar difficulties in appointing a Solicitor General.  His
first choice for the office was Felix Frankfurter, about whom Cummings pub-
licly professed an enthusiasm that he did not actually harbor.  After thinking
it over and consulting with Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, however, Frank-
furter declined the position in a blunt communication that caused an
annoyed Roosevelt to denounce him privately as “an independent pig.”682
Professor McKenna reports that Frankfurter and Brandeis, who “were already
showing dissatisfaction with the administration of the Justice Department,”
wanted Roosevelt to appoint Dean Acheson, a former Brandeis clerk and a
partner with the Washington law firm of Covington & Burling, to the office
that Frankfurter had rejected.683  “Frankfurter forcefully argued his case with
Roosevelt, but when FDR approached Cummings the reaction was immedi-
ate, violent, and adverse.”684  Acheson reported in his memoirs that
he yearned to be solicitor general, but Cummings bore a personal grudge
against him because Acheson’s father, the Episcopal bishop of Cummings’s
Connecticut diocese in 1929, disapproved of his multiple marriages, frowned
on his divorce of his second wife, and denied the complicity of the church in
677 Id.
678 Id.
679 Id. at 3.
680 Mr. Shogan reports that Tommy Corcoran and Ben Cohen regarded Cummings
with “‘undisguised intellectual disdain.’” SHOGAN, supra note 87, at 74–75. R
681 See MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 2–11. R
682 Id. at 12–13.
683 Id. at 13.
684 Id.
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his marriage to Cecilia Waterbury, the daughter of a prominent Darien,
Connecticut, businessman.685
Cummings refused to accept Acheson, causing a frustrated Roosevelt to
throw up his hands and exclaim, “‘Well for God’s sake, get me
somebody.’”686
The “nonentity” ultimately selected for the post “was James Crawford
Biggs, a sixty-year-old North Carolina trial lawyer and judge who landed the
job because no other candidates were actively in the field.”687  “From the
outset,” Professor McKenna relates, “Biggs seemed bewildered by his new
responsibilities,” for which he was “unfit.”688  He “lost ten of the seventeen
cases tried in his first fifteen months in office.  He was amiable, kindly, hon-
est, and courtly, but just plain unqualified for the job.”689  One of the Justices
“referred to him as ‘Serjeant Buzfuz’ after a character in Charles Dickens’s
The Pickwick Papers.”690  On one occasion, Chief Justice Hughes rebuked
Biggs in open court: “ ‘Mr. Solicitor General, you have talked forty-five min-
utes already.  You had better take the next fifteen minutes telling us what you
want this court to do.’”691  Biggs was, “as Paul Freund put it, a jury lawyer”
who “was known for making rather emotional arguments” to the Court.692
He “had not had experience with federal law, including constitutional law,
nor was his strength in appellate advocacy.”693  Freund “thought the govern-
ment was not getting the kind of representation it needed; nor was the Court
getting the kind of help it needed.”694
The unfortunate Mr. Biggs was only the tip of the iceberg.  Jerome Frank
later reported that “ ‘most of the lawyers we encountered in the Department
of Justice were not very good in those days.’”695  Thomas Emerson similarly
remarked:
The Department of Justice was then at its lowest ebb of any time during the
New Deal period in terms of the capacity of its personnel.  Under Homer
Cummings, it was a patronage agency.  The lawyers, at least the ones we dealt
with, were very limited in their abilities, highly political in their back-
grounds, and hardly interested or capable of carrying on an effective
enforcement program . . . .696
“Complaints about Cummings’s staffing of the Justice Department with
second-rate political appointments,” reports Professor McKenna, “came from
685 Id.






692 Id. at 14 n.27.
693 Id.
694 Id.
695 Id. at 127.
696 Id. at 84.
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all quarters.  Formerly the department had been steeped in a tradition that
excluded appointment of party hacks.  But as a faithful party man, Cum-
mings was an easy target for Postmaster General Farley, who came close to
wrecking the department by loading it up with ‘deserving Democrats.’”697
One Washington observer remarked that “ ‘Mr. Cummings’ appointments
make sad reading . . . . [T]hey were wholly inadequate as individuals, and a
terrible crew to unload on a Department that was soon to be confronted with
some of the most complicated legal cases ever tried in the history of the gov-
ernment.’”698  Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes likewise complained
that the Justice Department “‘was simply loaded with political appointees,’”
and that “ ‘hardly anyone has any respect for the standing and ability of the
lawyers over there.’”699
In June of 1934, “the justices conveyed word to the president that Biggs
should be kept from arguing in their court if the administration wanted to
win any more cases before it.  Justice Brandeis complained to Frankfurter
that Biggs was giving a ‘bad impression.’”700  Thomas Emerson, who lived
with Justice Cardozo’s clerk, Ambrose Doskow, “heard constant reports from
him that members of the Supreme Court were extremely dissatisfied with the
government’s arguments in the cases.”701  Justice Stone wrote to Frankfurter
of his concerns about the performance of the Solicitor General’s office, and
Frankfurter relayed those concerns to Roosevelt.702  And yet no action was
taken.  The “obviously incompetent” Biggs remained in office for two years,
“by the end of which much damage was done.”703  It was not until after a
long conversation with Roosevelt in December of 1934 that Frankfurter could
report that “ ‘[t]he President now thoroughly understands the weaknesses of
the [Justice] Department.’”704
The problems with the Justice Department did not stop with subpar oral
advocacy.  Wyoming Democratic Senator Joseph O’Mahoney thought that
Cummings was also “chiefly responsible for failing to give adequate attention
to the selection and cultivation of promising test cases and for failing to see
to it that the legal arguments offered in their defense were ably framed and
felicitously presented.”705  Similarly, in October of 1935 the editors of The
New Republic attributed much of the New Deal’s constitutional trouble to the
fact that
in the past it had been the business of government counsel to choose good
cases, get them before the courts without delays that implied a lack of confi-
dence, argue them properly, and, if the record permitted, make the
697 Id. at 15.
698 Id.
699 Id. at 15–16.
700 Id. at 15.
701 Id. at 84 n.23.
702 Id. at 15.
703 Id. at 16.
704 Id.
705 Id. at 25.
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Supreme Court realize that an adverse decision on constitutionality would
put an end to government activity approved by both houses of Congress, the
president, and the public.  Few if any of these requirements had been met in
the presentation of the recent New Deal cases, especially Schechter.706
Lastly, as Professor McKenna argues, the Department did not do enough
to ensure that the laws prepared by administration staffers were drafted to
weather constitutional challenges.  “Little was heard of the Constitution as
the vast New Deal juggernaut got under way,” she reports.707  “Doubts about
the constitutionality of New Deal programs were hesitantly expressed by a
few, including some of those involved in the legislative drafting process, but
most were confident that the crisis would be over before the Supreme Court
was given an opportunity to act.”708  Robert Jackson observed that “New Deal-
ers were inclined to ignore the problem of constitutionality.”709  As a conse-
quence, sophisticated government lawyers like Stanley Reed, Charles
Wyzanski, and Jerome Frank harbored “doubts” and “deep misgivings” about
the constitutionality of some New Deal programs.710
Professor McKenna and others lay much of the blame for this at the feet
of the Justice Department.  “As part of the executive branch,”711 she argues,
the Justice Department lawyers should have been prepared to take part in
drafting New Deal legislation, but they did not.  Cummings’s greatest failing
was his deliberate choice to exert little if any influence on White House staff-
ers and others in drafting laws, or in trying to prevent passage of hastily or
poorly drafted laws.712
Similarly, Senator O’Mahoney, “a strong New Deal Democrat,” believed that
“many of the problems of constitutionality arose simply because legislation
was so poorly drafted.  In his opinion, the Justice Department did not do its
homework.”713  For example, administration critics attributed the Panama
Refining decision “to the infirmities of the NIRA and its attempted delega-
tion, the result of hasty and sloppy draftsmanship.”714  Indeed, the President
himself “came close to admitting guilt on the charge of sloppy draftsmanship
when he characterized the decision as simply requiring that the New Deal
effect its policies with the ‘correct language’ and looked ahead to ‘a dozen or
one hundred other cases where the language isn’t correct yet.’”715  Even at
the time, however, criticism of such inattention to constitutional limitations
was growing.  In the wake of the Panama Refining decision the editors of the
New York Herald Tribune wrote, “ ‘In the skylarking days of 1933–34, the happy
706 Id. at 187.
707 Id. at 26.
708 Id. at 26–27.
709 Id. at 27.
710 Id. at 20–21.
711 Id. at 24.
712 Id.
713 Id. at 24–25.
714 Id. at 46.
715 Id.
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administrators of the New Deal brushed aside the Supreme Court as they
brushed aside Congress and the Constitution. . . . The President paid per-
functory lip service to the nation’s charter of liberty.’”716
Justice Department lawyers worried that that such criticism would inten-
sify after the Court ruled in favor of the government in Ashwander in early
1936.  That eight-to-one decision offered “proof” that the Justices were “not
totally unwilling to go along with the administration’s recovery efforts.”717
“The TVA ruling . . . did serious damage to the argument that everything
New Dealers were litigating would be declared invalid.”718 Ashwander’s signif-
icance “was captured by constitutional historian Carl Brent Swisher,” who
wrote that the decision “constituted ‘an embarrassment for the administra-
tion.’  It signaled that the Court had not set out maliciously to batter every
major feature of the New Deal program and that New Deal legislation might
be upheld if it could be brought within traditional lines of constitutional
interpretation.”719  Taking into consideration other regulatory victories the
Court handed down before the 1936 election or the introduction of the
Court-packing plan—decisions upholding the Railway Labor Act, the admin-
istration’s monetary policy, the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, and
commodity price regulation—Professor McKenna finds it difficult to contest
Swisher’s conclusion that “ ‘[i]n spite of the conviction of many administra-
tion leaders that the Court had set out deliberately to sabotage their pro-
gram, the line-up of decisions conveyed the suggestion that it was the
program and not the Court that was wrong.’”720  Indeed, a Justice Depart-
ment memorandum prepared in the wake of the decision observed that “ ‘the
public will again consider the Court fair to the Administration because of the
TVA case,’” and worried that “ ‘[t]he bad lawyer criticism is an active and
politically dangerous criticism which is being taken up even by the Adminis-
tration’s friends.’”721
Professor McKenna concludes this overview by noting that in March of
1937, Senator Burton Wheeler had
a long conversation with the Chief Justice.  Hughes mused openly on what
might have been the story of the New Deal’s legislation of the past few years
if, as he put it, “we had an Attorney General in whom the . . . Court had
confidence.”  “As it was,” Hughes continued, “the laws have been poorly
drafted, the briefs have been badly drawn and the arguments have been
poorly presented.  We’ve had to be not only the Court but we’ve had to do
the work that should have been done by the Attorney General.”722
716 Id. at 47.
717 Id. at 193.
718 Id.
719 Id. at 192.
720 Id. (quoting SWISHER, supra note 290, at 938). R
721 Id. at 196.
722 Id. at 24.
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Hughes was telling Wheeler “that the justices often could find no means of
upholding legislation that was so poorly drafted.”723
Professor McKenna illustrates these larger themes with a series of exam-
ples involving major New Deal programs.  She relates that the doubts that
some in the administration had about the NIRA’s constitutionality “were set
aside in favor of bold action.”724  The NIRA went into effect despite warnings
and objections from Wyzanski, Frankfurter, Brandeis, and others.  Jerome
Frank, the AAA’s general counsel, complained that National Recovery
Administration (NRA) legal counsel Donald Richberg “never gave an opin-
ion on anything.”725  According to Frank, “ ‘[t]hose NRA codes went through
without ever having any lawyer’” opine on their validity.726  “ ‘That was one
reason,’ Frank maintained, ‘for the debacle later.’”727
The NRA was unpopular even among friends of the New Deal.  It wasn’t
long before “[l]abor and industry were in open conflict,” “small businesses
were being done in by the giants,” and “the cumbersome, complex, confused
recovery machinery was creaking at the joints.”728  “For more than a year,
Brandeis repeatedly reminded Hugh Johnson that ‘frankly he was a’gin the
Experiment.’”729  Borah bluntly told him, “‘Hugh, your codes stink.’”730
Before the end of 1933, the NRA’s Compliance Division “was swamped with a
backlog of more than ten thousand complaints of code violations.”731  Yet
neither Johnson nor Richberg “had any enthusiasm for litigation as an
enforcement mechanism,”732 and
NRA and Justice Department lawyers evaded prosecuting violations and risk-
ing a constitutional test in the courts.  “One of the deepest weaknesses of the
administration in Washington, ever since the Agricultural Act and the Recov-
ery Act went into effect,” noted a liberal journal, “has arisen from its fears
that these laws, or parts of them, would be declared unconstitutional if
allowed to be tested in the courts.”733
Harold Ickes urged Johnson to take legal action seeking a favorable ruling
from the Court, but Richberg and his aides balked at the suggestion.734
As a result, “[l]ingering doubts about constitutionality hanging over the
NRA hampered enforcement.”735  Roosevelt appointed members to the first
National Labor Board (NLB) to adjudicate charges of noncompliance with
the statute’s labor provisions, “[b]ut when it came to enforcing decisions of
723 Id.
724 Id. at 82.
725 Id. at 81.
726 Id.
727 Id.
728 Id. at 82.
729 Id. at 81.
730 Id.
731 Id. at 82.
732 Id.
733 Id. at 82–83.
734 Id. at 83.
735 Id.
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the NLB, the Justice Department was slow to move.”736  A witness testifying
before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee called the statute “‘a fail-
ure and a flop,’” and four of the Committee’s Democrats concurred.737  It
had become clear “that the entire NRA might be toppled, either by Con-
gress’s allowing it to expire or through defeat in the courts.”738  NRA lawyer
Thomas Emerson “summed up the frustrations of his and other agencies
when he complained that Justice Department lawyers had done nothing
except lose cases.”739  Francis Biddle later reminded members of the Senate
Labor Committee “that in almost two years the Justice Department had
brought suit in only two cases of the two dozen in which he had sought litiga-
tion on section 7a.  ‘It is hardly necessary to labor the point,’” he remarked,
“‘that such delays as this amount to a complete nullification of the law.’”740
U.S. Attorneys prosecuting code violators felt abandoned when higher
officials refused to appeal adverse decisions.  One attorney announced pub-
licly that he would take no more NRA cases to a grand jury until the Supreme
Court ruled on the validity of the entire program.  “The sheer weight of cases
and pressures for a definitive decision on the act’s constitutionality was driv-
ing the program toward a Supreme Court challenge,”741 and “[a]fter a series
of reverses in district courts in Florida and Delaware, Cummings announced
that all decisions adverse to the NRA would be appealed to the Supreme
Court.”742
The leading candidate for such a test case was United States v. Belcher,
which challenged the NRA’s lumber code.743  That code set the maximum
workweek at forty hours and established a minimum wage of twenty-four
cents an hour.  William E. Belcher, who owned several sawmills in the soft
pine region of central Alabama, openly defied these provisions.744  He com-
plained to the code authorities that compliance would force him to lay off
somewhere between 300 and 500 workers.  In August of 1934 he was charged
with paying his employees seven cents an hour and working them for up to
forty-eight hours per week.745  The trial judge granted Belcher’s demurrer to
the indictment on the grounds that the NIRA unlawfully delegated legislative
power, that the lumber code was not authorized by Congress’s power to regu-
late interstate commerce, and that it denied to Belcher due process of law.
“Shortly thereafter, Belcher’s counsel and U.S. attorney Jim Smith, on receiv-
ing permission from his superiors, . . .  requested the dismissal of Belcher,
736 Id.
737 Id. at 84.
738 Id.
739 Id.
740 Id. at 85 (quoting IRONS, supra note 48, at 228, 324 n.6). R
741 Id.
742 Id. at 84.
743 Id. at 85.
744 Id.
745 Id. at 85–86.
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owing to the absence of a full trial court record and the need to revise provi-
sions of the lumber code.”746  That request was granted on April 4, 1935.747
The dismissal “came as a shock to Congress, the press, and the pub-
lic.”748  “NRA lawyers assigned to preparing the briefs and arguments were
described as ‘heartbroken.’ The New York Times scorned the move and the
‘unconvincing reasons’ announced for it.”749  The Times editors opined that
the dismissal “left the NRA ‘at sea’ and gave the impression that the govern-
ment feared a test case.”750  They charged that “[t]he Roosevelt administra-
tion is now in the indefensible position of urging Congress to extend with
slight modifications an act the constitutionality of which it is deliberately
refusing to test.”751  Similarly, The Washington Post reported that “the adminis-
tration was afraid to ‘face the music’ and contended that dismissing the case
was tacit acceptance of the lower court’s opinion that the NIRA and its lum-
ber code were unconstitutional.”752  The lumber code authorities “saw no
further point in trying to enforce the regulations, and within three days they
discharged most of their employees.”753
The dismissal of Belcher predictably “was followed by a new wave of code
violations.  Industrialists in every field argued that if the administration could
so easily sidestep a test of the codes’ constitutionality, there was no reason
why businesses large or small should be required to obey them.”754  The
NRA’s Compliance Division now had a “backlog of about eighteen thousand
cases of wages and hours violations and another four thousand cases of unfair
trade practices,” all of which awaited action.755  But the enforcement office
“made it known that unless there was a test of the law’s constitutionality, its
work would be futile.”756
Just days before the Belcher dismissal, the Second Circuit had upheld por-
tions of the conviction of the Schechter Brothers Poultry Corporation for
violation of provisions of the New York Live Poultry Code, while ruling
against the government on other issues.757  Richberg and Blackwell Smith
favored an expedited appeal to the Supreme Court.  Frankfurter and Tommy
Corcoran, by contrast, were “reluctant to use this case to test the NIRA and
favored delay.”758  The Frankfurter cohort “believed there would be no
chance of securing approval of the NIRA until it went back to Congress for
746 Id. at 86, 88.








755 Id. at 88–89.
756 Id. at 89.
757 Id. at 90–91.
758 Id. at 91.
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extensive revisions.”759  Frankfurter predicted “that an immediate court test
would prove disastrous.”760  Justice Department lawyers “were also unhappy
with Schechter as a test case.”761  The claim that federal regulation of Joe
Schechter’s modest kosher poultry operation was necessary for the health of
the national economy seemed to them “ridiculous.”762  The Live Poultry
Code’s detailed provisions regulating selection of chickens from coops “were
hardly calculated to electrify any court to the need for federal regula-
tions.”763  Moreover, sending Schechter and his brothers to prison “for viola-
tions of a system ignored by big business magnates was not a welcome
prospect and was bound to grate on humanitarian sensibilities.”764
On April 3, Richberg sent the vacationing President a radiogram argu-
ing that public opinion about the Belcher dismissal was “‘very unfavorable
throughout the U.S.,’” with the result that enforcement of the codes was
“‘generally impossible.’”765  He urged that “ ‘[p]rompt action will reverse
general retreat and strengthen entire situation. . . .  Otherwise, present dis-
couragement will probably destroy industrial program.’”766  Corcoran coun-
tered with his own radiogram, but to no avail.  Solicitor General Stanley Reed
reminded Roosevelt “how hard it would be in a case involving New York poul-
try dealers to show that their wages and hours affected interstate commerce,”
telling him, “‘[t]his is the most difficult type of labor provision to main-
tain.’”767  But he did not succeed in dissuading the President.  On April 4,
Cummings announced to the press that the government would appeal the
Schechter case to the Supreme Court, and the appeal was filed a week later.
On April 15 the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and oral argument was
set for May 2.  Smith and Richberg “had won their battle in spite of the formi-
dable opposition from Frankfurter, Corcoran, and Reed, but the tactical vic-
tory saddled them with what Smith described as ‘the weakest possible
case.’”768
Reed and Richberg had a difficult time at oral argument, particularly on
the issue of whether the Schechters’ activities had a sufficient effect on inter-
state commerce.  As Frankfurter and Corcoran had anticipated, the govern-
ment lost the case by the lopsided vote of nine to zero.769  Two years later,
veteran New York Times reporter Arthur Krock “expressed amazement that ‘as









767 Id. at 93.
768 Id. at 93–94 (quoting IRONS, supra note 48, at 85). R
769 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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legal reputation on the assumption that the government would win so narrow
a test.’”770
Professor McKenna reports that in the drafting of the AAA, “[a]s with
the NRA, the drafters framed legislation that rested on vague constitutional
theories and imprecise legal foundations.”771  “Less important pieces of New
Deal legislation were framed more carefully and rested on sounder constitu-
tional grounds . . . .”772  AAA legal counsel Jerome Frank “found many sec-
tions of the statute unintelligible.  He said Frederick Lee, Washington’s
legislative counsel for the Farm Bureau Federation, was just ‘a sloppy drafts-
man.’”773  Frank believed that provisions of the statute were “badly worded
and had been clumsily handled in the drafting stage.  When he questioned
any one of the sixty lawyers on his staff about sections of the AAA, he found
that ‘nobody could make head or tail of it.  It was just absurdly
incomprehensible.’”774
The bill’s drafters produced a plan similar to one that had been intro-
duced in Congress by agrarian Republicans the previous year.  Stanley Reed,
then general counsel to the Federal Farm Bureau, had regarded that bill as
unconstitutional.775  The AAA, argues Professor McKenna, gave the federal
government “unprecedented powers.”776  It was “as sweeping and constitu-
tionally unsound as the NRA.”777  The statute’s coverage “was not limited to
transactions in interstate commerce,” and it brought “every farmer-producer
under federal regulation.”778  The AAA thus was “constitutionally vulnerable
from the outset.”779  It showed “little concern either for constitutional limita-
tions or the authority of the states.”780  Professor McKenna notes that the
statute’s shortcomings “could be fatal flaws in the eyes of many members of
the federal judiciary, who shared few if any of the constitutional assumptions
of the bill’s framers.”781
The time for debate over the AAA was limited to less than six hours in
the House, but “constitutionalists in both houses found flaws in the mea-
sure’s largely unprecedented tax provisions.”782  For instance, Pennsylvania
Representative James Beck, the former Solicitor General, “delivered an
impassioned speech in which he argued that the Constitution never vested in
Congress any power over agriculture, a jurisdiction reserved to the states.”783
770 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 94. R
771 Id. at 119.
772 Id. at 121.
773 Id. at 124.
774 Id.
775 Id. at 120.
776 Id. at 124.
777 Id. at 121.
778 Id. at 123.
779 Id. at 121.
780 Id.
781 Id.
782 Id. at 121–22.
783 Id. at 122.
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Pennsylvania’s Republican Senator David A. Reed also “attacked the process-
ing tax provision, arguing that strong constitutional precedents firmly estab-
lished the rule that Congress cannot take from the pocket of A and put the
proceeds into the pocket of B.”784  Reed reminded his colleagues that the
Court had held in Loan Ass’n v. Topeka785 that “use of public funds to aid
private enterprise ‘is no less a robbery because it is done under the forms of
law and is called taxation.’”786  This, Professor McKenna points out, “was the
same point raised by Stanley Reed when the Domestic Allotment Plan was
first introduced in Congress in 1932.”787  Such critics regarded the AAA’s use
of the taxing power as “the weakest constitutional foundation for such broad-
based regulations.”788  Indeed, even Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace
told a fellow cabinet member “that he wished the Court would go ahead and
overturn the processing tax so that Congress would be forced to place the
AAA on more secure footing—perhaps by drawing its funding from general
tax revenues.”789
Senator Reed “ventured the guess that not half a dozen senators
believed the bill was constitutional.  But it was much easier, he said, for his
colleagues, faced with the clamor for farm relief and recovery, ‘to shrug their
shoulders and pass the responsibility on to the Supreme Court.’”790  Arguing
in support of the bill, Senator John Bankhead of Alabama “conceded that the
processing tax issue introduced a serious question, but predicted that ulti-
mately the Supreme Court would uphold the ‘broad and plenary’ powers
exercised by Congress.”791  “In the rush to complete action on the bill before
the end of the session,” Professor McKenna concludes, “few lawmakers gave
much thought to matters of constitutionality.”792
The Act was greeted with a flurry of litigation in the lower federal courts.
By September of 1935, more than a thousand challenges to the processing
tax had been filed, resulting in the granting of over 500 temporary injunc-
tions against its collection.  In only a mere twenty-one cases had a petition for
a temporary injunction been denied.793  The case in which the Court would
decide the constitutionality of the processing tax came out of Massachusetts.
United States v. Butler794 was a suit brought by the receivers of the bankrupt
Hoosac Mills cotton processing company.  The government had presented a
claim to the receivers of the bankrupt company for payment of processing
taxes on cotton.  The receivers resisted all attempts to collect the taxes on the
ground that they were intended to finance a program of agricultural regula-
784 Id. at 123.
785 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
786 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 123. R
787 Id.
788 Id. at 127.
789 SHESOL, supra note 2, at 176. R
790 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 124. R
791 Id.
792 Id. at 125.
793 Id. at 131 n.34.
794 297 U.S. 1 (1935).
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tion that lay beyond congressional power.795  “The federal district court in
Boston upheld the taxes as valid and ordered them paid,” but the First Cir-
cuit reversed.796  The Supreme Court heard oral argument in early Decem-
ber of 1935.797
Solicitor General Stanley Reed began the argument for the government,
but he “appeared tense and grew ashen during his presentation.  When the
chief justice, McReynolds, and Van Devanter let loose with a barrage of sting-
ing questions, Reed began to sway at the rostrum.”798  Tommy Corcoran later
recalled that Justice McReynolds “so viciously abused Reed that he became
physically ill and was compelled to interrupt his argument.”799  “‘I’m afraid
I’m going to have to ask the Court’s indulgence,’ he murmured as he sank
into a chair.”800  The Court’s Deputy Marshal “rushed over to administer
spirits of ammonia.”801  By contrast, “[a]n eloquent presentation was made
by George Wharton Pepper, the high-powered Philadelphia lawyer represent-
ing the cotton mills.”802
In a voice throbbing with emotion, he ended his peroration: “May it please
your Honors, I am standing here today to plead the cause of the America I
have loved, and I pray to Almighty God that not in my time may ‘the land of
the regimented’ be accepted as a worthy substitute for the ‘land of the
free.’”803
Professor McKenna reports that “[i]n conference, the chief justice at
first seemed to favor upholding the AAA, but five justices were unalterably
opposed to it and entertained not the slightest doubt about its unconstitu-
tionality.”804  She cites no source in support of this statement, and it is at
odds with what Justice Stone recorded in a contemporaneous memorandum.
In a document dated February 4, 1936, Stone reports that Butler
was argued on December 9th and 10th, 1935, and was brought up at confer-
ence by the Chief Justice the following Saturday.  In presenting the case he
recommended that the statute be overturned for improper delegation. . . .
After a painful elaboration of these ideas he concluded by saying that if we
were to come to the merits he thought that the A.A.A. was a regulation of
agriculture within the states and an invasion of the reserved power of the
states.805
795 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 131. R









805 Memorandum Re: No. 401, United States v. Butler (Feb. 4, 1936) (Harlan Fiske
Stone MSS, Box 62, on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress).
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Stone reports that none of the other Justices in the Butler majority were
prepared to rest the case on the ground of excessive delegation, but that the
Four Horsemen and Roberts agreed to rest it on the other ground suggested
by the Chief Justice.806  Professor McKenna claims (again without cited sup-
port) that Chief Justice Hughes took these positions only at a later confer-
ence,807 but Stone’s memo shows that the Chief Justice took them from the
outset.  Hughes did not change his vote in Butler.
Professor McKenna claims that the Butler ruling deprived the AAA of the
“financial means to maintain crop restrictions through farm subsidies.”808
“In effect,” she writes, “the decision crippled the AAA.”809  It is true that the
government was now powerless to collect the processing taxes from which the
acreage reduction payments were financed, but that did not prevent the gov-
ernment from continuing to make acreage reduction payments due under
existing contracts.  Such payments could be made out of general revenue,
and were thus immune from constitutional challenge under the taxpayer
standing doctrine of Frothingham v. Mellon.810
Thus, Professor McKenna relates that, at a private Washington dinner
party, Justice Stone told guests that “after Butler he thought it would be very
difficult for Congress to draft an alternative farm measure that would meet
the objections of the Court majority.”811  But she recognizes that “Stone
underestimated the tenacity of administration draftsmen.  Guided by Secre-
tary Wallace and other department officials, they set to work on a bill preserv-
ing as many features of the original farm bill as possible.”812  They quickly
designed “a new program permitting the government to pay farmers benefits
for reducing acreage in return for soil conservation.  Within a short time,
Wallace won approval for a new agricultural relief measure, the Soil Conser-
vation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, which levied no taxes” that
would provide an opening for a constitutional challenge.813
A similar dynamic would surface in the effort to address problems in the
coal industry.  Professor McKenna reports that Roosevelt “had nothing to do”
with the drafting of the Guffey Coal Act of 1935, and “refused to commit
himself” to the Act.814  It was only when leaders of the United Mine Workers
“threatened a nationwide strike if the Guffey bill did not pass” that FDR “half-
heartedly endorsed it.”815  He “doubted that, if passed, it could withstand a
constitutional test, but he put these doubts aside when faced with the threat
of a crippling strike.”816  Justice Department lawyers also “considered the
806 Id.
807 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 132–33. R
808 Id. at 139.
809 Id.
810 See ALFANGE, supra note 290, at 180–81. R
811 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 139. R
812 Id. at 140.
813 Id.
814 Id. at 198.
815 Id.
816 Id.
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Guffey Act unconstitutional, especially in the light of Schechter, and they told
Cummings as much.”817  Indeed, a Justice Department memo produced in
the spring of 1936 stated that “ ‘the Government can feel very certain of los-
ing the Guffey Act’” case.818  Cummings wrote in his diary that he thought
that the Act was “‘clearly unconstitutional.’”819  When a subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee asked Cummings to testify concerning
the bill’s constitutionality in the hearings on the bill in June of 1935, Cum-
mings tried to avoid an appearance.  As he wrote in his diary, he “‘could not
give them much comfort on the constitutional features of the Act.’”820  But
the subcommittee chairman insisted that he appear, and “[i]n view of the
precarious position of the bill, the president advised him to go before the
committee.”821  Cummings did appear, but he declined to offer an opinion
on the bill’s constitutionality.  Instead, he “divert[ed] attention to a line of
cases that could be regarded as favorable to the principles involved in the bill
and to another series that could be regarded as adverse.”822  When pressed,
Cummings stated that it would be “desirable . . . to approve the bill—to push
it through and leave the question of constitutionality to the courts.”823  Cum-
mings argued that “even if the bill could not meet the constitutional test,
there would likely be ‘further clarification’ by the Supreme Court of the
range within which legislation on topics of this kind might safely be
enacted.”824  He testified that “the purpose was not to pass an unconstitu-
tional bill, but to endeavor to ascertain the constitutional limits, if any, within
which the government might effectively act.”825
On July 4, two days before Cummings gave his testimony, the subcom-
mittee solicited the President’s view of the bill.  Roosevelt responded on the
date of Cummings’s appearance before the subcommittee with a letter to
Chairman Samuel B. Hill drafted by Cummings and Stanley Reed.  In the
letter, Roosevelt maintained that “fierce competition, overexpansion,
destructive price reductions, and labor strife” in the coal industry “were
directly affecting interstate commerce, even though the mining of coal, if
considered separate from its distribution, could be classified as an intrastate
activity.”826  The bill’s constitutionality “would depend on the final conclu-
sion as to whether production conditions directly affected . . . or obstructed
interstate commerce” in coal.827  The “most controversial”828 part of the let-
ter was its conclusion:
817 Id.
818 Id. at 195.
819 Id. at 198 n.53.
820 Id. at 198.
821 Id. at 199.
822 Id.
823 Id.
824 Id. at 199 n.54.
825 Id.
826 Id. at 199.
827 Id. at 199–200.
828 Id. at 200.
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Manifestly, no one is in a position to give assurance that the proposed act
will withstand constitutional tests for the simple fact is that you can get not
10 but 1,000 different legal opinions on the subject.  But the situation is so
urgent and the benefits of the legislation so evident that all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the bill, leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion, the
ultimate question of constitutionality.  A decision by the Supreme Court rel-
ative to this measure would be helpful as indicating with increasing clarity,
the constitutional limits within which this Government must operate. . . . I
hope your committee will not permit doubts as to constitutionality, however
reasonable, to block the suggested legislation.829
This last sentence, the only one drafted by the President himself, “created an
instantaneous furor.  FDR was condemned in the press and by members of
both parties in Congress.”830  Roosevelt was accused of “deliberately flouting
the Constitution and showing contempt for the Supreme Court.”831  The let-
ter, in short, “proved embarrassing” to the administration’s claims that it was
trying to solve the nation’s economic problems through constitutional
means.832
At the conclusion of the hearings on the Guffey coal bill, four of the
subcommittee’s seven members believed that the bill was unconstitutional.
The White House was able to persuade the subcommittee to report the mea-
sure to the full House Ways and Means Committee “‘without recommenda-
tion,’” but that was not the end of the struggle.833  In the full committee,
eight of the eighteen Democrats and six of the seven Republicans were
opposed to the bill.  After a series of secret meetings in which Democrats
sought to obtain sufficient votes to secure a favorable report, the leadership
finally succeeded.  In a meeting held on August 12, the full committee voted
the bill out favorably, “but only by the narrow margin of twelve to eleven,”
and this was made possible only “by the expedient of persuading two mem-
bers of the Democratic majority to withdraw their negative votes and merely
answer ‘Present.’”834
Professor McKenna notes that the report of the committee’s minority
“focused entirely on the bill’s unconstitutionality, arguing that stream of
commerce cases like Swift . . . offered no precedent for the Guffey bill.  In the
business of mining coal, interstate commerce had not even commenced.”835
The bill passed the Democrat-dominated House by a vote of 194 to 168.  In
the Senate, where the Democrats held sixty-nine of the ninety-six seats, the
bill passed by the narrow margin of 45 to 37.836  “Even with unrelenting
829 Id. (quoting a letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to Representative Samuel B.
Hill on July 6, 1935).
830 Id.
831 Id.
832 Id. at 201.
833 Id.
834 Id.
835 Id. at 201–02.
836 Id. at 202; see also id. at 202 n.62 (“In the Senate, twenty-four Democrats joined
twelve Republicans and one Farmer-Laborite in opposition to the bill.”).
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administration arm-twisting and open lobbying, substantial numbers of Dem-
ocrats” who had “lingering doubts” about the bill’s constitutionality voted
against passage.837  Congressman Bertrand Snell of New York said that this
was “‘the first time in the history of the country that the House passed a bill
opposed by the subcommittee which wrote it, by the full committee which
approved it, by the Rules Committee which brought it to the floor, and
toward which the entire House organization was entirely indifferent.’”838  In
light of the large majorities by which the Wagner Act was passed, Professor
McKenna observes that
it seems unlikely that the votes against the Guffey Act were motivated by any
general animosity toward federal regulation of labor relations.  Patently,
many members of Congress sincerely doubted the act’s constitutionality.
Their feelings were summed up by Senator Millard Tydings of Maryland,
who gave this ominous forecast of the bill’s future: “Like an autumn flower it
will be blown away by the first winter blast of the Court.”839
The labor provisions of the statute received a cool reception in the lower
federal courts, with district court judges “issuing wholesale injunctions”
against its enforcement.840  Under these circumstances, Solicitor General
Reed “pushed the Carter case up to the high bench.”841  The Court’s majority
invalidated the labor provisions and held that the price regulation provisions
were inseparable and therefore must fall with the labor provisions.842  But
administration lawyers noted that the four dissenters had maintained that the
price regulation provisions were separable and constitutional, and one of the
Justices in the majority, Justice Roberts, was the author of Nebbia.  They there-
fore concluded that a revised bill that dropped the labor provisions and sim-
ply regulated the price of coal could survive constitutional attack.843  Such a
statute was drafted and passed in 1937,844 and was upheld in 1940 over the
lone dissenting vote of Justice McReynolds.845
Thus, at a meeting between Roosevelt and Cummings “devoted to a post-
mortem on the invalidated Guffey Coal Act, Cummings assured him that the
substitute bill being drafted would likely be upheld by the Court in the light
of the split opinion in Carter.”846  Cummings “reminded the president that
each adverse decision (e.g., the AAA and Guffey Coal Act rulings) left the
door open to remedial legislation that was quickly drafted to meet the
Court’s objections.”847  In addition, the government “had been upheld in the
837 Id. at 202.
838 Id.
839 Id.
840 Id. at 204.
841 Id. (emphasis added).
842 Id. at 206.
843 Id. at 209.
844 Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-48, 50 Stat. 72.
845 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
846 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 225–26. R
847 Id. at 226.
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gold clause and TVA cases, and other New Deal measures had survived scru-
tiny.”848  Moreover, the use of the spending power “in measures establishing
the PWA and WPA had gone practically unchallenged.  Cummings was confi-
dent that better-drafted legislation could withstand the constitutional test,
even with the present Court.”849  As Professor McKenna puts it, “New Dealers
had been trying to conciliate the Court by drafting new statutes in conform-
ity with its strictures.”850
Professor McKenna believes that this strategy worked.  The Wagner Act,
for example, was “[c]arefully crafted to withstand scrutiny by the Supreme
Court,” and “established a substantial connection between the regulations it
imposed and interstate commerce.  Section I, outlining the policy behind the
law, was rewritten after Schechter to specify the burden placed on interstate
commerce by labor unrest.”851  A number of administration officials, includ-
ing Cummings, were doubtful that the Act could survive constitutional chal-
lenge in view of the Court’s decisions in Schechter and Carter Coal.852  In
retrospect, however, one can see that the more sanguine assessments of
NLRB attorneys such as Charles Fahy and Warren Madden, who were much
closer to the Wagner Act test cases, were considerably nearer to the mark.
The Wagner Act was drafted and the test cases selected, briefed, and argued
precisely so as to avoid the embarrassing fates of earlier New Deal
initiatives.853
Similarly, Professor McKenna explains that the Court’s decisions
upholding the Social Security Act were not surprising in light of the fact that
several lower federal courts had “refused to restrain by injunctions the collec-
tion of Social Security taxes.”854  Indeed, the challenge that first reached the
Supreme Court was filed by the Steward Machine Company, “one of two hun-
dred Alabama companies that had failed to obtain injunctions in the lower
courts restraining the government from collecting the levies.”855  Professor
McKenna observes that
[i]n its permissive, rather vague interpretation of the term “general welfare,”
Steward (and its companion case, Helvering) seemed to repudiate the Butler
ruling’s view that Congress, while exercising its power to tax for the general
welfare, is required by the Tenth Amendment to eschew regulation of mat-
ters historically controlled by the states.856
848 Id.
849 Id.
850 Id. at 193.
851 Id. at 424.
852 Id. at 425.
853 See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 48, at 227, 240–43 (“Witt and his colleagues were guided R
in their search by a ‘master plan’ which specified in detail the types of test cases best suited
for eventual submission to the Supreme Court.  This long-range plan took shape even
before the Wagner Act was signed . . . .”).
854 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 432–33. R
855 Id. at 433.
856 Id. at 434.
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But she then goes on to point out that the Butler majority “had in a general
way favored the expansive general view” of the spending power, and that “the
Social Security cases were much stronger ones for the government, or so they
appeared, not only to Hughes and Roberts, but to Van Devanter and Suther-
land as well,” who also “joined Cardozo’s majority in Helvering to uphold the
old-age benefits of the [Social Security Act].”857  Indeed, Van Devanter and
Sutherland “also explicitly agreed with most of Cardozo’s analysis in Steward
upholding the unemployment relief program,” dissenting only because they
objected to the requirement that state unemployment funds be deposited
with the federal government.858  Just as an overwhelming majority of Repub-
licans in Congress had voted in favor of the Social Security Act,859 so a
supermajority of the Justices believed that it was in its essential features a
constitutional exercise of congressional power.
With respect to the minimum wage cases, Professor McKenna points out
that in Tipaldo, “Henry Epstein, the state’s solicitor general, and Dean Ache-
son, arguing for the National Consumers’ League, tried to show that the state
law was distinguishable from the D.C. statute invalidated in 1923, but their
brief did not specifically ask the Court to overrule Adkins.”860  Justices Stone,
Brandeis, and Cardozo “considered Adkins bad law and wanted to overrule
it,” she relates, but Justice Roberts insisted “that the Court ought not to reach
out for issues that were not before it.”861  Roberts “found the New York law
indistinguishable from the one in Adkins,” and therefore refused to join
Hughes’s opinion adhering to Adkins while distinguishing the New York
law.862  Justice Butler’s majority opinion thus was “at first based narrowly” on
the lack of a constitutionally significant distinction between the statutes and
the failure of the New York Attorney General to request that Adkins be over-
ruled.863  But “the circulation of a biting dissent by Justice Stone so infuri-
ated” Butler “that he decided to broaden the opinion, moving from the
technical point to a bold defense of freedom of contract as enunciated in
Adkins.”864  Thus, on Professor McKenna’s view, Roberts’s vote to strike down
the minimum wage statute in Tipaldo was not an expression of his views on
the merits, but instead an instance of adherence to a precedent where its
authority had not been challenged directly, and where, due to the position of
the Chief Justice, there was no majority for overruling it.  She concludes of
Roberts that “there is good reason to believe that his vote in Parrish, though
not in Tipaldo, reflects [his] previously held substantive views.”865  Though
857 Id. at 435.
858 Id.
859 CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 29.  The Act passed the House by a vote of 372 to 33 and R
the Senate by a tally of 76 to 6. DEXTER PERKINS, THE NEW AGE OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT 33
(1957).
860 MCKENNA, supra note 48, at 211. R
861 Id. at 211–12.
862 Id. at 212.
863 Id.
864 Id.
865 Id. at 437.
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she recognizes that “[i]t may never be possible to explain with any degree of
exactitude why Roberts voted as he did in these cases,” she concurs in Profes-
sor Laurence Tribe’s judgment that Roberts “was influenced neither by pub-
lic reaction to the Supreme Court’s rulings of 1935–36 nor by the election
returns of November 1936, and certainly not by the court-packing threat of
February 1937.”866
CONCLUSION
More than a decade ago Professor Richard Friedman, himself a distin-
guished student of the Hughes Court,867 wrote, “[w]e should do away with
the oft-used term ‘constitutional revolution of 1937.’”868  Professor Friedman
argued that the Court’s decisions in 1937 “had significant antecedents that
long antedated the Court-packing plan,” and that there was “no persuasive
evidence” that those decisions “were caused by the politics surrounding
Roosevelt’s initiative.”869  As the popular accounts authored by Mr. Shogan
and Mr. Solomon demonstrate, we have not yet arrived at a point where it
can be said that everyone has heeded Professor Friedman’s admonition.  Par-
ticularly for journalists such as Mr. Shogan and Mr. Solomon, it is entirely
understandable that they would cleave to an account that understands the
behavior of the Justices in political terms, and sees their decisions as driven
by forces external to the law.  Long and successful careers in their chosen
profession no doubt have outfitted them with well-developed views about the
wellsprings of human behavior, and they might well be reluctant to devote
the time and effort that would be necessary to master the details and nuances
of the period’s constitutional doctrine.870
For many years most scholarly accounts of the period shared the presup-
positions one finds in such popular accounts.  The recent academic treat-
ments by Professors McKenna, Parrish, and Ross, however, each engage in a
considerably more sophisticated fashion with the internal, legal dimensions
of the story.  None of these three scholars ignores the political and social
context in which the Court operated, of course, and none of them maintains
that the Justices were hermetically insulated from broader social and cultural
866 Id. at 436.
867 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, A Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of the Roberts Memoran-
dum, or Felix the Non-Forger, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1985 (1994); Richard D. Friedman, Chief
Justice Hughes’ Letter on Court-Packing, 22 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 76 (1997); Richard D. Friedman,
Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transforma-
tion, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994).
868 Friedman, supra note 3, at 454.
869 Id.
870 See, e.g., Ranjit S. Dighe, Book Review, 9 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 383, 384 (2008) (“Sho-
gan . . . brings a journalist’s sensibility to this book, eschewing historical debates.”);
Michael E. Parrish, Book Review, 96 J. AM. HIST. 1229, 1230 (2010) (“Shogan does not
address the rich outpouring of scholarship on the Charles Evans Hughes court and the
New Deal generated over the past two decades that provides a far more nuanced view of
the constitutional confrontation between the justices and the New Deal in 1935–1936.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-5\NDL502.txt unknown Seq: 100 30-MAY-14 13:52
2028 notre dame law review [vol. 89:5
developments.  But each of them recognizes, to varying degrees, the necessity
of engaging seriously with the internal dimensions of the legal world if we are
to cultivate a richer understanding of the period.  By helping to raise the
level of legal sophistication with which academics analyze and evaluate the
jurisprudence of the Hughes Court, each of these scholars has performed a
valuable service.871
871 For laudatory reviews of Professor McKenna’s book, see, for example, Gary Dean
Best, Book Review, 90 J. AM. HIST. 1511, 1511 (2004) (“McKenna’s book, in short, is a
model for all who will hereafter write about FDR and the New Deal.”); Roy E. Brownell II,
Book Review, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 454, 456 (2003) (“Taken all in all, McKenna’s
thoroughness and her thoughtful reevaluation of the court-packing controversy should
ensure that Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Constitutional War will become one of, if not the,
standard texts in the field on this subject.”); Kermit L. Hall, A Nest of Furies, 86 JUDICATURE
263, 263 (2003) (“McKenna has devoted a lifetime of research and reflection to the sub-
ject, and the result is a superb contribution to the literature.”).
